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INTRODUCTION

Recently, the most significant changes in the law of products
liability in Minnesota have occurred with respect to defenses, contribution, and indemnity.' The law in these areas developed along
traditional lines until 1977 when a series of Minnesota Supreme
Court decisions radically altered the law. 2 The first decision rejected settled rules governing indemnity between parties in the
chain of distribution; the court favored contribution with responsibility allocated according to the percentages of negligence of the
parties. 3 In the second decision, the court determined that the
remedy of contribution would be available to a third party manufacturer against an injured plaintiffs employer. 4 The third opinion applied the comparative negligence statute to claims based
upon strict tort liability.5
Although this trilogy of decisions has left many questions unanswered, at least some of the future problems of interpretation will
be put to rest by the recently adopted comparative fault act. 6
Adoption of the act simplifies matters in some respects; however, it
also raises new and different problems of interpretation.
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the principles
governing loss allocation are a function of the date the cause of
action arises. Because of the position taken by the supreme court
on the retroactivity of its civil decisions, 7 the recent changes in the
law may have only prospective application. In addition, because
the comparative fault act applies to causes of action arising after
April 15, 1978,8 the possibility exists that there will be three groups
of legal principles from which to choose in attempting to resolve
1. Mt' Note, Contribution and Indmmlly--An examInation o/tht' Upht'alJalln M,nnt'sota Tort
Loss Allocation Conct'pts, 5 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 109 (1979).
2. Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977), nott'd in 5 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 517 (1979); Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn.
1977); Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 257 N.W.2d 679 (1977).
3. Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. 1977).
4. Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114,257 N.W.2d 679 (1977).
5. Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977).
6. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, §§ 6-8, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 839-41 (amending
MINN. STAT. § 604.01-.02 (1976».
7. For a recent analysis of the supreme court's position, see Note, Tht' Rt'troactluiljl 0/
M,nnt'Sota Suprt'mt' Court Pt'Tsonallnjury Dmsions, 6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 179 (1980).
8. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 11, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 842.
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questions relating to contribution, indemnity, and defenses. 9
This Article first analyzes the defenses to products liability
claims.1O The Article then discusses contribution and indemnity. I I
Building on these analyses, the next part suggests a method of loss
allocation for products liability cases. 12 Finally the comparative
fault act and its impact on the Minnesota Supreme Court's 1977
loss allocation decisions are examined. 13

II.

DEFENSES

The theory of recovery advanced by the plaintiff will be determinative of the available defenses. Different defenses, ranging
from contributory negligence to assumption of the risk and misuse,
may be applicable, depending on whether the plaintiffs claim is
based on negligence, strict liability, or breach of warranty. For
purposes of sorting out the applicable defenses in products liability
litigation, the defenses to each of these theories will be considered
in the next three sections.

A.

Negligence

Prior to the adoption of the comparative negligence statute in
Minnesota,14 contributory negligence and secondary assumption
of the risk were viewed as separate, complete defenses to a negli9. If the supreme court continues ·to adhere to the position it has recently taken on
the retroactivity of its civil decisions, sec Note, supra note 7, at 190-99, the recent decisions
concerning loss allocation would be given only prospective application. The new rules,
however, will again be changed by the comparative fault act. If, for example, the court's
decision in Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977) is applied only
prospectively, one set of defenses would apply to cases arising before the date of decision in
Busch, another set of defenses would apply after the effective date, and yet a third set of
defenses would apply to cases arising on or after April 15, 1978, the effective date of the
comparative fault act. S.... Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § II, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 842.
The same would be true with respect to the court's decision in Tolbert v. Gerber Indus.,
Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. 1977). For a discussion of Tolb..rt, see notes 262-321 inpa and
accompanying text. Because the comparative fault act should not change the basic rule
established in Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 257 N.W.2d 679 (1977),
the date of decision in Lambertson would be the only critical date. For a discussion of
Lamb..rtson, see notes 196-206, 225-37 inpa and accompanying text.
10. S.... notes 14-188 inpa and accompanying text.
11. Sa notes 189-321 inpa and accompanying text.
12. S.... notes 322-51 i'!fta and accompanying text.
13. Se.. notes 352-420 i'!fta and accompanying text. In addition, the Article discusses
and extensively analyzes a new statute enacted by the Legislature on the last day of the
1980 session. Set' notes 421-28 inpa and accompanying text.
14. Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 624, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069 (current version at MINN.
STAT. § 604.01 (1978)).
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gence action,15 whereas misuse was not considered as a defense independent from contributory negligence. 16 While the supreme
court acknowledged the overlap of the defenses of contributory
negligence and secondary assumption of the risk,17 the court consistently maintained that the defenses had two distinguishable elements: contributory negligence consisted of the failure to exercise
ordinary care for one's own safety; secondary assumption of the
risk necessitated a showing that the plaintiff had knowledge and
appreciation of the risk, a choice to avoid the risk or encounter it,
and that he voluntarily chose to encounter it. 18 The reasonable15. Seeo, eo.g., Knutson v. Arrigoni Bros., 275 Minn. 408, 413-14,147 N.W.2d 561, 56566 (1966).
16. Seoeo, eo.g., Johnson v. West Fargo Mfg. Co., 255 Minn. 19,22-23,95 N.W.2d 497,
500-01 (1959).
17. Su, eo.g., Parness v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 284 Minn. 381,385,170 N.W.2d
554,557 (1969); Knutson v. Arrigoni Bros., 275 Minn. 408, 412-13, 147 N.W.2d 561, 565
(1966); Zuber v. Northern Pac. Ry., 246 Minn. 157, 172, 74 N.W.2d 641, 652 (1956).
18. Su Knutson v. Arrigoni Bros., 275 Minn. 408, 413, 147 N.W.2d 561, 565-66
(1966).
To understand assumption of the risk, it is important to distinguish primary from
secondary assumption of the risk. In Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d
826 (1971), the court said that:
Primary assumption of risk, express or implied, relates to the initial issue of
whether a defendant was negligent at all-that is, whether the defendant had
any duty to protect the plaintiff from a risk of harm. It is not, therefore, an
affirmative defense. The limited duties owed licensees upon another's property, . . . or patrons of inherently dangerous sporting events, . . . are illustrative. The classes of cases involving an implied primary assumption of risk are
not many and, because this is not such a case, we have no occasion to determine
the method by which such issue should be presented to a jury.
Id. at 24, 192 N.W.2d at 827 (citations omitted).
In Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343 (Minn. 1979), a case involving the death
of firemen resulting from the explosion of a large liquid propane storage tank, the court
further elucidated the distinction:
The doctrine of primary assumption of the risk technically is not a defense,
but rather a legal theory which relieves a defendant of a duty which he might
otherwise owe to the plaintiff with respect to particular risks. . . . The doctrine
is sometimes confused with secondary assumption of the risk. Secondary assumption of the risk occurs when the plaintiff voluntarily encounters a known,
appreciated risk wlihoul an attendant manifestation by the plaintiff that he consents to relieve the defendant of his duty. . . . Primary assumption of the risk,
therefore, is a doctrine which defines the limits of the defendant's duty. Its application is dependent upon the plaintiff'S manifestation of consent, express or implied, to relieve the defendant of a duty. Its application is not dependent upon
the wisdom or reasonableness of the plaintiff's consent.
Id. at 351 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
The doctrine of primary assumption of the risk was applied to bar recovery against
Mailand, the owner of the apartment complex where the LP storage tank was located, for
the deaths of the firemen. It also applied to the plaintiffs' claims against the other defendants in the suit, even though the theories of recovery were negligence per se, strict liability
for an abnormally dangerous activity, and strict products liability. Seeo id.
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ness of the plaintiff's conduct did not enter into the contributory
negligence determination. 19 Either or both of these defenses could
apply, depending on the case. 20
The harshness of contributory negligence as a complete defense
was acknowledged in 1938 by the ¥innesota Supreme Court when
it suggested that a comparative negligence statute would provide a
more just approach. 21 While the impact of the defenses was at
times softened,22 it was not until 1969 that the Legislature enacted
a comparative negligence statute. 23
With the enactment of the statute, contributory negligence was
no longer a complete defense unless the plaintiff's negligence was
equal to or greater than the negligence of the person against whom
recovery was sought. 24 Although the court had a pre-statute opportunity to merge the defenses of contributory negligence and
secondary assumption of the risk,25 it preferred to wait for a case
arising under the comparative negligence statute. That opportunity came in Springrose D. Wtllmore,26 in which the court recast secondary assumption of the risk as an aspect of contributory
negligence: "[T]he only question for submission in the usual case,
we think, will be whether the particular plaintiff was, under the
circumstances, negligent in regard to his own safety, for under that
general issue counsel may fully argue that issue in all its respects."27 A separate instruction on secondary assumption of the
19. &~ Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 24, 192 N.W.2d 826, 827 (1971) (court
abandoned 4 MINNESOTA PRACTICE JIG II, 136 G-S (2d ed. 1974), which instructed that
"[a]ssumption of risk does not involve a failure to use reasonable care").
20. Su authorities cited note 17 supra.
21. &~ Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425,431-32,281 N.W. 261, 263
(1938).
22. The court has indicated a willingness to consider inexperience of a product user in
determining if contributory negligence exists. &I! Miller v. Macalester College, 262 Minn.
418,431, 115 N.W.2d 666, 674 (1962). The doctrine of last clear chance would also avoid
the defense of contributory negligence. Su Gardner v. Germain, 264 Minn. 61,64, 117
N.W.2d 759, 761 (1962). In special situations in which the defendant has breached a
statute designed to protect a specific class of individuals, contributory negligence will not
be a defense. &~ Zerby v. Warren, 297 Minn. 134, 140,210 N.W.2d 58, 62 (1973) (selling
glue to minors; case decided after enactment of comparative negligence statute, but court
held the statute had no impact).
23. Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 624, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069 (current version at MINN.
STAT. § 604.01 (1978)).
24. Id. § 1, 1969 Minn. Laws at 1069.
25. S~~ Parness v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 284 Minn. 381,386, 170 N.W.2d 554,
557-58 (1969) (cause of action arose prior to adoption of statute).
26. 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971).
27. Id. at 26, 192 N.W.2d at 828.
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risk should no longer be necessary. The only question should be
whether, based upon what the plaintiff knew or should have
known, he exercised reasonable care for his own safety.28
28. The general statement, however, has to be qualified. The court said that in "the
usual case" there would be no need to submit a separate question on assumption of the
risk. Leaving open this possibility means that it could be expected to arise as a potential
defense in the "unusual case." Furthermore, the Springros~ court stated that the standard
jury instruction governing assumption of risk would remain an appropriate instruction.
Id. at 24, 192 N.W.2d at 827. The instruction states:
Assumption of risk is voluntarily placing (oneself) (one's property) in a position to chance known hazards. To find that a person assumed the risk you must
find:
I. That he had knowledge of the risk.
2. That he appreciated the risk.
3. That he had a choice to avoid the risk or chance it and voluntarily chose
to chance it.
4 MINNESOTA PRACTICE JIG II, 135 S (2d ed. 1974).
The explanation offered in JIG indicates that when the defenses are to be submitted
separately, "the percentage of fault attributable to plaintiff's secondary assumption of risk
and the percentage of fault attributable to plaintiff's other negligence shall be added together and the total percentage compared with the percentage of fault attributable to the
defendant." Id., 135 G, at 107.
Just exactly how a jury could separate defenses that are indistinguishable is puzzling.
The reason for the hedge in Springros~ is unclear and it has continued to raise appealable
issues, with the court expressing an ambivalent attitude toward assumption of the risk as a
defense. Three decisions of the court illustrate the problem. In Lambertson v. Cincinnati
Corp., 312 Minn. 114,257 N.W.2d 679 (1977), a personal injury case arising out of injuries
sustained by the plaintiff when his arm was caught in a press brake that double cycled,
Cincinnati alleged error in the trial court's failure to submit assumption of the risk to the
jury. The supreme court found no error. The court first stated that assumption of the risk
would not have been submitted because the injury occurred after Springros~ was decided.
Second, the court noted its prior approval of the instruction on assumption of the risk,
finding that the elements of assumption of the risk had not been satisfied because of an
absence of evidence in the record indicating that the plaintiff voluntarily chose to encounter a known risk. The court indicated that without such evidence "a line of recent decisions of this court holds that submission of or a finding of assumption of risk is improper."
Id. at 119, 257 N.W.2d at 683.
The fact that the court indicated initially that assumption of the risk would not have
been submitted as a separate defense in any event, yet went on to indicate that the standard jury instruction would still be an appropriate definition of assumption of the risk, but
that the elements had not been met, is somewhat confusing. Perhaps the court was saying
only that assumption of the risk should not have been submitted as a separate defense, but
that even if it had, the elements would not have been met. If so, there is no problem with
the court's decision.
In Gaston v. Fazendin Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 434 (Minn. 1978), the plaintiff was
injured while installing telephone wires in a bedroom wall. The defendant alleged error in
the trial court's failure to give jury instructions on assumption of the risk. The supreme
court cited Springros~, holding that it was a proper application of the standard by the trial
court.
In Beckman v. V.J.M. Enterprises, Inc., 269 N.W.2d 37 (Minn. 1978), the plaintiff
was injured when he fell down some stairs in the defendant's supper club. The jury found
the plaintiff 68.4% negligent and the defendant 31.6% negligent. The trial court gave a
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Fitting misuse into the defenses of contributory negligence and
assumption of the risk should create no problem. Two of the potential applications of the misuse concept relate to the elements of
the plaintiff's case. If an unforeseeable misuse is made of a product, the manufacturer will owe no duty to make the product safe
for that use. 29 Misuse may also be important in determining if a
product is defective at the time it leaves the control of the manufacturer. 3o
As a defense matter, misuse has not been treated separately from
contributory negligence. The point is illustrated inJohnson lJ. West
Fargo Manufacturing, Inc. ,31 a wrongful death action that arose out
of the collapse ofa West go Auger Elevator, an auger-type portable
grain elevator, while the plaintiff's decedent was assisting in
changing a cable on the machine. The elevator collapsed because
stop hooks on the elevator were being improperly used to support
the elevator while the cable was being changed. 32 The foreseeability of the misuse related to the manufacturer's duty to anticipate
and guard against that use and it also related to the defense of
contributory negligence: "Whether the decedent in restringing the
cable should have in the exercise of ordinary care found some
other means of supporting the auger and tube and negligently assumed that the stop hooks would serve the purpose of support was
a question of fact for the jury."33 Even though the decedent may
have misused the product, the court evaluated his conduct in
terms of negligence, rather than treating misuse as a separate deseparate instruction on assumption of the risk. The plaintiff argued that by submitting an
instruction on contributory negligence and assumption of the risk his negligence was over·
emphasized. The plaintiff urged the court to eliminate assumption of the risk in all jury
instructions. The court did not respond to the argument, finding that the elements of
assumption of the risk had not been satisfied. The court reiterated its statement in Spring.
rose that JIG 135 remains an appropriate definition of assumption of the risk and that
assumption of the risk must be unreasonable.
Given the absence of any apparent justification for the retention of assumption of the
risk terminology, further confusion could readily be eliminated by scrapping the concept
as a separate defense.
29. See, e.g., Westerberg v. School Dist. No. 792,276 Minn. 1,7-8, 148 N.W.2d 312,
.316 (1967); Hofstedt v. International Harvester Co., 256 Minn. 453,460-61,98 N.W.2d
808, 813 (1959); Lovejoy v. Minneapolis-Moline Power Implement Co., 248 Minn. 319,
326, 79 N.W.2d 688, 693-94 (1956); Curwen v. Appleton Mfg. Co., 133 Minn. 28,32-33,
157 N.W. 899, 901 (1916) (opinion couched in terms of proximate cause).
30. See Hofstedt v. International Harvester Co., 256 Minn. 453, 98 N.W.2d 808
(1959) ..
31. 255 Minn. 19,95 N.w.2d 497 (1959).
32. Id. at 22-23, 95 N.W.2d at 500-01.
33. Id. at 24, 95 N.W.2d at 501.
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fense. 34 In the defense context, therefore, the issue is not whether
the plaintiff's use of the product can be labeled a misuse, but
whether the plaintiff's use of the product was negligent.
Thus, in post-Spnngrose negligence cases, the defenses of secondary assumption of risk, misuse, and contributory negligence can
be distilled to a single issue: did the plaintiff exercise reasonable
care for his own safety?
B.

Stnet Liabilt"lj'

At least as initially formulated, the defenses to strict tort claims
deviated significantly from negligence defenses. The reason for the
variance in treatment of defenses under the two theories is a function of the origins of strict tort liability. Superficially, the formulation of a new theory with broad social and economic justifications
seemed to warrant a different view of defenses, one consistent with
other strict tort theories rather than negligence law. 35 This development, coupled with an initial absence of a comparative fault
mechanism to allocate loss in such cases, justified separation of defenses that would not logically be separated under negligence
law. 36
The position taken in the comments to section 402A in the Restatement (Second) 0/ Torts 37 (Restatement) has influenced the formulation of defenses in most jurisdictions. 38 Under the Restatement
approach, contributory negligence in the sense of failure to discover a product defect or an unreasonable failure to guard against
its existence is not a defense. 39
.
On the other hand, the Restatement makes assumption of the risk
34. Id. at 22·24, 95 N.W.2d at 500-01.
35. Su, e.g., Epstein, Plaintiff's Conduct in /toducts Liabllzty Actions: Comparative Negligence, Automatic Division and Multiple Parties, 45]. AIR L. & COM. 87, 92-94 (1979); Prosser,

The Fall ofthe Citadd (Strzct Liabzlzty to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791,838-40 (1966).
36. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 734-36,575 P.2d 1162, 1167-68,
144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 385-86 (1978). The Da(y court rejected the concept of separation and
merged the concepts of strict liability and comparative fault, thereby removing the bar to
recovery in strict tort liability presented by negligent assumption of the risk. Id. at 738,
575 P.2d at 1169-70, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 387-88.
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965).
38. See, e.g., Hawkeye Security Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 199 N.W.2d 373, 380
(Iowa 1972); Brooks v. Dietz, 218 Kan. 698, 704-05, 545 P.2d 1 \04, 1110 (1976); Hawkins
Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546,566-67,209 N.W.2d 643, 655 (1973); Suter v.
San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., - N.]. - , -,406 A.2d 140, 149 (1979); Ernest W.
Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979); Morningstar v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., - W. Va. - , -,253 S.E.2d 666, 683-84 (1979).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965).

HeinOnline -- 6 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 251 1980

252

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6

a complete defense. 4o It requires a showing that the plaintiff voluntarily and unreasonably encountered a known danger. 41 It requires discovery of the defect, awareness of the danger, and
unreasonable use of the product in spite of that awareness. 42
Although not specifically mentioned as a defense in the Restatement ,43 misuse arose as a third potential defense in strict tort cases
in reaction to the restrictive position on defenses taken by the Restatement. 44 Judicial acceptance of the misuse defense has varied.
Some courts, adhering to the Restatement position on defenses, have
over generalized, refusing to consider anything other than assumption of the risk as a defense to a strict liability claim. 45 Other
courts have considered misuse to be a defense, but only in the sense
of negating a plaintiff's proof of defect or causation. 46 Still others
have accepted misuse as a defense, but without distinguishing it
from contributory negligence. 47
With the enactment of comparative fault statutes,48 the judicial
application o( comparative negligence statutes to strict tort
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. /d.
43. Comment g of the Restatement states that a seller will not be liable if the product is
delivered in a safe condition and "subsequent mishandling or other causes make it harmful by the time it is consumed." Id., Comment g. The Comment makes it clear that the
plaintiff bears the burden of proof of showing that the product was defective when it left
the hands of the seller.
Comment h states that a product is not in a defective condition if it is safe for normal
handling or consumption. Id., Comment h.
44. See Vargo, The Dijenses To Strict Liabzlity In Tort: A New Vocabulary With An Old
Meaning, 29 MERCER L. REV. 447, 457-59 (1978); Wade, Products Liabzlity and Plaintijf's
Fault-The Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 29 MERCER L. REV. 373, 384 (1978).
45. See Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., - N.). - , - , -,406 A.2d 140,
144-45, 147 (1979) (contributory negligence in strict liability may exist only when plaintiff
"voluntarily and unreasonably proceeded to encounter the known risk"); Ernest W. Hahn,
Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158 n.5 (Utah 1979).
46. See McDevitt v. Standard Oil Co., 391 F.2d 364, 369-70 (5th Cir. 1968) (applying
Texas law; misuse is a defense to strict liability action only when it constitutes a proximate
cause of the injury). In Hughes v. Magic Chef, Inc., 288 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1980), the
Iowa Supreme Court, reversing its earlier position that misuse is a defense, took the position that misuse relates only to the elements of the plaintiff's case. The reversal was based
on the court's recognition that misuse does not become an affirmative defense simply because the defendant offers proof on the misuse issue. Id. at 546.
47. See Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 343, 298 N.E.2d 622, 629, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461,
470-71 (1973); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1366 (Okla. 1974) (misuse constituted complete defense to motorist's action to recover on theory of strict liability
in action against manufacturer for injuries sustained when seat collapsed and plaintiff fell
backwards).
48. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
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claims,49 and the judicial development of comparative fault procedures,5o new pressures have been created to make strict tort defenses conform to the treatment of negligence defenses. 51 Even
with the availability of comparative fault mechanisms, however,
there is no clear uniformity in the treatment of strict tort defenses.
This lack of consistency in strict tort defenses is reflected in the
Minnesota cases.
Prior to the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Busch lJ.
Busch Construction, Inc.,52 in which the court applied the comparative negligence statute to claims based on strict liability, the status
of strict liability defenses in Minnesota was unclear, as the court
itself acknowledged. 53 The strongest indication was that the court
would follow the lead of the Restatement.
14, § 156 (1964); MINN. STAT. §§ 604.01-.02 (1978); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW §§ 1411-1413
(McKinney 1976).
49. St-.. Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 393-94 (Minn. 1977); Baccelleri
v. Hyster Co., - Or. - , - , 597 P.2d 351, 354-55 (1979); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443,
459-62, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63-64 (1967).
50. S.... , ...g., Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska
1976) (defense of comparative fault in products liability extends beyond cases involving
use with knowledge of defect to those cases when plaintiff misuses product and misuse is
proximate cause of injuries alleged), modifit'd, Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d
871,890 (Alaska 1979) (under Butaw, consumer who uses product as it was intended cannot be deemed to have misused product irrespective of knowledge of defect); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 731-43, 575 P.2d 1162, 1165-73, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380,
383-91 (1978); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978);
Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., - N.]. - , 406 A.2d 140 (1979); General
Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
51. In Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., - N.]. - , - , 406 A.2d 140, 149
(1979) (not reasonably fit for its intended or reasonably foreseeable purposes) and in General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351 (Tex. 1977), the courts held that
foreseeable misuse would not be a defense to a strict liability claim. Suter further held that
only contributory negligence would be a defense subject to apportionment and that even
contributory negligence would not be available in industrial accident settings. St-.. - N.J.
at - , 406 A.2d at 148.
In West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 90 (Fla. 1976), the court apparently
took the position that misuse and assumption of the risk would be defenses, but that contributory negligence in the sense of failure to discover a product defect would not be a
defense. A similar position was taken by the Alaska Supreme Court in Caterpillar Tractor
Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979), in which the court held that, "when the design
defect is the lack of a safety device, the jury may be instructed that the plaintiff may be
comparatively negligent in the knowing use of a defective product only if he voluntarily
and unreasonably encounters the known risk." 593 P.2d at 892. In other situations, the
court's decision in Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42
(Alaska 1976), modifit'd, Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979),
would control, with no distinction made between apportionable defenses.
52. 262 N.w.2d 377 (Minn. 1977).
53. St-.. id. at 393.
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The court leaned toward the Restatement approach in Magnuson lJ.
Rupp Manlffocturing, Inc. 54 In Magnuson, the plaintiff was injured in
a snowmobile accident when his leg struck a spark plug protruding
from the snowmobile engine. The plaintiff was an experienced
mechanic, had worked on his snowmobile, and was well aware of
the position of the spark plug. The evidence in the case did not
establish, however, that the plaintiff was aware of the specific risk
of injury arising from the defect. The supreme court reversed the
trial court's order for a new trial and reinstated a jury verdict adverse to plaintiff. 55 Although a clear treatment of defenses is difficult to glean from the majority opinion,56 Justice Rogosheske, in a
concurring opinion, concluded that the plaintiff should be barred
from recovery as a matter of law because he should have been
aware of the risk of injury.57 The elements of assumption of the
risk as defined by the Restatement 58 were present, except that defendant had not shown that plaintiff was aware of the risk of injury from the defect. 59 Thus, the defense, which is subjective in
the Restatement, was apparently made partially objective upon its
application in Minnesota. 60
Although Justice Rogosheske intimated in Magnuson that the Restatement position on contributory negligence and assumption of
the risk would be followed, no clear position was taken concerning
misuse as a defense;61 it remains an open question. However, the
Minnesota strict liability cases do illustrate the treatment of misuse
in two of its applications, both relating to the elements of the strict
liability case.
First, in Ke" lJ. Coming Glass Works, Inc.,62 a case involving an
exploding baking dish, recovery was denied because the plaintiff
was unable to establish that the flaw in the baking dish that led to
54. 285 Minn. 32, 171 N.W.2d 201 (1969).
55. Id. at 46,171 N.W.2d at 210.
56. In his concurring opinion, Justice Rogosheske said, "[w)hile I agree with the disposition reached, I fail to comprehend the basis thereof." Id. (Rogosheske, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 50,171 N.W.2d at 212 (Rogosheske,J., concurring).
58. See notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text.
59. See 285 Minn. at 50, 171 N.W.2d at 212 (Rogosheske, J., concurring).
60. See id. (Rogosheske, J., concurring).
61. Misuse was discussed in the majority opinion in connection with the elements of a
strict liability case. The court stated that the plaintiff had the burden of proving proper
use of the machine as part of his case, but, "being aware of the condition and voluntarily
doing what he did, he has not sustained this burden . . . . " Id. at 45, 171 N.W.2d at 209.
62. 284 Minn. 115, 169 N.W.2d 587 (1969).

HeinOnline -- 6 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 254 1980

1980)

THE ANATOMY OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY

255

the explosion existed at the time the product left the defendant's
control. Because the dish had been out of the defendant's control
from seven to forty-six months, the possibility of intervening misuse made it unlikely that the flaw existed at the time the dish left
the defendant's control. 63 In this context, it was necessary for the
plaintiff to negate intervening misuses in order to create the inference that the baking dish was defective at the time it left the control of the defendant. Failure to do so resulted in a judgment for
the defendant. 64
Second, to prove a defect it must be shown that the product in
question is dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
anticipated by the ordinary user or consumer or, to use the standard in Fa" lJ. Annstrong Rubber CO.,65 that the product is not safe
for the uses to which a manufacturer should reasonably anticipate
the product will be pUt. 66 If the manufacturer has no reason to
anticipate the use that is made of the product, it is not defective.
To illustrate, in Olson lJ. Village qf Babbit,67 a child was injured
while igniting an unexploded rocket from a Fourth of July fireworks display. Because the use made of the product was not a use
that the fireworks manufacturer was required to anticipate, the
product was determined not to be defective. 6B
Another question relating to strict tort defenses concerned the
applicability of Minnesota's comparative negligence act to strict
tort claims. A matter of speculation since the comparative negligence act was adopted in 1969, this question was answered by the
supreme court in Busch lJ. Busch Construction, Inc.,69 in which the
court took speCific positions on the defenses to strict tort claims,
the applicability of the comparative negligence statute to strict
tort claims, and the method of loss allocation in such cases.
Busch arose out of a single vehicle accident involving a vehicle
manufactured by defendant General Motors and driven by Lando
Busch, plaintiff and codefendant in the action. The accident was
caused in part by a plastic yoke of the turnsignal switch lodging in
the steering column of the vehicle and in part by the negligence of
Lando Busch in driving the vehicle. The jury found Busch to be
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 118-19, 169 N.W.2d at 589.
Id.
288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970).
Su ld. at 89-90, 179 N.W.2d at 69.
291 Minn. 105,189 N.w.2d 701 (1971).
Su ld. at 108-11, 189 N.W.2d at 704-05.
262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977), noti!d in 5 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 517 (1979).
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fifteen percent at fault and General Motors eighty-five percent at
fault. 70
Although Minnesota's comparative negligence statute did not
mention strict tort liability, the court avoided the problem by relying on the presumption that Minnesota's adoption in 1969 of a
comparative negligence statute patterned after Wisconsin's, included Wisconsin judicial constructions of that statute up to the
time of the Minnesota enactment. 71 Because Minnesota's adoption of comparative negligence followed the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's 1967 decision in Dippelv. Sdano,72 applying the Wisconsin
statute to strict liability claims, the presumption gave the Minnesota Supreme Court a ready basis for application of Minnesota's
statute to strict liability claims. 73
A brief but critical portion of the Busch opinion specifies the defenses applicable to strict liability claims and provides a rough indication of how loss will be allocated between a plaintiff and
defendant in the strict liability context.
1.

The Defenses Under Busch

To avoid eroding the policy of consumer protection underlying
the adoption of strict tort liability, the Busch court held that "a
consumer's negligent failure to inspect a product or to guard
against defects is not a defense and thus may not be compared
with a distributor's strict liability."74 This follows the position
taken by the Restatement, but only to the extent that negligent fail70. /d. at 393.

71. In a case involving multiple parties, Minnesota followed the lead of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in deciding that the plaintiff'S percentage of negligence should be compared to the percentage of negligence of the defendants individually, rather than in the
aggregate. See Marier v. Memorial Rescue Serv., Inc., 296 Minn. 242, 246, 207 N.W.2d
706, 709 (1973). The court in Olson v. Hartwig, 288 Minn. 375, 180 N.W.2d 870 (1970),
although not cited by the Maner court, also used Wisconsin law to construe Minnesota's
comparative negligence statute.
72. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
73. Although the Minnesota Supreme Court used the statutory presumption to justify
application of the comparative negligence statute to strict liability claims, the court stated
that, because no question of statutory construction was involved, it would not be bound
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court's approach to defenses to strict liability claims. In particular, the court emphasized that it did not adopt the Wisconsin approach indicating that
a strictly liable distributor could avoid liability by proving it was not negligent. 262
N.W.2d at 393 n.13. This refusal represents more of a disagreement with the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's peculiar rationalization of strict tort theory than a disagreement over the
application of other defenses.
74. Id. at 394.
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ure to discover a defect is removed from consideration as a defense. 75
The court then held that "[a]ll other types of consumer negligence, misuse, or assumption of risk must be compared with the
distributor's strict liability under the statute."76
a.

Contributory Negligence and Assumption

of the Risk

The Busch court's separation of these defenses for purposes of
specifying what types of plaintiff misconduct will be legitimate defense matters in strict liability cases does not mean that the defenses should receive separate definition for submission to the trier
of fact. Separation of the defenses to strict liability but not negligence claims would create unnecessary practicaP7 and theoretical
problems. 78 The Busch court did not specifically hold that the
merger of secondary assumption of the risk and contributory negligence in the negligence context, effected by Sprzngrose v. Willmore, 79
would carry over to strict liability cases. 80 In the subsequent case
of Armstrong v. Mazland,81 however, it was made clear that the court
intended such a result.
The litigation in Armstrong arose out of the deaths of three West
St. Paul firemen who were killed when an 11,000 gallon liquid propane tank exploded while they were attempting to extinguish a
fire that had spread to· the tank from a fuel truck filling the tank.
Suit was brought against multiple defendants, including the owner
75. Following a suggestion made in Note, A Reappraisal 0/ Contributory Fault in Strict
Products Liabzlllj! Law, 2 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 235, 251 (1976), the court stated:
[A]ny solution to this issue [of strict tort defenses] must be tailored to protect the
consumer's reliance on the product's safety. To insure protection of this interest,
we hold that a consumer's negligent failure to inspect a product or to guard
against defects is not a defense and thus may not be compared with a distributor's strict liability.
262 N.W.2d at 394.
76. 262 N.W.2d at 394 (footnote omitted).
77. In Busch a single theory of recovery, strict liability, was submitted to the jury. See
ld. at 384. If both negligence and strict liability theories are submitted, attempts to distinguish between defenses are likely to lead to confusion. For an attempt to explain how
both theories may be submitted without confusion, see Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
118 N.H. 802, 810-14, 395 A.2d 843, 848-50 (1978).
78. See Epstein, supra note 35, at 94, 108-09.
79. 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971).
80. In Busch the court cited Springrose, but only for the proposition that "[t]he use of
the term 'negligence' in the [comparative negligence] statute is not a bar to its application
in strict liability cases." 262 N.W.2d at 393 n.12.
81. 284 N.W.2d 343 (Minn. 1979) (in wrongful death action court held assumption of
risk a bar to strict liability action).
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of the property on which the tank was located, the seller and installer of the tank, the company responsible for the delivery of the
liquid propane at the time of the fire, and the companies responsible for an improperly installed meter and broken relief valve on
the delivery truck. The theories of recovery ranged from negligence and negligence per se to strict liability for an abnormally
dangerous activity and strict products liability.
The claims against all defendants were resolved on the basis of
primary assumption of the risk. 82 Because the firemen were familiar with the possibility of explosion in such a situation, and because they had received training in fighting such fires, the court
82. Id. at 350, 352-53. In Armstrong the court followed Springrose v. Willmore, 292
Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971), in distinguishing between primary and secondary assumption of the risk:
In Springrose ll. Willmore. . . this court held that primary assumption of the
risk remains an absolute bar to the plaintiffs recovery, whereas secondary assumption of the risk becomes a question of comparative negligence. Primary
assumption of the risk is not really an affirmative defense; rather, it indicates that
the defendant did not even owe the plaintiff any duty of care. . . . On the
other hand, secondary assumption of the risk is a type of contributory negligence
where the plaintiff voluntarily encounters a known and appreciated hazard created by the defendant without relieving the defendant of his duty of care with
respect to such hazard.
284 N.W.2d at 348-49.
The use of primary assumption of the risk to bar the plaintiffs recovery on a strict
liability claim may seem somewhat curious in light of the court's statement in Spnngrose
that the cases involving primary assumption of the risk would be few in number. 292
Minn. at 24, 192 N.W.2d at 827. In Sprlngrose, however, the court stated that cases involving owners' and occupiers' duties would be appropriate for use of the concept. See id.
The use of primary assumption of the risk terminology in the strict products liability
context should not by any means be taken as a general extension of the concept to all
products liability cases. First, Armstrong involved a unique issue: the duty owed to
firemen. The court's initial application of primary assumption of the risk was in the context of the obligation owed by owners and occupiers of land to firemen. The court held
that a property owner would not be liable except when "injury is caused by a hidden or
unanticipated risk attributable to the landowner's negligence and such negligence is the
proximate cause of the injury." 284 N.W.2d at 350. The court felt compelled to extend
this holding to the other defendants in the case, including those against whom strict products liability claims were made. In so doing, the court adopted the reasoning of a dissenting judge in an Illinois Supreme Court case, Court v. Grzelinski, 72 Ill. 2d 141, 152,379
N.E.2d 281, 286 (1978) (Ryan, J., dissenting):
The majority appears to be willing to apply the firemen's rule only in the
'limited context of landowner/occupier liability.' This implies that the majority
would not permit a fireman to recover for injuries he receives in extinguishing a
fire in my automobile which I caused by negligently pouring gasoline on the hot
manifold if the automobile is parked in my driveway, but that he would be permitted to recover if my automobile is parked in the street. This appears to me
not only to be extremely illogical but also to possibly present some constitutional
questions . . . .
. . . The majority opinion is in error. . . in equating assumption of risk as
used in the firemen's rule with the affirmative defense in negligence and products

HeinOnline -- 6 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 258 1980

1980]

THE ANA TOMY OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY

259

held that the landowner owed no duty to the firemen. 83 This holding was extended to the remaining defendants in the suit, even
though the theories of recovery asserted against those defendants
were based on negligence per se and strict liability.84 The court
said, however:
If the issue in this case concerned the applicability of secondary assumption of the risk to strict liability actions, we would
feel compelled to follow our decision in Sprz'ngrose lJ. Wzllmore
. . . and Busch lJ. Busch Cons!., Inc. . . . and hold that such conduct of the plaintiff should be treated as a type of contributory
negligence and compared with the defendant's fault under our
comparative fault statute . . . . 85
liability cases. Under the fireman's rule assumption of risk is not an affirmative
defense. It, instead, defines the duty that is owed to a fireman.

It is not important in the application of the fireman's rule to determine
what caused the particular danger which brought about the injury. Of critical
importance is whether the particular danger is one that the fireman would anticipate in the performance of his duties.
284 N.E.2d at 352 n.2.
Second, to the extent that a parallel is drawn between primary assumption of the risk
as it is discussed in Armstrong, and the duty issue in products liability cases in general, it
should be noted that establishing that a particular danger was obvious will not automatically avoid the defendant's duty. s".. Steenson, Th .. Anoto"!}' ofProducts Liabt"biy in Minnuota:
Th .. Th..on~sofR"colJery, 6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1,42 n.190 (1980). Obviousness, in the
context of owners' and occupiers' duties, as in products liability cases, is not preclusive on
the duty issue. Other decisions of the supreme court, such as Adee v. Evanson, 281
N.W.2d 177 (Minn. (979) and Gaston v. Fazendin Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 434 (Minn.
1978), make the point clear. In Adu, for example, the court held in a slip and fall case
that the trial court erred in holding that the store owner had no duty to warn the plaintiff
of risks of which the customer had present knowledge and realization. The trial court
instructed the jury that there is "no duty to warn a customer who comes upon the store
owner's premises of risks of which the customer himself or herself had present knowledge
and present realization." 281 N.W.2d at 179.
By contrast, section 343(A)(I) of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965), provides that "A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to
them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them,
unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness."
Id. Following this approach, the supreme court held that despite the obviousness of the
danger, a defendant may nonetheless owe a duty to an invitee if harm should be anticipated, despite the obviousness of the danger. 281 N.W.2d at 179-80; su Gaston v.
Fazendin Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 434, 435 (Minn. 1978) (construction company liable
to telephone installer for injuries sustained on company premises).
The rule in products liability cases, although not ordinarily couched in terms of primary assumption of the risk, is directed to the duty element, just as primary assumption of
the risk is in discussing negligence liability. The term should not be given undue meaning
because of the court's decision in Armstrong.
83. Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d at 350.
84. Id. at 352-53.
85. Id. at 351.
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The intent of the court to merge contributory negligence and assumption of the risk as strict liability defenses is clear.

b.

Misuse

In Busch the court took the position that all types of contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and misuse would be valid
strict liability defenses. However, because the court had not previously taken a clear position on misuse as a defense86 it is not clear
exactly what the court meant in holding that misuse is a defense to
strict liability claims. As a starting proposition, misuse as it relates
to the elements of a plaintiff's strict liability claim can be eliminated. If a plaintiff is unable to establish a product defect or a
causal relationship between the defect and the injury, misuse as a
defense becomes irrelevant.
Assuming that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case,
the use made of the product may be highly relevant in determining if the plaintiff's recovery should be reduced or barred. Arguably, it is inconsistent to find that a manufacturer should have
made a product safe for a particular use and nevertheless allow the
plaintiff's use to be the subject of an affirmative defense. 87 Understanding the origins of the misuse defense, however, may be of
assistance in understanding what it is that makes misuse proper
defense matter.
The origins of misuse demonstrate that when it is accepted as a
defense it is simply contibutory negligence with a different label.
A good example of the treatment of the defense of misuse in a
comparative fault jurisdiction appears in Schuh v. Fox River Tractor
CO.,88 a 1974 Wisconsin Supreme Court case. In Schuh the plaintiff, an experienced farm worker, suffered a traumatic amputation
of his right leg in the fan of a crop blower. The plaintiff had
climbed on top of the machine to make repairs after he had pulled
the clutch lever disengaging the auger. The plaintiff assumed
from the position of the clutch lever on the machine that the fan
had also been disengaged. The fan was hidden from view by a
housing and noise from tractors being used to run the crop blower
and other machines made it difficult to determine by sound if the
fan was running.
Although the misuse, climbing on top of the machine, was fore86. S.... Steenson, supra note 82, at 15-19.

87. S.... Vargo, supra note 44, at 460-611.
88. 63 Wis. 2d 728,218 N.W.2d 279 (1974).
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seeable and should have been anticipated and guarded against by
the defendant, Schuh's misuse of the machine was also negligent
because he should have been aware of the defect. The court in
discussing the misuse question stated that "under certain circumstances misuse may constitute contributory negligence and thus be
a factor in the comparison of negligence."89 Because Schuh's misuse of the machine apparently was a negligent misuse, the court
determined as a matter of law that he was barred from recovery
because his negligence equalled or exceeded the negligence of the
defendant. 90
If properly viewed, the defense of misuse is simply another label
for contributory negligence and has no meaning apart from contributory negligence. 91 If the plaintiff's use of the product is not a
negligent use, labeling it a misuse is irrelevant.
c.

The Merger

oJ Defenses

With the adoption of comparative fault in Minnesota, the reasons for making any distinction between the defenses of contributory negligence, secondary assumption of the risk, and misuse
disappear. Both secondary assumption of the risk and misuse
should be treated as aspects of contributory negligence. The
supreme court's position following the merger of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk in Spnngrose is equally apposite
to misuse: "The only question for submission in the usual case, we
think, will be whether the particular plaintiff was, under the circumstances, negligent in regard to his own safety, for under that
general issue counsel may fully argue that issue in all its respects. "92 By making the treatment of strict tort defenses consis- .
tent with the defenses to negligence claims, the pigeonholing
tendencies prompted by the Restatement's restrictive position on defenses are avoided and a more equitable allocation of loss will be
achieved, consistent with the function of the comparative negligence statute.
d.

The Busch Exception

The exception established in Busch that excludes failure to discover a product defect from the contributory negligence determi89. Id at 741, 218 N.W.2d at 286.
90. Id. at 744, 218 N.W.2d at 287.
91. Set' Shields v. Morton Chem. Co., 95 Idaho 674, 677, 518 P.2d 857, 860 (1974).
92. 292 Minn. 23, 26, 192 N.W.2d 826, 828 (1971).
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nation gives rise to several questions concerning the specific
application of the exception, the scope of its application, and
finally, its justification.
The facts in Busch provide a good example of the problems involved in applying the exception in specific cases. There was testimony that Lando Busch, the driver of the vehicle, could have
braked the vehicle but failed to do SO.93 Thus, the jury could have
inferred that he was negligent in failing to avoid the accident after
the danger created by the locked steering wheel became apparent
to him.94 Although his misconduct may have included failure to
discover the defect, it went further because of his additional failure
to exercise reasonable care after the danger arose. 95
Another example, roughly similar to Schuh D. Fox River Tractor
CO.,96 is Paries v. Allis-Chalmers COrp.97 Paries involved a farm machinery accident in which the plaintiff lost his right hand in a forage harvester while attempting to unclog corn stalks that had
caught in the harvester. There were warnings on the machine telling the operator to "[k]eep hands, feet and clothing away from
power-driven parts."98 The warnings and instructions were repeated in the operator's manual. 99
Because unclogging the machine with the power off took longer
than unclogging while the power was connected, the plaintiff had
been cleaning the machine with the power on. The plaintiff was
familiar with the operation of the harvester and was aware of the
warnings on the harvester and in the manual. On the day of the
injury, the plaintiff had unclogged the machine four or five times
with the power connected. On the last occasion, as he reached in
to unclog the machine, he felt a quick jerk and had his arm drawn
into the machine.
The plaintiff's theory of the case was negligent design and failure to warn. The jury found the defendant fifty-one percent and
the plaintiff forty-nine percent negligent. 1OO A hotly disputed issue
in the case concerned the plaintiff's knowledge of the danger:
Defendant argues that plaintiff "deliberately encountered a
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

262 N.W.2d at 390.
id. at 394.
Se~ id.
63 Wis. 2d 728, 218 N.W.2d 279 (1974).
289 N.W.2d 456 (Minn. 1979).
Id. at 458.
S~~

/d.

Id. at 457.
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known and obvious risk in conscious disregard of defendant's
warnings." The evidence does not prove that alleged fact as a
matter of law. There was credible testimony that plaintiff did
not know that the speed of the rolls could vary and might suddenly increase so that he could not let go of a stalk before his
hand was in the rollers. His prior use of the machine had not
made him aware of that danger. 101
Although Paries was a pre-Busch negligence case, it is interesting
to speculate on the impact of Busch had it been applied. It seems
clear that reasonable minds could differ on the classification of the
plaintiff's conduct. The plaintiff's conduct seemed to stop short of
secondary assumption of the risk because he was not aware of the
specific danger created by the harvester. He may have misused
the machine in attempting to unclog it without disconnecting the
power, but his misuse, like that of the plaintiff in Schuh, cannot be
considered apart from his negligence, which may have consisted
solely of a failure to discover the defect.
Even assuming that the plaintiff was negligent in some respect
other than in failing to discover the defect, obvious difficulties
would be presented in attempting to distill the plaintiff's misconduct into separate categories of misconduct, and then assess a percentage of negligence to the plaintiff after Restatement section 402A
comment n 102 contributory negligence is excised.
These problems of application may be illustrated, but it is not
101. Id. at 460 (footnotes omitted). A large portion of the briefs was devoted to a
discussion of the impact of the plaintiff's awareness. See Brief and Appendix of Appellant
Allis-Chalmers Corporation at 10-12, 18-23; Brief of Respondent Dwight Parks at 3-21.
102. A final example of the confusion over the application of the Busch exception arises
in the court's recent decision in Wegscheider v. Plastics, Inc., 289 N.W.2d 167 (Minn.
1980). In Wegscheider plaintiff was injured when he fell from a tanker trailer owned by
defendant, while using a piece of new clothesline rope to lift a flexible chute used to transfer plastic pellets from a truck to a tanker on which he was working. Although plaintiff
was generally aware of the risks in the procedure, the record contained little evidence
concerning plaintiff's knowledge that jagged edges on the tanker could sever the rope. He
knew that the ropes could become frayed through such use, but there was no evidence that
he knew a new rope would be so severed. The jury found plaintiff 10% negligent, defendant 90% negligent, and that plaintiff assumed the risk.
The supreme court held in this case, which arose prior to Springrose v. Willmore, 292
Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971), that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding
of assumption of the risk. Plaintiff also argued that the trial court should have instructed
the jury on strict liability and that plaintiff's only negligence consisted of failing to inspect
the tanker for jagged edges, misconduct that could not be considered under Busch. The
supreme court found, however, that the jury could have decided plaintiff's negligence
consisted of more than failure to inspect. "It could have found he was negligent in using a
clothesline to hoist the heavy chute or in continuing to pull upon the chute when he felt
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likely that they can be cured. The best that can be done is to set
forth clearly the excepted type of conduct in a jury instruction and
leave it to the trier of fact to apply the standard.103
Aside from the problems of classification, Parks also prompts
questions concerning the scope of the Busch exception. The principal question is whether it will apply to negligence as well as strict
liability claims. A certain irony would exist in not applying the
exception to negligence claims, whether the plaintiff's claim is
based on a manufacturing or design defect or failure to warn. 104 If
the cause of action involves negligent design or warning, the close
similarity if not exact duplication of the elements of strict liability
would logically compel the same application of defenses to the
negligence theories. lOS If the case involves a manufacturing defect,
in which the difference between negligence and strict liability is
more pronounced, the illogic of making a strictly liable defendant's exposure greater than a negligent defendant's is apparent.
This potential lack of symmetry in products liability defenses
should be addressed and resolved in order to promote conceptual
consistency in the treatment of defenses, thereby avoiding the conthe rope scraping against the struts on the tanker." Wegscheider v. Plastics, Inc., 289
N.W.2d at 170.
As with the conduct of the plaintiff in Schuh, it is difficult to separate plaintiff's failure
to discover the defect from his other conduct. If the Busch exception is avoided this easily
it will become largely meaningless, given the ability to find some plaintiff misconduct
going beyond the mere failure to discover the defect. Short of completely passive behavior, it is difficult to imagine situations in which the Busch exception might apply.
In Wt!gscht!irl" the court found that even if Busch applied it would not have affected
the outcome of the case. Even assuming plaintiff's misconduct consisted solely of failure
to discover the defect, plaintiff failed to request an instruction based on Busch. The court
thus found no reversible error in the trial court's refusal of the plaintiff's strict liability
instruction. Set! irl.
103. For an examination of how the loss allocation question may be submitted to juries, see notes 120-59 iT/pa and accompanying text.
104. Su Epstein, supra note 35, at 108·09. If separate defenses to negligence and strict
liability theories are allowed, with comment n contributory negligence a legitimate defense to negligence but not strict liability claims, it would be necessary for the jury to
assign a separate percentage of fault to the plaintiff's failure to discover the defect. Assuming that the jury finds the plaintiff 40% at fault (with 10% of that fault consisting of
failure to discover the defect) and the defendant 60% at fault, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover 60% of his damages on the negligence claim. On the strict liability claim,
however, Rl!Statl!11ll!Tlt section 402A comment n negligence cannot be considered. This
would call for a reassignment of the 10% fault assigned to the plaintiff for failure to discover the defect. Because the fault determination must total 100%, that 10% would have
to be reassigned to the defendant, making the defendant 70% at fault on the strict liability
claim and 60% at fault on the negligence claim. Such a result would seem indefensible.
105. For a discussion of the similarity between theories, see Steenson, supra note 82, at
14-63.
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fusion that necessarily will arise if separate defenses are established
for strict liability and negligence claims. A single set of defenses
for both theories will then avoid the problems that otherwise will
result when a jury is instructed on both theories lO6 or when a case
is submitted on negligence theory alone.
In addition, if the Busch exception is applied to negligence
claims in the products liability context, there seems to be no reason
why it should not be applied in other negligence contexts. 107 If the
negligent failure of a consumer to discover a product defect is not
taken into consideration in the contributory negligence determination, then no reason appears why the failure of a shopper to discover the icy condition of a merchant's sidewalk should be
considered in the contributory negligence determination of a basic
negligence case. 108
A final question concerns the conceptual justification for the
Busch exception. The exception is subject to question for a variety
of reasons, including the weakness of the historical antecedents
supporting the exception and the policies supporting the exception.
The exception is based in part on analogies to strict tort liability
for abnormally dangerous activities and dangerous animals,109 as
106. One possibility is that of an inconsistent verdict, in which a jury might find negligence, but not strict liability. q. ld. at 38-49.
It could be argued that even though the defenses to strict tort liability and negligence
are distinct, only the strict defenses should be submitted to a jury, even if a jury is instructed on both negligence and strict liability theories. Because the strict tort defense
position is more favorable to the plaintiff than the negligence defense position, the findings
on the strict tort defenses would necessarily control. This would not cure the problem,
however, when the jury arrives at an inconsistent verdict by finding a defendant negligent
but not strictly liable.
107. See Epstein, supra note 35, at 102.
108. See ld.
109. Professor Prosser justified the strict liability position on defenses as follows:
It frequently is said that the contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a
defense in cases of strict liability. This involves the seemingly illogical position
that the fault of the plaintiff will relieve the defendant of liability when he is
negligent, but not when he is innocent. The explanation must lie in part in the
element of wilful creation of an unreasonable risk to others by abnormal conduct
which is inherent in most of the strict liability cases; and in part in the policy
which places the absolute responsibility for preventing the harm upon the defendant, whether his conduct is regarded as fundamentally anti-social, or he is
considered merely to be in a better position to transfer the loss to the community.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 79, at 522 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes
omitted); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 515, Comment b, § 524, Comment a
(1977).
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well as warranty law. 110 The analogy to abnormally dangerous
activities and animals seems particularly inappropriate given the
justification for the elimination of the defense of ordinary contributory negligence (failing to discover the defect) in those contexts.
Based at least in part upon the presumption that an individual
who is subjected to a risk of injury from an unusual or highly dangerous activity or vicious animal should not have to bear the consequences of failing to discover that risk, it is arguably fair to place
the burden of the unexpected on the defendant who engages in
that activity or harbors the animal. III The risks created by product distributors, while not insubstantial, hardly seem to be in the
same category with the activities such as blasting. In addition, the
direct contact the consumer or user has with the product provides
him with a better means of self protection than an individual subjected to a risk of injury from an abnormally dangerous activity.
The analogies to warranty law, while appropriate, raise the
question whether the initial justification for refusing to consider
ordinary contributory negligence has been overextended. Formulation of the exception in cases involving the sale of food and drink
may have been justifiable, given the expectation of the consumer
that such products would be safe for consumption without examination. 112 Application of the exception to all products liability
cases extends the justifiable reliance concept to situations in which
it is not warranted. The basis for extending the exception, that
consumers and users of products are less likely to be able to cope
with increasingly sophisticated products,113 does not satisfactorily
explain why consumers and users should not bear the burden of
discovering product hazards that, with the exercise of reasonable
care, would be discoverable.

In effect, the argument in favor of excepting ordinary contributory negligence as a defense rests upon the inconsistency that
would be involved in first finding a product defective because it
failed to protect against user inadvertence, yet allowing the de110. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Cliade/ (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
1099, 1147-48 (1960); Prosser, supra note 35, at 838-40.
Ill. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § SIS, Comment a, § 524, Comment a
(1977); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537,542-43 (1972).
112. See Epstein, supra note 35, at 92-93.
113. See Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 394 (Minn. 1977). The exception seems to flow logically from the policies justifying the adoption of strict tort liability
in Minnesota. See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 338, 154 N.W.2d 488,
500 (1967).

L.J.
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fendant to use that inadvertence as a defense. Allowing such a
defense would arguably dilute the manufacturer's duty.114
In a jurisdiction in which the plaintiff wins all or nothing, the
argument carries greater weight than in a comparative fault jurisdiction. Once a comparative fault mechanism exists, however, it is
no longer necessary to separate plaintiff misconduct into discrete
categories. Because of comparative fault, responsibility can be
shared, without the danger that a manufacturer will consistently
avoid liability through use of the complete defense of contributory
negligence.
Although the Busch exception could have been drawn more narrowly,115 it is questionable, given the general unpredictability of
114. Su Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 891 (Alaska 1979); Suter v. San
Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., - N.]. - , - , 406 A.2d 140, 148 (1979).
115. In Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach Co., - N.J. - , 406 A.2d 140 (1979), the
New Jersey Supreme Court, in the context of an industrial accident, held the New Jersey
Comparative Negligence Act applicable to strict liability actions. Id. at - , 406 A.2d at
147. However, the court limited its application to contributory negligence that constitutes
assumption of the risk as defined in Comment n to the R~statmlmt.
Even assumption of the risk may be limited, depending on the circumstances. The
Suter plaintiff was injured when he inadvertently tripped the gear lever of a metal rolling
machine while he was attempting to remove a piece of slag from the machine. Suter had
purchased the machine for his company and had operated it numerous times over a period
of eight years. He was familiar with the operation of the machine and knew that pushing
the lever would activate the rollers. In spite of this knowledge, the court held that his
conduct would not constitute assumption of the risk:
The imposition of a duty on the manufacturer to make the machine safe to
operate whether by installing a guard or. . . by making it inoperable without a
guard, means that the law does not accept the employee's ability to take care of
himself as an adequate safeguard of interests which society seeks to protect. The
policy justification for B~xiga [referring to Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.].
402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972)] is sound. We see no reason to depart from Bexiga's
elimination of contributory negligence where an employee is injured due to a
defect (whether design or otherwise) in an industrial accident while using a
machine for its intended or foreseeable purposes. The defendant manufacturer
should not be permitted to escape from the breach of its duty to an employee
while carrying out his assigned task under these circumstances when observance
of that duty would have prevented the very accident which occurred.
- N.]. at - , 406 A.2d at 148 (footnote omitted).
In Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979), a case arising out of
the death of the decedent due to the lack of a roll-over protective shield on a front-end
loader manufactured by defendant, the court held as follows:
We do not believe that a consumer who uses a product as it was intended to
be used, and who knows or should know of the lack of a safety device, can be
deemed to have misused the product within the meaning of Butaud II. If the jury
finds that a product is defective by virtue of its lack of a safety feature, plaintiff's
failure to install such a device will not reduce his recovery based upon his mere
knowledge of the inadequate safety features on the product.
Id. at 890-91. The court used the following reasoning to justify its decision:
First, the general policy of strict liability demands that responsibility for placing

HeinOnline -- 6 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 267 1980

268

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6

comparative fault determinations, whether any additional deterrence will be achieved or that a manufacturer's duty will be diluted if ordinary contributory negligence becomes a legitimate
defense matter. The problems involved in identifying ordinary
contributory negligence and isolating it in any meaningful way
from other plaintiff misconduct heightens the unpredictability of
products liability law. In addition, given the difficulties that will
arise in attempting to classify plaintiff misconduct, it is questionable whether any determination that plaintiff misconduct constitutes ordinary contributory negligence or some other type of
misconduct is likely to lead to an increase in product safety. 116
When the exception is applied, the result may be deemed to be
substantially unfair from the manufacturer's perspective. In a case
such as Paries, the jury's apportionment of forty-nine percent of the
negligence to the plaintiff is an obvious indication of disapproval
of the plaintiff's conduct in that case. Application of the Busch
exception would erase that determination, allowing the plaintiff to
recover 100% of his damages. In terms of the desirabilty of compensating a seriously injured individual, the result is perhaps justifiable, but the law of products liability has not yet moved to the
point in which the fact of injury is sufficient to jusify compensation.
Finally, the very inability to logically limit the Busch exception
to strict liability claims in the products liability context subjects
the exception to question. There seems to be no discrete justification for confining the exception to strict products liability
the defective product on the market should not be shifted to those in no position
to realistically assess the danger. If the focus is on the nature of the product as
defective, and the jury has found the lack of safety device to render the product
defective, it is inconsistent to turn around and reduce the user's recovery merely
because he bought and used the product as marketed. . . . Second, accidents
are inevitable costs, and it is better to place the burden of such costs on the party
best able to spread the losses. Third, the public interest in reducing the level of
accidents makes it reasonable to put the cost burden on the party best able to
prevent accidents.
Id. at 891 (citation omitted).
Bed differs from Suter in that secondary assumption of the risk as defined by the
Restatemmt would be a defense. Both decisions have in common, however, a limitation on
the range of defenses available in a strict tort action. Both suggest that it is inconsistent to
hold a manufacturer liable for failing to incorporate a safety device, yet allow the manufacturer to use the very conduct that it should have anticipated as an affirmative defense.
The cases suggest one potential application of the Busch exception.
116. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 736-37,575 P.2d 1162, 1168-69,
144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 386-87 (1978); Epstein, supra note 35, at 106.
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claims. 117 Once it is recognized that there is no logical limitation
on the exception, however, the weaknesses of the underpinnings of
the exception are exposed.
In summary, assuming the continued existence of the Busch exception, it will be critical to determine whether it applies to negligence claims as well as to claims based on strict liability theory.
Resolution of these scope problems will determine the proper
reach of the exception, but problems involved in its application
will not be resolved. The price of the Busch exception is the resulting difficulty of application, even given a clear definition of the
standard by which the trier of fact must decide whether the plaintiff's conduct consists of a negligent failure to discover a product
defect or something more.
As a final matter, it should be noted that the life of the Busch
exceptions depends on the 'position the supreme court takes on the
retroactivity of its decision. I 18 If Busch is prospective only, then it
will be applicable only to causes of action arising after December
9, 1977, the date of decision, but before April 15, 1978,119 the effective date of the comparative fault act, which overrides the Busch
exception.

e.

A SuggestedJury Instruction

A proposed jury instruction recognizing the merger of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and misuse, and including the
Busch exception is as follows:
The defendant has raised the defense· of contributory fault.
Fault consists of a failure on the part of the plaintiff to exercise
117. See Epstein, supra note 35, at 102.
118. It is not clear what position the court will take on the retroactivity of Busch. In
Wegscheider v. Plastics, Inc., 289 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1980), discussed in note 102 supra,
the supreme court seemed to assume the applicability of Busch to a cause of action that
arose prior to Busch. Assuming this to be the case, a curious result arises. Assumption of
the risk, which would have been a complete defense to a negligence action in this case,
because the cause of action arose prior to the court's decision in Springrose v. Willmore,
292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971), would not be a complete defense to the strict
liability claim, because of the merger of contributory negligence and assumption of the
risk accomplished in Busch. The odd result is that in cases arising before Springrose, assumption of the risk would be a complete defense to negligence actions, but not to strict
liability actions arising before Spnngrose and coming to trial after Busch. See Note, supra
note 7, at 198 n.99.
Curious as the result might be, the retroactivity problem should not be aggravated by
making Busch prospective only. To insure future consistency in the law, Busch should be
applied to all cases coming to trial after the date of decision in that case.
119. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 11, 1978 Minn. Laws 836,842.
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reasonable care for his own safety. You are to determine
whether under all the circumstances, the plaintiff exercised reasonable care for his own safety. In order to find the plaintiff to
be at fault, you must find that the plaintiffs fault was a direct
cause of his injuries.
You are instructed that you may not take into consideration
the fault of the plaintiff if it consists of a failure to discover the
defect or an unreasonable failure to guard against its existence.
To find the plaintiff at fault you must find that his fault went
beyond a failure to discover the defect or an unreasonable failure to guard against its existence.

The instruction appropriately simplifies what could otherwise
be a confusing inquiry if specific instructions were given covering
each potential type of plaintiff misconduct. 120 The instruction allows for a full consideration of the contributory fault of the plaintiff yet makes it clear that contributory fault consisting of a failure
to discover a defect may not be considered. Finally, because the
instruction is consistent with negligence defenses and the Busch exception, no differentiation between strict tort and negligence defenses need be made in cases in which the plaintiff relies upon both
theories. 121
120. One suggested special verdict form would separate the defenses into a number of
categories:
Was the plaintiff negligent with respect to his own safety with respect to:
(a) Using the product despite full knowledge of its condition?
ANSWER

----

(b)

Failure to discover "a condition rendering the product unsafe?
ANSWER_ _ __

(c)

Using the product in the manner or for a purpose other than it was
intended to be used?
ANSWER_ _ __

(d)

Abuse of the product?
ANSWER

(e)
(I)

-------

Alteration of the product?
ANSWER

The Impact of Comparatille Negligence on Products Liabilz?J', app. A, at 55, in PRODucrs LIABILITY . . . COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (Minn. Continuing Legal Education
Kir~her,

1970). Following these questions, the illustrative special verdict form asked other questions regarding the causation of plaintiff's negligence, again separating plaintiff misconduct into the same categories. See id.
121. In Busch a single theory of recovery, strict liability, was submitted to the jury. See
262 N.W.2d at 384. Ifboth negligence and strict liability theories are submitted, attempts
to distinguish between defenses are likely to lead to confusion. For an attempt to explain
how this confusion might 'be avoided, see Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802,
811-12,395 A.2d 843, 849 (1978).
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The Method oJ Loss Allocation

Merging strict tort defenses and making those defenses consistent with the treatment of negligence defenses will resolve some of
the problems of interpretation that might be created by Busch.
One problem remains: that of determining the method of loss allocation.
Unlike the situation in negligence cases, in which the common
denominator for comparison is the negligent conduct of the plaintiff and defendant, application of the comparative negligence statute to claims based on strict liability alters the comparison, in
effect requiring plaintiff negligence to be compared to defendant
strict liability. The question of whether comparative negligence
principles should be applied in strict liability cases has generated
substantial controversy.122 Much discussion of the question is devoted to an analysis of the difficulties involved in making such a
comparison, or, if the application of comparative negligence principles is accepted, what the best method of loss allocation is. 123
Two related policy goals operate as a framework for determining the most appropriate method of loss allocation: the conceptual
means of resolving the "apples and oranges" problem of comparing incomparables,124 and developing the clearest method of submitting the complicated apportionment question to a jury. 125 To
this might be added a third factor, the need for adopting an approach that will encompass not only strict tort theory, but negligence as well. 126
122. Su, e.g., Brewster, Comparatille Negligmce in Strict Liability Cases, 42 j. AIR. L. &
COM. 107, 109-17 (1976); 'Epstein, Products Liability: Dijenses Based on Plaintijj's Conduct,
1968 UTAH L. REV. 267, 284; Feinberg, The Applicabzlzty 0/ a Comparatille Negligmce Dijense
in a Strict Products Liabzlzty Suit Based on Section 102A 0/ the Restatemmt 0/ Torts 2d, 42 INS.
COUNSEL]' 39,52 (1975); Fischer, Products Liabzlzty-Applicabzlzty o/Comparatille Negligence,
43 Mo. L. REV. 431 (1978); Levine, BU)'er's Conduct as A..Iftcting the Extmt 0/ Manufacturer's
Liabzlzty in Warranty, 52 MINN. L. REV. 627, 662-63 (1968); Levine, Stnet Products Liabilzty
and Comparatille Negligmce: The Collision 0/ Fault and No-Fault, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 337,
346-51 (1977); Noel, Dijectille Products: Abnonnal Use, Contnoutory Negligmce, and Assumption 0/
Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93, 117-18 (1972); Schwartz, Stnet Liabzlzty and Comparatille Negligmce, 42 TENN. L. REV. 171, 179-81 (1974); Twerski, The Use and Abuse 0/ Comparatzve
Negligmce in Products Liabzlzty, 10 IND. L. REV. 797 (1977); Wade, supra note 44.
123. Some authors have had difficulty with the application of comparative principles
to strict tort claims. Su, e.g., Fischer, supra note 122, at 443. Others have recognized the
dilemma but assumed that the comparison problems should be ignored. See, e.g., Twerski,
supra note 122, at 805-06.
124. Su Fischer, supra note 122, at 443-44; Wade, supra note 44, at 376-79.
125. Su Fischer, supra note 122, at 443-44.
126. Cf. Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 811-12, 395 A.2d 843, 849
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There are three major approaches to the allocation of loss in
strict liability cases under comparative type statutes: 127 the comparative cause approach,128 the comparative fault approach,129
and what might be termed the equitable reduction aproach. 130
The first compares the relative contributions, in a causal sense, of
the parties to the litigation. The second compares the plaintiffs
fault to the defendant's. The third attempts to avoid the problem
involved in comparing incomparable conduct by ignoring the
comparison process and, focusing solely on the plaintiffs misconduct, reducing the plaintiffs recovery according to the jury's perception of the degree to which the plaintiffs misconduct
contributed to his injuries. A closer examination of these approaches, and some of the criticisms directed toward them, raises a
(1978) (indicating the problems involved when both strict liability and negligence theories
are used).
127. The Draft Uniform Product Liability Law contained a comparative fault provision, but it did not consider" 'the extent of the causal relationship between the conduct
and the damages claimed' . . . in apportioning responsibility." U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE DRAfT UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW § Ill, Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed.
Reg. 2995, 3011 (1979). Su generally U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT §§ 100-122, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714-50 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as MODEL ACT] (successor to Draft Uniform Product Liability Law). This position
was presumably based upon a reaction to the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, which
considers both fault and causation in apportioning responsibility. See UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § l(a). The apparent problem was based upon a perception that causein-fact would be apportioned. Su Twerski & Weinstein, A Cniique of the Unifonn Product
Liabtlity Law-A Rush to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 221,247-48 (1978-1979).
The Model Act considers both fault and causation, following the approach of the
Uniform Comparative Fault Act: "In determining the percentages of responsibility, the
trier of fact shall consider, on a comparative basis, both the nature of the conduct of each
person or entity responsible and the extent of the proximate causal relation between the
conduct and the damages claimed." MODEL ACT § III (B)(3), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at
62,735.
Following the adoption of the Law Reform Act of 1945, which adopted comparative
negligence, the English courts promptly recognized the need for considering both fault
and causation in determining how much a plaintifrs damages should be reduced. See R.
DIAS & B. MARKESINIS, THE ENGLISH LAw OF TORTS 241 (1976); P. JAMES, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF TORTS 199-200 (3d ed. 1969).
128. See Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598, 603 (D.
Idaho 1976) (applying Idaho law); Jensvold, A Modem Approach to Loss Allocation Among
Tortftasors in Products Liability Cases, 58 MINN. L. REV. 723, 725 (1974).
129. Su Wade, supra note 44, at 376-81.
130. Su Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129,
1139 (9th Cir. 1977) (recovery reduced in proportion to plaintifrs contribution to loss);
Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 45-47 (Alaska 1976)
(same), modifod, Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Daly v.
General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 736, 575 P.2d 1162, 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 386
(1978) (court uses term "equitable apportionment or allocation of loss"); Fischer, supra
note 122, at 449.
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question of whether there is, in theory or practice, any significant
distinction among the approaches.
The comparative cause approach has been criticized for a variety of reasons. The arguments against comparative cause seem to
be predicated on the irrationality and inaccuracy of the comparison that comparative cause requires. Because it does not take into
consideration all of the causes of a particular accident, it is argued,
any allocation of cause will necessarily be distorted because it will
take into consideration only the contributions of the parties to the
lawsuit. 131 Comparative cause has also been criticized because it
does not focus on any particular causal element that would provide a valid basis for comparison. 132
Comparative causation, however, requires more than a comparison of causation in the abstract. In Sun Valley Al'rlines~ Inc. lJ. AlJcoLycoming Corp.,133 which has been cited as adopting a comparative
cause approach, the United States District Court for the District of
Idaho evaluated the comparison process as follows: "Upon a finding of blameworthy conduct, the jury in this case was asked, consistent with Idaho law, to assign a percentage to the causative
conduct of the parties to this lawsuit. "134 In an explanatory footnote, the court made the following statement:
Once culpability, blameworthiness or some form of fault is
determined by the trier of fact to have occurred, then the labels
denoting the "quality" of the act or omission, whether it be
strict liability, negligence, negligence per se, etc., becomes unimportant. Thus, the underlying issue in each case is to analyze
and compare the causal conduct of each party, regardless of its
label. 135

Taken in context, the Sun Valley Air/ines~ Inc. court was concerned
about the difficulty in comparing different types of misconduct of
a plaintiff and a defendant. To avoid the conceptual problems in
the comparison, the court adopted a comparative cause approach.
This does not mean that fault is ignored or that the conduct of a
party giving rise to that fault is irrelevant. The court's statement
means that the labels are unimportant once a fault basis of liability is established for a plaintiff and a defendant.
Recognizing the nature of the comparison advocated by the Sun
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Su Fischer, supra note 122, at 444-47.
Su id.
411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976) ..
'!d. at 603.
Id. at 603 n.5.
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Vaffry Azdznes) Inc. court may resolve part of the criticism of comparative causation since cause in the abstract is not being compared; the comparison is between causally related conduct. 136
Other criticisms remain, however. Even assuming that causal conduct is being compared, the approach has been criticized because
the wide-open inquiry engendered by comparative conduct bears
no relationship to the policies strict liability is meant to serve. 137

The comparative fault approach attempts to avoid the comparison of conduct or cause problem by recognizing that fault is being
compared. Professor Wade, in justifying the comparative fault approach adopted in the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, has argued that the sale of a defective product, like breach of a statute,
constitutes a kind of fault. In his opinion, the closeness of the relationship to negligence per se, which is apportionable under a comparative negligence statute points up the lack of distinction
between comparative fault and comparative negligence, and the
ability of a fact finder to apportion such conduct. 138
Because marketing a defective product is conduct that can prop136. q: Fischer, supra note 122, at 446 (criticizing comparative causation because
there is no relationship between physical causation and personal culpability).
137. The argument is based on the assumption that if conduct other than negligence is
considered, the amount of the loss a defendant is required to bear will not be rationally
related to his fault, thereby undermining the risk spreading and deterrence functions or
making them more difficult to achieve. It also raises the question whether or not nonnegligent conduct of the plaintiff should be considered. See id. at 446-47.
138. See UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1, Comment; Wade, supra note 44, at
377-78. The discussion of the application of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act to strict
liability claims is instructive in indicating the difficulty some of the Commissioners had
with the concept. The following exchange between Professors Wade and Dickerson from
the transcript of the proceedings of the Committee of the Whole is instructive:
Mr. Dickerson: I wonder if the chair would indulge me by allowing me to
refer briefly to subsection (b).
Now, you may have answered this question in connection with Section 1,
and in that regard I apologize for missing that discussion. But what I'm wondering about is how you determine percentages of fault, which suggests to me degrees of fault in a case where the fault does not involve any sort of culpability,
but consists of strict liability.
Now, we have been speaking, I think, most of the time about fault in its
conventional sense of culpability, and we can compare the carelessness of the
plaintiff with the defendant's, but suppose one of them has done nothing that
would subject him to any possible criticism, but nevertheless he is liable under
some such doctrine as negligence per se, or noncompliance with a warranty of
wholesomeness or merchantability.
Now, I have difficulty comparing greater or lesser; let's say, a plaintiff is
grossly negligent, but the only thing you can say about the defendant is that he is
liable otherwise because he violated a food statute not requiring mens rea, where
no one could possibly criticize him or criticize any employee.
In other words, how do you compare heavy carelessness on the part of the
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erly be labeled fault, it is conduct that can be considered in making the fault apportionment. Factors such as the degree of danger
presented by the product and the likelihood that it will cause injury will be relevant in making the apportionment of fault. 139 The
conduct of a manufacturer leading up to the marketing of a product would also be relevant in Wade's analysis. 140 In developing
plaintiff with an eitherlor situation of a defendant, who either is strictly liable or
isn't? There can't be degrees of strict liability, can there?
Mr. Wade: There is some logical difficulty here, but the fact of the matter is
that in many states today this is being done. It is being done, for example, in
Wisconsin, which has more experience than most states in this regard, and it has
not given trouble in connection with the actions of the jury.
In a measure, saying that this is strict liability really doesn't eliminate the
aspect of fault, because what is happening is that the manufacturer is putting
out on the market an article which is unreasonably dangerous, which will be
dangerous to a good number of people. And when that comes to the jury for its
consideration, the experience in three or four states that have had this is that it
can be handled, and is handled properly, by the jury.
The only state I think of right off that has disagreed with this is Colorado,
and Colorado has said that their Comparative Fault Act will not apply to strict
liability. It is a decision of the Court of Appeals, rather than the Supreme Court.
Mr. Dickerson: What kind of a percentage can you put on strict liability?
Do you make it 25%, or can you go all the way and make it 50%, is it automatically 50, or what?
Mr. Wade: It is not automatically 50. It is appropriate to consider how
dangerous this thing is, how many people would be jeopardized, matters of that
sort. And the juries have been able to work it out.
Mr. J;>ickerson: I don't want to press on this too far, but I am mystified,
because it goes not only to the quality of the product which you referred to, but
the quality of the conduct, and I can't see how, if they are doing it, it would
remain a mystery to me how you can make a comparison there.
Now, it's interesting to know that it's being done, but can you give any
understandable explanation of how you can do it, how you can instruct the jury
on it?
Mr. Wade: What we are doing is speaking of the conduct of the manufacturerMr. Dickerson: Right.
Mr. Wade: [Continuing] . . . in putting this on the market, when it is in
this unreasonably dangerous condition. So it's conduct against conduct.
Mr. Dickerson: Well, there's no wayMr. Wade: One other thing I would like to say in this connectionMr. Dickerson: I'll stop now, but I think the Conference ought to know that
this Act stretches-and it's all right; I won't quarrel with that-the concept of
fault into the area which we associate with a lack of fault. And I think we have
to take account of the fact that this is going to be applied in the more difficult
cases, where you don't have these much easier chances to make nice horseback
distinctions about degrees of carelessness.
Uniform Comparative Fault Act of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law, Proceedings in Committee of the Whole 66-69 (Aug. 3-4, 1977).
139. &~ UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1, Comment; Wade, supra note 44, at
378.
140. According to Professor Wade:
On the matter of inspecting the products as they come off the assembly line, for
example, even though a system of spot-checking may be regarded as sufficiently
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guidelines for analyzing the defendant's conduct, the same standards used to determine whether a product is defective would be
relevant. 141
The comparative fault approach differs little, if at all, from the
comparative cause or conduct approach. Comparative fault may
facilitate the avoidance of the theoretical criticisms of the application of comparative principles to strict liability cases by establishing that it is really fault that is being compared. But comparative
fault is still subject to the same criticisms as the comparative conduct approach. 142
Some courts have suggested that the best approach to allocation
is to ignore the comparison problem and focus on the plaintiff's
misconduct, asking a jury to determine how much the plaintiff
contributed to his own injury. This is the equitable reduction
method. The Ninth Circuit decision in Pan-Alaslca Fisheries) Inc. lJ.
Marine Construction & Design Co. 143 is illustrative.
[W]hether we use the term comparative fault, contributory
negligence, comparative causation, or even comparative blameworthiness, we are merely beating around the seman tical bush
seeking to achieve an equitable method of allocating the responsibility for an injury or loss. It comes down to this: the
defendant is strictly liable for the harm caused from his defective product, except that the award of damages shall be reduced in proportion to the plaintiffs contribution to his own
loss or injury}44
This approach presumably avoids the comparison problem because the focus is on the plaintiff's misconduct measured against
the objective reasonable prudent person standard, without requiring a comparison of that conduct to a defendant's conduct. 145
The equitable reduction method at first glance appears to avoid
the comparison problem. In reality, however, it is difficult to understand how a jury will be able to decide how much the plaintiff's
thorough to keep the manufacturing process from being characterized as negligent, if the particular product was dangerously defective, the nature of the spotchecking would still be relevant in determining the respective percentages of
fault.
Wade, supra note 44, at 378.
141. s.-~ Steenson, supra note 82, at 28 n.131.
142. Su Fischer, supra note 122, at 444-45.
143. 565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1977) (applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A and comparative fault in the context of an admiralty claim).
144. Id. at 1139.
145. Su Fischer, supra note 122, at 449.
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recovery should be reduced without taking into consideration the
conduct of the other parties involved in the lawsuit. Invariably, a
jury would be prompted to think that the more egregious a defendant's conduct, the less a plaintiffs recovery should be reduced.
If the equitable reduction method prohibits taking a defendant's
misconduct into consideration it takes from a jury a means of placing the plaintiff's misconduct in the proper context. If the defendant's misconduct is considered, the equitable reduction method is
a comparative conduct or fault approach without labeling it as
such.
Designed to avoid the comparison problem when strict tort liability is involved, the equitable reduction method has the disadvantage of failing to take into account a defendant's negligence or
strict liability.146 This creates a potential problem if two distinct
methods of loss allocation are adopted in cases in which a plaintiff
relies on both negligence and strict liability theories. The potential for confusion should be apparent. 147
Overall, one has difficulty in escaping the conclusion that
whatever method is chosen the differences between the approaches
are insubstantial, both in the nature of the comparison that must
be made and in the clarity of the approaches. The real advantage
of the comparative fault or conduct approaches, in relationship to
the equitable reduction method, is that the former approaches are
broad enough to encompass other theories of liability, including
negligence, so that consistency may be achieved in the method of
loss allocation irrespective of the plaintiff's theory of recovery.
In Busch the court used varying terms, such as "comparative
cause" and "comparative fault" to describe the loss allocation
process. 148 In fact, there seem to be no significant distinctions
flowing from the use of those terms as they are used in the court's
opInIOn.
146. It seems clear that the equitable reduction method is designed to overcome the
problem of lack of a basis for comparing plaintiff negligence with strict liability. &.r id.
147. &.r Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 811-12, 395 A.2d 843, 849
(1978). Given the fact that negligence is ordinarily pleaded along with strict liability,
there would be difficulty in instructing a jury on separate standards for loss allocation as
to each of the theories. Because of the continued and justifiable use of negligence theory
along with strict liability theory, and because of the impact a finding of negligence will
have on loss al!ocation, s.r.r Owen, Th.r High(y Blam.rworthy A-Ianzifacturn-: Implications on Rul.rs
if Liability and D¢ns.r in Products Liability Actions, 10 IND. L. REV. 769, 788-89 (1977), the
assumption should not be made in considering methods ofloss allocation that cases will be
decided solely on a strict liability basis.
148. &.r 262 N.W.2d at 393-94.
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In discussing loss allocation, the court first made reference to a
law review article advocating the use of comparative principles in
allocating loss: "[T]he comparative negligence statute becomes
more than a comparative negligence or even a comparative .fault
statute; it becomes a comparative cause statute under which all independent and concurrent causes of an accident may be apportioned on a percentage basis."149 Although the portion of the
Article cited by the court seems to indicate that something more
than fault is being compared, the analysis in that Article is consistent with the comparative fault approach suggested by Professor
Wade. 150 The only difference is that conduct that Wade would
label "fault" is called "faultless· conduct" by the Article's author. 151
Further indications that causal fault is being compared are
found in the Busch court's reference to Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. ll.
149. Id. at 394 (quoting Jensvold, supra note 128, at 725).
150. The rule advocated by Jensvold was intended to apply specifically to determine
loss allocation among multiple defendants, although the suggested standards could be
used just as easily as guidelines for determining how loss should be allocated between a
plaintiff and defendant.
The rule advocated by Jensvold is as follows:
One held liable for personal injury resulting from a defective product manufactured or sold by him in the ordinary course of business may not recover indemnity from anyone if:
(a) he was negligent with respect to the product, breached an express
warranty or misrepresented, intentionally or innocently, the product and
such conduct was a direct cause of the injury; or,
(b) his independent conduct with respect to the product, apart from
any conduct directly related to the defect itself, was a direct cause of the
injury.
A party so denied indemnity may recover contribution from all other persons legal(y responsible for the injury, contributions to awards being in proportion
to the percentage of causal conduct attributable to each such person responsible.
Jensvold, supra note 128, at 741 (emphasis in original). In making the determination
whether a party's "independent conduct" is a direct cause of the injury suffered by the
plaintiff, Jensvold suggests the following criteria would be relevant:
(a) the extent to which conduct of a defendant induced the plaintiff to purchase
the product which caused his injury; (b) the extent to which the conduct of the
defendant was motivated by a justifiable reliance upon the proper conduct of
others; (c) the economic gain derived by each defendant as a result of his conduct
in comparison to such gains derived by other defendants; and (d) the likelihood
of the accident not happening at all in the absence of the defendant's conduct.
Id. at 742. Of these factors, the first and second seem clearly to be "fault" criteria. See
Wade, supra note 44, at 377-78. The fourth factor makes it clear that causation is required. The only potential distinction is in the third factor, requiring a consideration of
the economic gain derived by each defendant from the sale of the product. Any consideration of economic gain would seem to inject a largely collateral issue into the lawsuit, a
factor that has a significant possibility for improperly influencing a jury's verdict.
151. See Jensvold, supra note 128, at 741.
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AlJco-qcoming COrp. 152 and Winge lJ. Minnesota Transfer Raz/way,153 a
Minnesota Supreme Court case. In Winge the plaintiff was injured
when the vehicle he was driving collided with a train that had
come to rest on a grade crossing.1 54 The plaintiff's contributory
negligence would have been a complete defense absent a comparative negligence statute because of prior supreme court decisions
holding that failure to observe a train at a crossing constitutes contributory negligence as a matter of law. With the advent of comparative negligence, however, the Winge court indicated that the
plaintiff would be entitled to have his negligence compared with
the causal negligence of the defendant railroad:
While the statute speaks of a comparison of negligence, in
application what is really compared, upon a consideration of
all relevant facts and circumstances, is the relative contribution
of each party's negligence to the damage in a causal sense.
Thus, while cases bearing on the liability issue decided before
the enactment of § 604.01 may continue to have precedential
value where the railroad's failure to give statutory warnings is
not a proximate cause of the collision, recovery is not barred by
plaintiff's contributory negligence and he is now entitled to
have such negligence compared with any other causal negligence of defendant railroad. 155
The emphasis on causally related negligence apparently was made
to ensure that no misunderstandings would arise over the impact
of the comparative negligence statute. In cases involving grade
crossing accidents, the plaintiff would still be required to establish
that the negligence of the railroad is causally related to the accident. 156
It becomes quite clear that the court is not advocating comparative causation in the abstract, but rather is requiring a comparison
of negligence, emphasizing the need for establishing a causal relationship between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's injury.157 Thus, both fault and causation must be considered in
determining liability and in comparing fault. 158 In asking a jury
152. 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976), ctied in Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262
N.W.2d at 394.
153. 294 Minn. 399, 201 N.W.2d 259 (1972), ctid in Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262
N.W.2d at 394.
154. 294 Minn. at 400, 201 N.W.2d at 261.
155. Id. at 403-04, 201 N.W.2d at 263.
156. Id. at 404, 201 N.W.2d at 263.
157. See id. at 405-06, 201 N.W.2d at 264.
158. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act provides that "the trier of fact shall con-
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to make a fault determination, the term "fault" should be defined.
Instructing a jury that "fault" consists of both failure to exercise
reasonable care (negligence), and placing a defective or unsafe
product on the market (strict liability), provides a jury with the
basic factors to consider in making the fault apportionment. Attempts to provide further definition of the term involve the same
problems that exist in attempting to give a jury detailed instructions to assist them in deciding if a product is defective. 159 An
instruction that fault consists of placing a defective product on the
market as well as the negligence if any, surrounding the manufacture and sale of the product, establishes a framework for the fault
determination, but it does not overload the jury with unquantified
factors to be considered in making the determination. As is the
case with the comparative negligence determination, much is left
to the jury. Use of comparative principles in the strict liability
context, however, necessitates recognition of the latitude jurors
will have in apportioning fault according to their subjective judgments. The determination may be neither precise nor predictable,
but it is the logical outcome of applying comparative fault principles in strict liability cases.
C.

Warranlj'

If strict tort instructions are given it should be unnecessary to
instruct on implied warranty of merchantability. If implied warranty is used as an alternative theory of recovery in cases to which
strict tort applies, however, the defenses should be the same as the
defenses to strict liability, a conclusion supported by the supreme
court's consistent recognition of the common conceptual bases of
strict tort and implied warranty theories. 1OO
In Nelson lJ. Anderson, 161 a case involving property damage caused
by a defective furnace, the Minnesota Supreme Court took the position that contributory negligence would be a defense to a warsider both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the extent of the causal
relation between the conduct and the damages claimed." UNIFORM COMPARATIVE
FAULT ACT § 2(b). The Comment explains that "[d]egrees of fault and proximity of causation are inextricably mixed, as a study of last clear chance indicates." Id., Comment.
159. Su Steenson, supra note 82, at 57 n.218.
160. See notes 161-81 infta and accompanying text. In Gardner v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 267 Minn. 505, 127 N.W.2d 557 (1964), the court stated that the action for breach of
implied warranty has its roots in tort law, and that contributory negligence is a defense to
such an action. Id. at 511, 127 N.W.2d at 562.
161. 245 Minn. 445, 72 N.w.2d 861 (1955).
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ranty action. The court recognized the conflict in the authorities
but took the position adopted by New York in Razey lJ. J.B. Colt
Co. 162 as stating the relevant law for Minnesota. 163 The Razey
court stated:
Where the plaintiff seeks to recover damages for a breach of a
general warranty, which are usually the difference between the
value of the thing as it is in fact and as it was warranted to be,
the question of negligence does not enter, but where he seeks to
recover consequential damages he should not be permitted to
recover for his own negligence. It has frequently been said that
such damages are recoverable as may reasonably be said to
have been within the contemplation of the parties. Warranty is
not insurance, and there is nothing in this contract to indicate
that either party supposed the defendant was to answer for the
plaintiff's carelessness. If it is impossible to separate the consequences of the plaintiff's negligence from the consequences of
the defendant's breach of warranty, then the plaintiff must be
limited to general damages, for otherwise he is permitted to recover for his own fault. We can discover no reason why he
should be permitted to recover any damages which his own
negligence has contributed to produce, and no authority has
been cited by the respondent in support of such a proposition. l64

The Razey court also indicated that the seller would not be liable
for consequential damages if the buyer continues to use the product after he has discovered it is not functioning properly.165
In Coblzrsch lJ. Western Land Roller CO.,166 the Minnesota court
held that secondary assumption of the risk, which in a pre-Spnngrose case would be a complete defense to a negligence action, was
also a defense to a breach of implied warranty action. Again emphasizing the tort origins of implied warranty, the court concluded
that the defenses to implied warranty should be the same as the
defenses to negligence. 167 Because the case arose prior to Spnngrose,
162. 106 A.D. 103, 94 N.V.S. 59 (1905).
163. 245 Minn. at 450-51,72 N.W.2d at 865.
164. 106 A.D. at 106,94 N.V.S. at 61, quot~d in Nelson v. Anderson, 245 Minn. at 451,
72 N.W.2d at 865.
165. &~ 245 Minn. at 451, 72 N.W.2d at 865 (citing Razey v. J.B. Colt Co., 106 A.D.
103, 94 N.V.S. 59 (1905».
166. 310 Minn. 471, 246 N.W.2d 687 (1976).
167. &~ id. at 477, 246 N.W.2d at 691 (citing Gardner v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 267
Minn. 505, 127 N.W.2d 557 (1964»; if. Nelson v. Anderson, 245 Minn. 445, 451, 72
N.W.2d 861, 865 (1955) (allowing contributory negligence defense to breach of warranty
action).
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the court was not required to decide whether the comparative negligence statute would be applied to implied warranty claims in
post-Springrose cases.
That question was presented in two recent cases, Wenner Y. Gulf
Oil Corp .168 and Cha{fold Y. Sherwin- Williams Co., 169 but the court
declined to reach the issue. Wenner involved a claim against a herbicide manufacturer based upon damage to a farmer's wheat crop
caused by application of the herbicide.17° The defendant's requested comparative negligence instruction was denied by the trial
court. l7l On appeal, following entry of judgment for the plaintiff,
the supreme court agreed that the evidence supported the defendant's request for an instruction on comparative negligence, but it
found no error because an instruction less favorable to the plaintiff
was actually given. 172 The instruction stated that if the plaintiff's
reliance on Gulf Oil's representations was unreasonable the plaintiff would be entitled to no recovery whatsoever. 173
Cha{fold involved an action by a painter against Sherwin-Williams for direct and consequential damages caused by the fading
of paint purchased from Sherwin-Williams and applied by the
plaintiff on a number of jobs. 174 The trial court gave a comparative fault instruction to the jury. 175 Although the jury found the
plaintiff to be fifteen percent and the defendant eighty-five percent
at fault, the trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff for the
full amount of direct and consequential damages awarded by the
jury.176 The supreme court declined to decide whether Busch
would be applicable to implied warranty actions because the question had been raised for the first time on appeal. 177

The difficulty in continuing the trend toward full assimilation of
tort defenses in the implied warranty context is a function of the
type of loss involved in those cases coupled with the lack of statutory authority for applying comparative negligence to such cases.
Crop losses of the type sustained in Wenner traditionally have been
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

264 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1978).
266 N.W.2d 171 (Minn. 1978) (per curiam).
264 N.W.2d at 376.
& .. id. at 377.
S.... ld. at 383.
S.... ld.
S.... 266 N.W.2d at 172-73.
S.... ld. at 174.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 176.
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litigated in Minnesota under implied warranty theory,178 and the
economic loss sustained in Chaijield would seem clearly to fall
outside the coverage of strict liability theory as applied in Minnesota. 179
In Busch the supreme court relied on Wisconsin judicial constructions of its comparative negligence statute to mold Minnesota's comparative negligence statute to strict liability cases, but
the statute applies only to "damages . . . resulting in death or injury to person or property."180 The application of the comparative
negligence statute to claims involving economic loss does not fit
within the statute.
Although the statute does not apply to cases that ordinarily fit
within the Uniform Commercial Code, the Code seems to provide
latitude for the adoption of comparative principles to apportion
loss. 181 The motivation for adopting a comparative negligence
statute, the desire to avoid the all-or-nothing common-law approach to defenses, applies equally to cases involving economic
loss.
Even if comparative fault is not applied to warranty claims involving economic loss, there should be no impediment to its application in cases involving personal injury and property damage
that traditionally fall within the scope of negligence and strict tort
liability. The very closeness of negligence, strict liability, and warranty in these cases mandates such a result. 182
D.

Summary

The defenses to a negligence cause of action were merged in the
supreme court's decision in Springrose v. Wzllmore .183 Following
Sprzngrose, the sole issue is whether the plaintiff exercised reason178. St-"', .,..g., Kleven v. Geigy Agricultural Chems., 303 Minn. 320, 227 N.W.2d 566
(1975).
179. S.,..,. Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 90-94, 179 N.W.2d 64, 69-71
(1970) (discussing distinction between strict liability in tort and breach of express or implied warranty).
180. Act of May 23,1969, ch. 624, § 1, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069, 1069-70 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 604.01(1) (1978».
181. Candid recognition of the judicial power to formulate comparative fault in strict
tort cases should compel the conclusion that comparative principles can readily be applied
in the economic loss context. S.,..,. Fischer, supra note 122, at 449.
182. St-.,. Levine, BZ!JIff's Conduct as Ajfocting th.,. Extmt qf Manu.lactum·'s Liabilz?y in Warranljl, supra note 122, at 662-63.
183. 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971).
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able care for his own safety.184 In the strict liability context, defenses have become more complicated. New terminology and
classification problems have created difficulties that do not exist
under negligence law. 185 The court's decision in Busch, applying
the comparative negligence statute to claims based on strict liability, should resolve much of the confusion.
Busch has substantially standardized the defenses in products liability cases. By applying the comparative negligence statute to
strict liability claims, the treatment of negligence and strict liability defenses becomes uniform, with the single exception carved out
by Busch-negligence consisting of a failure to discover the defect
or an unreasonable failure to guard against its existence.
Although the exception is subject to criticism for a variety of
reasons, and although it will be difficult to administer in practice,
the exception should be uniformly applied to both negligence and
strict liability claims to avoid the inconsistencies that will otherwise occur in consideration of defenses. The defenses to warranty
actions should also be subject to Busch, at least when the claim is
for property damage or personal injury. The rationale of the
court's decisions commencing with Nelson lJ. Anderson 186 seems to
mandate a tort treatment of warranty defenses in such cases.
Although the exact method of loss allocation is not as important
as acceptance of the concept of comparative fault, the fault allocation procedure adopted in Busch seems to require a comparison of
conduct labeled as fault. Fault consists of negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty; conduct giving rise to liability under
any of those theories will be compared to the plaintiff's contributory fault.
Fault allocation creates some potential for confusion. Several
alternatives have been suggested for allocating fault in products
liability cases,187 but it appears that no matter which method is
suggested, all methods will invariably involve a comparison of the
conduct of the involved parties, if that conduct can be labeled
"fault." "Fault" includes failure to exercise reasonable care as well
as the conduct of a product seller in placing a defective product on
the market. 188
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Su notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 35-121 supra and accompanying text.
245 Minn. 445, 72 N.W.2d 861 (1955).
Su notes 127-30 supra and accompanying text.
See UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1(b) & Comment.
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The fault allocation process is not a predictable one, but comparative fault should be no more unpredictable or difficult to administer than the comparative negligence procedure administered
in Minnesota over the last ten years.
III.

CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY

In addition to the problems in determining how loss will be allocated between a plaintiff and defendant, similar problems arise in
determining how to allocate loss among multiple defendants.
Questions concerning contribution or indemnit y 189 may arise in
several contexts. One party in the chain of manufacture and distribution may seek contribution or indemnity from another party
in the chain, or a party in the chain may seek contribution from a
party outside the chain. This may arise when the seller seeks contribution from a product user or consumer whose negligence contributed to the plaintiff's injuries or the claim may arise in the
context of workplace injuries when the product seller seeks contribution from a negligent employer.
A.

Contrzoution Outside the Chazn

I.

0/ Distrzoutlon

Non- Workplace Injury Contrzoutlon Claims

Contribution outside the workplace injury context may involve
claims by product users or consumers who seek contribution from
a product seller. Conversely, a party in the chain of distribution
may seek contribution from the user or consumer or other contributing party.
In cases involving contribution claims between negligent users
or consumers, contribution would seem to present no problem.
The question seems to be more complicated, however, when a
strictly liable party in the chain seeks contribution from a negligent user or consumer.l90 As a matter of common sense it would
seem that the result should not differ. If contribution is available
to a negligent party in the chain it should also be available to a less
culpable party, one held liable solely on the basis of strict liability.191
189. For an explanation of how the theories of contribution and indemnity operate, see
Note, supra note I, at 110-18.
190. See II U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY: FINAL REPORT OF LEGAL STUDY 142-44 (1977) [hereinafter cited as LEGAL
STUDY].
191. q: Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 738, 742-43, 575 P.2d 1162,
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In Busch D. Busch Construction, Inc. ,192 the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that contribution would be available to General Motors Corporation against Lando Busch, the driver of the vehicle,
even though Busch's liability was predicated on negligence and
General Motor's on strict liability.193 There was one qualification
on the right of contribution, however: "[A] user or consumer who
fails to discover a defect cannot be liable for contribution to a
strictly liable distributor." 194 Because Lando Busch was a plaintiff
as well as a codefendant in the suit, the court held that consistency
dictated that the negligent failure to discover a defect, which was
not a legitimate defense matter, could not be the basis for the manufacturer's contribution claim.
Because of the special qualification in Busch, when a contribution claim is asserted against a product user or consumer, the assumption can be made that Busch would be inapplicable to
prevent contribution claims asserted against parties other than
users or consumers. For example, in cases in which an individual's
intoxication is a contributing factor, a contribution claim against
the dram shop would lie without the Busch restriction,195 as would
a contribution claim against a negligent intervening party, such as
a driver of another involved motor vehicle.
In addition, although the particular concern of the court in
Busch was the contribution claim of the manufacturer against the
product user, contribution would also work against the manufacturer. Thus, any party from whom contribution could be claimed
by a manufacturer should be able to assert a contribution claim
against the manufacturer.
1169-70, 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380,387-88,390 (1978) (merger of strict liability into comparative fault obviates absurd result allowing plaintiff who assumed risk to recover under
negligence theory but not strict liability).
192. 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977).
193. Su id. at 393-94.
194. Id. at 394 n.17.
195. Although comOlon liability will be necessary to support a claim of contribution,
the basis of liability may differ. Su Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. Village of Rose Creek, 302
Minn. 282, 284-85, 225 N.W.2d 6, 8-9 (1974). Busch was not specifically concerned with
dram shop claims, but legislative application of comparative negligence to dram shop
claims, see MINN. STAT. § 340.95 (1978), coupled with Busch, should make comparative
fault principles applicable to contribution claims between dram shops and manufacturers.
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The Workplace l1ljury
a.

The Polif')!

Until the supreme court's 1977 decision in Lambertson D. Cincinnati
COrp.,196 the right of a third party to claim contribution from a
plaintiff's employer was barred because of the lack of common liability between the employer and the third party, based on the employer's immunity from suit by an injured employee granted by
the workers' compensation act. 197 The only remedy available to a
third party to shift loss to an employer was a limited right to indemnity.198 At one point, the Legislature amended the workers'
compensation act to circumscribe even the right to indemnity,199
but the supreme court found the amendment unconstitutional. 2oo
Although the court had questioned the fairness of the no-contribution rule,201 it remained intact until Lambertson was decided.
In deciding whether contribution should be allowed, the Lambertson court delineated the conflicting interests involved:
196. 312 Minn. 114,257 N.w.2d 679 (1977).
197. The workers' compensation act is the exclusive source of the employee's right to
recover against his employer. s",t' MINN. STAT. §§ 176.021(1), .031 (1978). Because the
employer is not liable to the employee in tort there can be no common liability of the
employer and third party to the employee, thus precluding a contribution claim by the
third party against the employer. s",t' Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258
Minn. 368, 371-72, 104 N.W.2d 843,847-48 (1960), olJt'TTUled in part on other grounds, Tolbert
v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 368 n.11 (Minn. 1977).
198. s",t' Keefer v. Al Johnson Constr. Co., 292 Minn. 91,100,193 N.W.2d 305, 310-11
(1971) (general contractor held vicariously liable allowed indemnity against subcontractor); Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 349,364-65,63 N.W.2d 355, 365 (1954) (automobile owner held liable on basis of financial responsibility act allowed indemnity against
employer). In Lambertson Cincinnati Corporation sought indemnity from Hutchinson, the
plaintiff's employer, on the basis that had Hutchinson purchased the safety devices offered
to it by Cincinnati the accident would have been avoided. The supreme court found
indemnity to be inappropriate:
The difficulty with this argument lies in the jury's unchallenged finding that
Cincinnati was 25-percent negligent in the first instance, when it placed its press
brake in the stream of commerce without certain kinds of safety devices. Since
the independent acts of negligent manufacture and sale by Cincinnati and refusal of safety devices by Hutchinson combined to produce plaintiff's injury, liability should be apportioned between them, not shifted entirely to one or the
other.
312 Minn. at 127, 257 N.W.2d at 688.
Given the fact that active fault will always be involved when a manufacturer places a
defective product into the stream of commerce, the remedy of indemnity would be particularly restricted in the products liability context.
199. s",t' Act of June 4,1969, ch. 936, § 4, 1969 Minn. Laws 1804, 1806 (repealed 1976).
200. s",t' Carlson v. Smogard, 298 Minn. 362,369,215 N.W.2d 615, 620 (1974).
201. s",t' Haney v. International Harvester Co., 294 Minn. 375, 382-83, 201 N.W.2d
140, 144-45 (1972).
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If contribution or indemnity is allowed, the employer may be
forced to pay his employee-through the conduit of the thirdparty tort feasor-an amount in excess of his statutory workers'
compensation liability. This arguably thwarts the central concept behind workers' compensation, i.e., that the employer and
employee receive the benefits of a guaranteed, fixed-schedule,
nonfault recovery system, which then constitutes the exclusive
liability of the employer to his employee. . . . If contribution
or indemnity is not allowed, a third-party stranger to the workers' compensation system is made to bear the burden of a full
common-law judgment despite possibly greater fault on the
part of the employers. This obvious inequity is further ex. acerbated by the right of the employer to recover directly or
indirectly from the third party the amount he has paid in compensation regardless of the employer's own negligence. . . .
Thus, the third party is forced to subsidize a workers' compensation system in a proportion greater than his own fault and at
a financial level far in excess of the workers' compensation
schedule. 202
Stating the varying interests of the parties served to identify the
problem, but two questions remained: whether contribution
should be allowed in spite of the commOn liability impediment
and if so, how much contribution?
The Lambertson court disposed of the commOn liability impediment on two bases. The court first noted that although there is no
common liability between the employer and third party in tort,
both are responsible for the employee's injuries, the employer
through the workers' compensation system and the third party
through the tort system. 203 More importantly, relying on the flexibility and equitable nature of the remedy of contribution, the
court held that contribution "should be utilized to achieve fairness
on particular facts, unfettered by outworn technical concepts like
common liability."204
The court perceived the second problem, deciding just how far
202. 312 Minn. at 120,257 N.W.2d at 684 (citations omitted).
203. Id. at 128, 257 N.W.2d at 688. The court's ready disposition of the common liability impediment gave rise to speculation that common liability would no longer be an
impediment to contribution in any case. The court has subsequently made clear, however, that common liability is still a requirement for contribution. Se~ Conde v. City of
Spring Lake Park, 290 N.W.2d 164, 165-66 (Minn. 1980); Hart v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 276
N.W.2d 166, 168-69 (Minn. 1979), discuss~d in Comment, Intnvmtion,Joind~r, and Issu~ Pr~
c/usion: A New Look at Tort Claim Procedures, 6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 361 (1980). Su
gl!1lnally Note, supra note 1, at 146-49.
204. 312 Minn. at 128, 257 N.W.2d at 688.
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to extend the right of contribution, to be the most difficult. The
court recognized the superiority of a legislative solution to the
problem,205 but it nonetheless decided to allow limited contribution by the third party against the employer:
. While the opinions of other jurisdictions must be read with
caution on this issue because of different statutes and concepts
of recovery in negligence cases, we have found direction in the
approach taken by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. That
court has allowed contribution from the employer up to the
amount of the workers' compensation benefits. This approach
allows the third party to obtain limited contribution, but substantially preserves the employer's interest in not paying more
than workers' compensation liability. While this approach may
not allow full contribution recovery to the third party in all
cases, it is the solution we consider most consistent with fairness
and the various statutory schemes before US. 206

Following the decision in Lambertson, a petition for rehearing and
clarification was filed by one of the defendants. The rehearing was
denied, leaving open the question of the exact formula for loss apportionment.
b.

The Method oJ Allocation

Although there a're several potential methods for allocating loss
among an employer, employee, and third party, the supreme court
ended speculation on the matter when it decided Johnson lJ. Raske
Budding Systems, Inc. 207 In Johnson the court established a threestep procedure for allocating loss. The procedure requires the
third party to first pay the full amount of the verdict to the plaintiff. 208 Second, the employer is required to contribute to the third
party tort feasor an amount proportionate to its fair share of the
judgment, as determined by its percentage of negligence, but not
to exceed its workers' compensation liability.209 Third, the employee is required to reimburse the employer according to the
scheme set out in section 176.061, subdivision 6(c) of the Minnesota Statutes. 210
205. Id. at 129, 257 N.W.2d at 688.
206. Id. at 130, 257 N.W.2d at 689 (citations omitted).
207. 276 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1979).
208. Id. at 81.
209. Id.
210. Id. It is possible that the employer's reimbursement right could be completely
avoided in a settlement. In Naig v. Bloomington Sanitation, 258 N.W.2d 891 (Minn.
1977), the supreme court established that:
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Because this procedure hinges in large part on the method of
If an employee settles only those claims not subject to subrogation by the employer, the employer in no way is prejudiced by the settlement. It possesses not
only the right to intervene in the employee's suit but also the right to maintain
actions in its own name to enforce its subrogation rights and recover expenses for
medical treatment. . . . Crediting part of such a settlement to the employer
effectively precludes the employee from seeking a settlement of his own claims.
So long as the employer is notified of negotiations leading to such a settlement so
that it can appear or intervene to protect its interest and so long as the employee
demonstrates that the settlement concerns only damages not recoverable under
workers' compensation, or allocates the settlement into recoverable and
nonrecoverable claims, the employer cannot credit the nonrecoverable portion of
the settlement against compensation payments. By pursuing this course, however, the employee waives his statutory right to one-third of the employer's net
recovery from the third-party.
Id. at 894 (footnote and citations omitted); if. Sutley v. North Central Airlines, 30 Minn.
Workers' Compo Dec. 294 (1978) (employer can settle its claim against third party, avoiding employee's statutory claim).
If the claim against the third party is settled only for those losses not recoverable in
workers' compensation, the third party should be unable to claim contribution from the
employer. Although the employer, if negligent, is responsible in part for causing the injuries giving rise to the claim against the third party, the third party's contribution claim
exists only to the extent of the employer's workers' compensation liability. If the contribution claim by the third party is allowed against the employer, the employer, deprived of
any reimbursement right under section 176.061, subdivision 6, would be held liable for an
amount far exceeding its workers' compensation liability. Given the evil the supreme
court wished to avoid in Lamb~rtson, disallowing the contribution claim while allowing a
negligent employer reimbursement, the contribution remedy should not exist when the
employer has no reimbursement right in the proceeds of the tort settlement.
If the claim is settled pursuant to Naig, however, the possibility exists that the employer will have a separate claim against the third party. Even without the Naig release,
the employer retains a separate cause of action against the third party for medical expenses paid to the employee. S~~ Travelers Ins. Co. v. Springer, 289 N.W.2d 131 (Minn.
1979) (action created by MINN. STAT. § 176.061(7) (1978)). This right creates the possibility that the at-fault employer may seek to obtain reimbursement from the at-fault third
party who would ordinarily have a contribution claim against the employer. There are at
least two possible solutions to this problem. First, the employer could be allowed reimbursement, with the amount reduced by the employer's percentage of negligence. However, this would allow the employer to be reimbursed in situations in which the third party
claim, if asserted following the statutory distribution of the proceeds of a tort judgment or
settlement, would completely avoid the employer's claim for reimbursement. This makes
the second alternative preferable: the employer should be allowed reimbursement only to
the extent that the amount of reimbursement would exceed the employer's fair share of
the judgment as determined by its percentage of negligence.
The Naig case also raises the possibility that, aside from settlement, the same formula
could be applied to a judgment, if the special verdict form distinguishes between workers'
compensation and non-workers' compensation losses. In effect, Naig rewrites the statute
insofar as the employer's reimbursement right can be avoided by specifying that a settlement is for non-workers' compensation losses. There would seem to be no reason why the
same could not be done with a judgment. If the special verdict form provides for breaking
the tort award into losses recoverable and non-recoverable under workers' compensation,
the statutory method of distribution would be altered. While the exact amount of money
a'vailable for distribution would depend on how attorney's fees and costs are assessed as to
each type ofloss, su Bradt, Third Party Actions, in WORKERS' COMPENSATION, SKILLS AND
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allocating the proceeds of a third party action established in section 176.061, subdivision 6,211 that section must be examined
before the impact of the procedure set out inJohnson can be understood. Both Lambertson andJohnson were decided under a version
of the workers' compensation statute that did not provide for the
proportionate sharing of fees and expenses by the employer. In
1976 the statute was amended to require the employer to share a
proportionate amount of fees and expenses. 212 Once both versions
are understood, the statute may be integrated with the procedures
established inJohnson to determine how the contribution claim will
be enforced and what its impact will be on the rights of the employer and third party.213
1.

The Pre-/976 Statute

Prior to the 1976 amendment the statute read as follows:
The proceeds of all actions for damages or settlement thereof
under section 176.061, received by the injured employee or his
dependents or by the employer as provided by subdivision 5,
shall be divided as follows:
PRACTICE 74-75 (Minn. Continuing Legal Education 1979), the apportionment could
have an impact on the third party's claim against the employer. The amount might be
more or less than if no differentiation between types of losses is made.
211. MINN. STAT. § 176.061(6) (1978 & Supp. 1979).
212. Act of Apr. 3, 1976, ch. 154, § 2, 1976 Minn. Laws 449, 449-50 (current version at
MINN. STAT. § 176.061 (6) (1978 & Supp. 1979».
213. A 1979 amendment to the workers' compensation act raises yet further complications:
(b) If an employer, being then insured, sustains damages due to a change in
workers' compensation insurance premiums, whether by a failure to achieve a
decrease or by a retroactive or prospective increase, as a result of the injury or
death of his employee which was caused under circumstances which created a
legal liability for damages on the part of a party other than the employer, the
employer, notwithstanding other remedies provided, may maintain an action
against the other party for recovery of such premiums. This cause of action may
be brought either by joining in an action described in clause (a) or by a separate
action. Damages recovered under this clause shall be for the benefit of the employer and the provisions of subdivision 6 shall not be applicable to such damages.
MINN. STAT. § 176.061 (5) (b) (Supp. 1979).
One can only speculate how the employer's right relates to the third party's contribution claim. If the employer's negligence has contributed to his employee's injuries, along
with the negligence or fault of the third party, the employer could have a claim for increased premiums against the third party while the third party will have a contribution
claim against the employer. The only way the two rights could be balanced is to offset the
amount of the employer's claim from the third party's claim. To the extent that the employer's claim exceeds the third party's claim, the third party would have an additional
obligation to pay the employer for the amount the employer's claim exceeds the third
party's contribution claim.
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(a) After deducting the reasonable cost of collection, including but not limited to attorneys fees and burial expense in excess of the statutory liability, then
(b) One-third of the remainder shall in any event be paid to
the injured employee or his dependents, without being subject
to any right of subrogation.
(c) Out of the balance remaining, the employer shall be reimbursed for all compensation paid under Minnesota Statutes,
Chapter 176.
(d) Any balance remaining shall be paid to the employee or
his dependents, and shall be a credit to employer for any compensation which employer is obligated to pay, but has not been
paid, and for any compensation that such employer shall be
obligated to make in the future. 214

The following hypothetical illustrates the operation of the section:
ILLUSTRATION I
Employee receives $ J00,000 as the proceeds oja tort judgment against the
Third Party. The foes and costs are $1~00o. The Employee has prevz'ous(y received $20,000 in workers' compensation benefits.

The statute requires the following steps:
a. $100,000 (Proceeds) - $40,000 (Fees and Costs) = $60,000.
b. One-third (Employee's share) X $60,000 = $20,000.
c. $40,000 (remainder) is available for reimbursement of the
employer. Because the employer has paid $20,000 in benefits, it will be reimbursed in full.
d. The balance remaining, $20,000, is a credit to the employer
for future compensation benefits.

The employer would have no additional obligation to pay workers'
compensation benefits until the credit is exhausted.
There are situations, however, in which the employer will not be
fully reimbursed for workers' compensation benefits paid. To illustrate assume the following hypothetical:
ILLUSTRATION II
Employee receives $100,000 as the proceeds oja tort judgment against the
Thzrd Party. The foes and costs are $1~000. Workers' compensation
benefits have been paid in the amount oj $6~000.

The statute would dictate the following distribution:
a.
b.

$100,000 (Proceeds) - $40,000 (Fees and Costs) = $60,000.
One-third (Employee's share) X $60,000 = $20,000.

214. Act of Apr. 25, 1969, ch. 199, § 2, 1969 Minn. Laws 307, 309 (current version at
MINN. STAT. § 176.061(6) (1978 & Supp. 1979».
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$40,000, the remainder, is available for reimbursement.
Because the full $40,000 is taken up by the employer's reimbursement right, there is no credit.

The employer has thus paid $60,000 in workers' compensation
benefits to the employee, but has been reimbursed only in the
amount of $40,000.
ll.

The Post-/9J6 Statute

The statute was amended in 1976 to remedy the inequity involved in allowing an employer to be reimbursed for workers' compensation benefits paid without sharing the fees and costs
expended in obtaining that recovery. The amendment reads as
follows:
(c) Out of the balance remaining, the employer shall be reimbursed in an amount equal to all compensation paid under
chapter 176 to the employee or his dependents by the employer
less the product of the costs deducted under clause (a) divided
by the total proceeds received by the employee or his dependents from the other party multiplied by all compensation paid
by the employer to the employee or his dependents. 215

The statutory formula for sharing fees and expenses is as follows:
Fees and Costs
X Benefits = Employer's share.
P
d
rocee s
As applied to the first illustration, the employer's share of the fees
and expenses would be $8,000:
$40,000 (Fees and Costs) X $20000 (W C b
fit) = $8000
$100,000 (Proceeds)
, . . ene s
,.
With the amendment the statutory apportionment yields a different result:
ILLUSTRATION III
Employee receives IJO~OOO as the proceeds ofa tortjudgment agaz1zst the
Third Party. The foes and costs are 11~00o. The Employee haS previously received 120,000 in workers' compensation benefits.

The statute requires the following distribution:
a. $100,000 (Proceeds) - $40,000 (Fees and Costs) = $60,000.
b. One-third (Employee's share) X $60,000 = $20,000.
c. $40,000 remains. Out of this amount the employer is reimbursed in an amount equal to its workers' compensation
benefits paid ($20,000) less its proportionate share of fees
215. Act of Apr. 3, 1976, ch. 154, § 2, 1976 Minn. Laws 449, 449-50 (current version at
MINN. STAT.. § 176.061(6)(c) (1978 & Supp. 1979».
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and costs (forty percent of $20,000 = $8,000). The employer thus receives $12,000.
d. $20,000, the balance remaining, constitutes a credit against
future benefits. 216
Before the amendment, the employer would have been reimbursed
in full for workers' compensation benefits paid. After the amendment, the right of reimbursement is reduced by the employer's
proportionate share of fees and expenses.
ILLUSTRATION IV
Employee receives $100,000 as the proceeds ofa tort judgment against the
Third Party. The foes and costs are $40,000. Workers' compensation
benefits have been paid in the amount of $60,000.

The following distribution would result:
a. $100,000 (Proceeds) - $40,000 (Fees and Costs) = $60,000.
b. One-third (Employee's share) X $60,000 = $20,000.
c. $40,000 remains. Out of this amount the employer is reimbursed in an amount equal to either: (1) workers' compensation benefits paid less its proportionate share of fees and
costs (forty percent of $60,000 = $24,000) or $36,000, or (2)
the amount remaining for reimbursement, $40,000, less its
proportionate share of fees and costs based on the amount
remaining for reimbursement (forty percent of $40,000 =
$16,000) or $24,000. 217
d. No credit remains.
216. The employer's share of the fees and costs should not become part of the credit.
Because the employer is entitled to reimbursement in the amount of $20,000, less its proportionate share of fees and costs, making the fees and costs part of the credit would
enable the employer to avoid its statutory obligation. A contrary position is taken in
Bradt, supra note 210, at 73.
217. The illustration establishes two potential ways of computing the employer's obligation to bear a portion of fees and costs. If the employer's obligation to bear a portion of
the fees and expenses is tied to the amount of workers' compensation benefits paid, irrespective of the amount actually available for reimbursement, the net result is that whenever the workers' compensation benefits paid exceed the remainder available for
reimbursement, the employer will be entitled to reimbursement in a greater amount than
if the employer's obligation were based on the amount left for reimbursement.
This question arose in a recent workers' compensation court of appeals case, Kealy v.
St. Paul Hous. & Redev. Auth., No. 475-66-5184 (Minn. Workers' Compo Ct. App. Feb.
15, 1980). The accident involved took place on December 10, 1976, after the effective date
of the 1976 amendment to the workers' compensation act providing for the sharing of fees
and expenses by the employer. The relevant facts upon which the distribution of the
proceeds of the tort settlement was made were as follows:
Compensation paid prior to third
party recovery
$30,283.49
Third party proceeds (settlement)
$49,000.00
Legal costs
$16,787.69
iri., slip op. at 2. The statutory method of apportioning the proceeds of the tort settlement yielded the following results:

.see
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Irrespective of which method of computing the employer's share of
fees and costs is used, the problem of the employer receiving less
than the workers' compensation benefits paid is aggravated.
I. $49,000 (settlement) - $16,787.69 Oegal costs) = $32,212.31
2. One-third (employee's share) X $32,212.30 = $10,737.44
3. Remainder = $21,474.87
S.... id. The principal issue in the case concerned the treatment of attorney's fees and costs.
If the statute were adhered to strictly, the employer would be entitled to reimbursement in
the amount of workers' compensation benefits paid ($30,283.49) less its share of the legal
costs
$16,787.69
)
X $30,283.49 = $10,375.03 .
(
$4 9 ,000.00
The employer would thus be entitled to reimbursement in the amount of $19,908.19, an
amount close to the amount of the remainder of $21,474.87. See la. Instead of following
this method, the workers' compensation division made the statutory obligation to bear a
percentage of the fees and costs turn on the amount available for reimbursement, rather
than on the amount of workers' compensation benefits paid. The method of computation
utilized by the Division was as follows:
I. Legal Costs
Total Third Party Recovery
$16,787.69
$49,000.00 = 34.2606%
2. $21,474.87 less (34.26% X $21,474.87) = $14,117.58

The Division then held that the total and maximum reimbursement to the insurer was the sum of $14,117.58 and that the insurer would in the future have to
pay to the employee 100% of the compensation benefits that might be payable in
the future beyond the $30,283.49 previously paid and utilized in its determination. Thus, the Division in its computation held that the dollar amount of the
"balance remaining" less the insurer's proportionate share of attorney's fees was
a limiting factor or "cap" or a "ceiling" on the dollar amount of "all compensation paid" in applying paragraph c of Subd. 6.
Id. (footnote omitted). The court also noted that:
An implied corollary to the Division's formula, of course, was that if the figures
had been such that after an application of their formula technique, the insurer
would have been left with a credit of "any balance remaining" under Subd. (d)
the insurer would have had to pay to the employee a proportionate share of
attorneys fees as their future compensation liability accrued.
Id., slip op. at 5 n.2 (citing Cronen v. Wegdahl Coop. Elevator Ass'n, 278 N.W.2d 102
(Minn. 1979».
If adhered to, the court of appeals' opinion establishes a number of critical points in
the interpretation of Lambertson. First, it makes clear that the computation of the employer's share of attorney's fees and expenses ultimately depends not on workers' compensation benefits paid, but rather on the amount of the remainder available to satisfy the
employer's reimbursement right. To avoid disadvantage to either the employee or employer, the statutory percentage of fees and costs
Fees and costs)
(
Benefits paid
should be applied to the workers' compensation benefits paid, unless the amount available
for reimbursement is less. In that event, the statutory formula would be applied to the
amount of the remainder, with the fees and costs subtracted from the remainder. In effect,
subdivision 6(c) would read as follows:
Out of the balance remaining the employer shall be reimbursed in an
amount equal·to all compensation paid (or, if the amount is less, the balance
remaining) to the employee or his dependants by the employer less the product
of the costs deducted under clause (a) divided by the total proceeds received by
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Although in absence of the provision requiring sharing of fees
and expenses by the employer the employer might not be reimbursed in an amount sufficient to cover workers' compensation expenses, in cases to which the amendment applies insufficient
reimbursement will be the usual result.
The final question that arises in the construction of section
176.061, subdivision 6 concerns the impact of the amendment on
future losses. In the third illustration, the employer received a
credit in the amount of $20,000 against workers' compensation
benefits that otherwise would be payable but for the credit. If the
assumption is made that following the apportionment, the employee incurs additional expenses for which workers' compensation
benefits would have been paid but for the credit, a problem arises
with respect to the employer's obligation to share fees and costs.
While section 176.061, subdivision 6(d) gives the employer a credit
for proceeds of the tort judgment or settlement, it does not provide
for any future sharing of fees and costs by the employer. To illustrate, assume the same facts as in the third illustration except that
the workers' compensation benefits paid at the time of the judgment were $40,000, rather than $20,000. If $40,000 in benefits had
been paid, the employer's share of the fees and costs would have
been $16,000:
$40,000 (Fees and Costs) X $40000 (Benefits) = $16000.
$100,000 (Proceeds)·'
,
In contrast, under the third illustration, only $20,000 in workers'
compensation benefits had been paid at the time of judgment; the
employer would have paid $8,000 as its share of fees and costs, and
the employer would receive a credit of $20,000. Assume that the
employee then incurs additional expenses in the amount of
$20,000, for which workers' compensation benefits would be paid
but for the credit. The statute does not directly provide for the
sharing of fees and costs by the employer. Thus, if the employer's
credit is not reduced by the same percentage of fees and costs used
to determine the "price" to the employer of reimbursement in the
case in which $40,000 in benefits had been paid at the time of
judgment, an arbitrary result occurs. The advantage to the emthe employee or his dependents from the other party multiplied by all compensation paid by the employer to the employee or his dependents (or, if it is less, the
balance remaining).
Second, the opinion establishes that the employer's share of the fees and costs does not
become part of the credit, but rather is paid to the employee.
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ployer is the same as if reimbursement were available for the full
$40,000, but the "price" for the benefit is only one-half.
To avoid the arbitrary result that would occur if the employer's
obligation to bear a proportionate share of fees and costs does not
extend to the credit, the supreme court, in Cronen v. Wegdahl Cooperatzve Elevator Assocz"atzon ,218 held that the employer's credit will' be
reduced by the same formula used to determine the employer's
share of fees and expenses at the time of judgment. 219 In illustration three, that figure is forty percent.
If the full credit of $20,000 were reduced by forty percent, however, the credit would still be $12,000. The employer would thus
avoid bearing any additional portion of the fees and costs until
that credit was exhausted. To avoid this result and to ensure that
the employer continues to bear a proportionate share of fees and
expenses, the reduction should be applied as expenses are incurred
by the employer. 22o For each dollar of expenses for which workers'
compensation benefits would be payable, the employer should receive a one dollar credit. That credit of one dollar should be reduced by forty percent, requiring the employer to pay forty cents
to the employee for each dollar of expenses incurred by the employee, until the credit is exhausted.
c.

Contrzoutzon

Having established the method of allocating the proceeds of a
judgment or settlement between an employee and employer, the
discussion can proceed to a consideration of the third party's contribution claim against the employer. To illustrate the impact of
218. 278 N.w.2d 102 (Minn. 1979).
219. Id. at 105. In Cronm the plaintiff's decedent died in a car-truck collision. At the
time of the accident, the workers' compensation insurer for Wegdahl Cooperative paid to
the decedent's wife 52,345.80, including benefits for statutory burial expenses and ten
weeks of dependency benefits, covering the period from October 31, 1977 to January 8,
1978. In early January of 1978, the wrongful death claim against the estate of the driver
of the automobile was settled for 5100,000. The case was submitted to the Workers' Compensation Division for calculation of the credit. The attorney's fees were agreed upon at
the rate of 24%.
The distribution resulted in a credit to the employer of 547,272.49. The Workers'
Compensation Division determined that the insurer would be required to "pay 24% of the
benefit entitlement until additional fees and costs in the sum of 511,345.40 in relation to
additional benefit entitlement in the sum of 547,272.49 shall have been paid, at which
time the insurer shall pay 100% of all subsequent benefit entitlement." Relator's Brief and
Appendix at A-13, Cronen v. Wegdahl Coop. Elevator Ass'n, 278 N.W.2d 102 (Minn.
1979) (reprinting Workers' Compensation Division determination of third-party credit).
220. Su 278 N.W.2d at 105.
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Johnson, the right of contribution must be considered in each of the
contexts previously discussed.
I.

Contnoutlon Pnor to the 1976 Amendment

First, as to illustration one, assume the employer is twenty percent at fault and the third party is eighty percent at fault. Graphically,221 the result would be as follows:
Plaintiff-Employee +-- $1 00,000 - - - - - - Third Party
(Proceeds)

i

$20,000
(Contribution)
$20,000
(W.C. Benefits)
$20,000
(Reimbursement) ~
. ~ Employer
The employer's liability is limited by its workers' compensation
liability or its fair share of the judgment as determined by its percentage of negligence. In the hypothetical both figures are the
same. If, however, the third party was sixty percent negligent and
the employer forty percent negligent, the employer's contribution
liability would still be limited to $20,000, the amount of its workers' compensation liability, even though its fair share of the judgment according to its percentage of negligence would be $40,000.
If the facts of illustration two are utilized, and it is assumed that
the employer is sixty percent and the third party forty percent negligent, the following result would be achieved:
Plaintiff-Employee -

$100,000 - - - - - - Third Party

~

prOCeedS)

t

$60,000
(Contribution)

$60,000
(W.C. Benefits)

$40,000
(Reimbursement)

~

Employer

221. The method of illustration is borrowed from Professor Davis. See Davis, ThirdParty Tortftasors'Rights Where Compensation-ColJered Employers are Negligmt-Where Do Dole
and Sunspan Lead? 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 571 (1976).
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The employer has paid $60,000 in workers' compensation benefits,
and $60,000 in contribution to the third party. However, the employer has been reimbursed only in the amount of $40,000. The
employer's total liability thus exceeds its workers' compensation
liability by $80,000.
tt.

Contnoutlon afler the 1976 Amendment

In virtually all cases decided after the effective date of the 1976
amendment, the impact on the employer will be the same as in the
last example, insofar as the employer will have to pay the third
party an amount equal to its workers' compensation liability, but
will not be reimbursed in an amount equal to its workers' compensation liability. To illustrate, assume the facts in illustration three,
in which the tort judgment is $100,000, fees and costs are $40,000,
and workers' compensation benefits paid are $20,000. Also assume
that the third party is eighty percent and the employer is twenty
percent negligent. The following result would be achieved:

r

Plaintiff-Employee_$100,000 - - - - - - T h i r d Party
.
(Proceeds)
$20,000
(Contribution)

$12,000
(Reimbursement)
The employer's total liability is thus $40,000, consisting of
$20,000 in workers' compensation benefits and $20,000 on the contribution claim. The employer is only reimbursed in the amount
of $12,000. The net loss to the employer is thus $28,000, which is
$8,000 more than its workers' compensation liability. As applied
to the second illustration, in which the reimbursement right without the 1976 amendment does not equal workers' compensation
benefits paid, the right to reimbursement would be reduced further with the sharing of fees and costs, making the employer's total
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exposure even greater. 222
The court inJohnson recognized in a footnote to its opinion that
by operation of the amendment the employer would not be reimbursed in an amount equal to its workers' compensation liability.223 Even though the total loss exposure of the employer exceeds
its workers' compensation liability, this result occurs only by payment of its fair share of the fees and costs expended in obtaining
the tort judgment.
The third illustration raises a problem concerning the employer's credit. Assuming that the employer is forty percent and
the third party sixty percent negligent, application of the facts in
illustration three would require the employer to pay to the third
party $20,000, the amount of its workers' compensation liability as
of the time of judgment. The employer's fair share of the judgment is $40,000, but its liability on the contribution claim is limited to $20,000, its workers' compensation liability. The problem
arises when additional expenses are incurred by the employee for
. which benefits would have been paid by the employer, but for the
credit.
When additional expenses are incurred by the employee, Cronen
has established that the employer bears a continuing obligation to
pay to the employee an amount equal to its percentage of fees and
expenses, until the credit is exhausted. The question is whether
the principle established in Cronen should also require the employer to bear a continuing obligation to the third party on the
contribution claim.
Because there is no additional workers' compensation liability
on the part of the employer until the $20,000 credit is exhausted, it
could be argued that the employer would owe no additional obligation to the third party. If there is no additional workers' compensation liability, there can be no additional contribution.
Application of this reasoning, however, would lead to the same
arbitrary result that the supreme court sought to avoid in Cronen.
The third party's right to contribution would be dependent on the
222. In situations such as illustration four, the problem is aggravated. Not only is the
amount remaining for reimbursement insufficient to reimburse the employer, but application of the sharing provision further reduces the amount available. This, in turn, increases
the employer's loss exposure on the third party contribution claim. See note 217 supra and
accompanying text.
223. "In future cases the amount of reimbursement will not equal the benefits actually
paid because of the 1976 amendment to § 176.061, subd. 6 (c)." Johnson v. Raske Bldg.
Sys., Inc., 276 N.W.2d at 81 n.S.
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benefits paid at the time of judgment. If $40,000 in workers' compensation benefits had been paid at the !ime of judgment, rather
than $20,000, the third party's contribution claim would have
been fully satisfied. If Cronen is not applied, however, and the employer has paid only $20,000 in benefits at the time of judgment,
the third party's contribution claim would be limited to $20,000,
even though additional expenses in the amount of $20,000 are
later incurred by the employee.
Just as the employer's obligation to share in fees and costs
should not depend on workers' compensation benefits paid as of
the time of judgment, the right of contribution should not be controlled by the benefits paid at the time of judgment, but should
extend to the credit. To be consistent with Cronen, the employer
should have continuing liability to the third party on the contribution claim. For each dollar of expenses incurred by the employee
for which workers' compensation benefits would be payable but
for the credit, the third party should be entitled to one additional
dollar of contribution. Therefore, the result in Cronen appears to
mandate a continuing obligation on the part of the employer to
share fees and expenses with the employee and a continuing obligation to respond to the third party's contribution claim. Assuming the facts in the third illustration, with the additional fact that
the employee has incurred one dollar of expenses after judgment,
the employer's obligation would be as follows:
Employee

Third Party

~$.40
(Employer's share
of fees and expenses)__

$1.60
(Contribution)

I

Employer
Presently, the employer's obligation to respond to the contribution
claim is not dependent on the benefits paid at the time of judgment. To achieve such a result, the term "workers' compensation
liability" should, for purposes of the contribution claim, be construed to include the credit when expenses are incurred for which
workers' compensation benefits would be payable but for the
credit.
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It could be argued that this result does not necessarily flow from
the Cronen decision, because Cronen involved a statutory construction while extending the contribution claim to the credit does not.
The distinction is of potential significance because the statutory
obligation to pay fees and expenses as the "price" of the credit is
covered by coverage A of the workers' compensation insurance
policy, whereas the payment on the contribution claim would be
covered only by coverage B, the employer's liability portion of the
policy, if it is covered at al1. 224
However, that factor would not seem to be critical given the
court's decision in Johnson. If there is no difficulty in creating a
new liability for the employer in situations in which the employer's
reimbursement does not equal the workers' compensation benefits
paid because of the employer's obligation to pay a portion of the
plaintiff's attorney's fees and expenses, there should be no problem
in extending the third party's right of contribution to the employer's credit. In principle, it is difficult to distinguish the two
situations from a policy perspective.
d.

Implz"cations and Alternatives

Following the procedures established in Johnson and Cronen to
their logical conclusion creates the possibility that the liability of
the employer may in fact exceed its workers' compensation liability. This can occur in several ways: when the 1976 amendment
applies so that reimbursement will not equal workers' compensation benefits paid; when the amount of workers' compensation
benefits paid approximates the amount of the tort recovery; or
when the employer has a credit and the employee incurs additional expenses after settlement or judgment. In addition, new
costs in the form of attorney's fees incurred in defending contribution claims will be added to the employer's costs. The new liability is likely to be significant in terms of the expected frequency and
magnitude of third party claims. 225 The difficulty is in determin224. See 4 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 94.40 (1980).
225. A closed claims study by the Insurance Services Office covering 1976 and the
early part of 1977 has indicated that in slightly more than one-half of the claims for which
payment was made to employees, insureds would have impleaded the employer but for
the sole source remedy rule. In terms of dollars of payment, the percentage was 56%. Su
INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILITY CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY 64-65
(1977). In cases in which the employer would have been impleaded, the economic loss
tended to be greater than in those cases in which there would have been no impleader. See
id. at 66.
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ing if the new liability and costs can be justified.
Given the variety of interests involved in structuring a method
of distributing losses flowing from workplace injuries it is apparent
that no simple solution exists. A number of proposals for modification of the existing system have been made, and some have been
accepted. The proposals range from complete abolition of the
third party action,226 to allowing contribution to the full extent of
the employer's fair share of the judgment or only to the extent of
the employer's workers' compensation lien,227 to a limitation or
elimination of the employer's subrogation interest in the employee's claim against the third party. The method of reallocation
adopted in Lambertson and refined inJo.hnson and Cronen has characteristics of the last two proposals.
The Interagency Task Force on Product Liability considered a
variety of such proposals in its survey of products liability law. 228
226. The proposals for elimination of third party actions are varied. They may range
from elective no-fault insurance, see O'Connell, Harnessing the Liabzlziy Lottery: Elective FirstParlj' No-Fault Insurance Financed 0/ Third-Parlj' Tort Claims, 1978 WASH. V.L.Q. 693, to
elimination of the third party suit, with the savings used to finance higher workers' compensation benefits, su Bernstein, Third Parlj' Claims in Workers' Compensation: A Proposal to
Do More With Less, 1977 WASH. V.L.Q. 543, to the elimination of the third party claim
without making any adjustments in the system at all, as was proposed by Senator Davies
in the 1978 tort reform bill.
Section I of H.F. 338, as introduced by Senator Davies, would have amended Minnesota Statutes section 176.061, subdivision 4 to read as follows:
The provisions of subdivision I, 2, and 3 apply only where the employer
liable for compensation and the other party legally liable for damages are insured or self-insured and engaged in the due course of business, (a) in furtherance of a common enterprise, or (b) the accomplishment of the same or related
purposes in operation on the premises where the injury was received at the time
thereof. For purposes of this subdivision a person is deemed to be engaged in
furtherance of a common enterprise with an employer if the person is in the
chain of manufacture and distribution of a product sold to used or consumed by
an employer in the due cOurse of business and if the liability of the person to the
employee arises from the manufacture sale use or consumption of that product.
H.F. 338, § I, 70th Minn. Legis. 1978 Sess. (underscoring in original). The effect would
have been to eliminate third party suits, but without any quzd pro quo to the employee.
Section I of the bill was stricken in the Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on
Judicial Administration. See Minutes ofMeeting on HF. 338 Be.fore the Minnesota SenateJudiciary Subcommittee onJudlcial Administration, 70th Minn. Legis., 1978 Sess. (Feb. 3, 1978).
For other analyses of these proposals, see VI LEGAL STUDY, supra note 190, at 65-71;
Comment, A Cniique of the Justijications .for Emplqyu SUlis In Stnd Products Liabllziy Agaznst
Third Parlj' Manufacturers, 25 V.C.L.A. L. REV. 125 (1977).
227. See V.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, FINAL REPORT VII-92 (1977) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT); Comment, The
Effict of Workers' Compensation Laws on the Right ofa Third Parlj' Liable to an I'!}ured Emplqyu to
Recover Contn"bution or Indemllliy ftom the Emplqyer, 9 SETON HALL L. REV. 238, 300-03
(1978).
228. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 227, at VII-85 to -113.
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Surprisingly, the Final Report of the Task Force lacks any clear
information concerning the impact of the proposals. There is no
indication that allowing third party claims will have any real impact in the cost of products liability insurance. 229 There is no indication that employer incentives to provide greater safety in the
workplace will be increased if contribution is allowed or subrogation is disallowed. 230 It is also questionable whether imposition of
liability in excess of an employer's workers' compensation liability
will be covered by the employer's liability insurance coverage in
the workers' compensation insurance policy.231 If there is coverage, it is questionable whether the amount will be sufficient to insure an employer in cases in which the tort judgment and workers'
compensation benefits paid are high. 232 Even assuming coverage is
provided, the likelihood of increased claims against employers
make it likely that the cost of insurance will be increased.
Based in part on the Task Force Report, the Department of
Commerce has proposed a Model Uniform Product Liability
229. See zd. at VII-90.
230. See zd. at VII-90 to -91; VI LEGAL STUDY, supra note 190, at 56-57. A major
question concerns whether the rating structure for workers' compensation insurance will
be able to reflect the increased liability of the employer, whether through the contribution
claim by the third party or through elimination of the employer's interest in the third
party recovery by the employee. If experience rating does not exist, it is questionable
whether either remedy will have any impact on the employer's incentive to make the
workplace safer. The theory underlying experience rating "states that the more immediate economic stake the employer has, the greater is the incentive for that employer to
reduce his employees' exposure to injury." MINNESOTA WORKERS' COMPENSATION
STUDY COMMISSION, A REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA LEGISLATURE AND GoVERNOR 152
(1979).
The Study Commission Report points out that in Minnesota, nearly 50,000 employers, constituting 70% of Minnesota employers, are not experience rated. Id. at 153. In
order to be experience rated, the annual policy premium must be larger than 5750. See zd.
at 153. The figure might be misleading, however, since only small employers would not be
experience rated. The proportion of employees working for businesses that are experience
rated would constitute the vast majority of employees in the state.
The critical question, even assuming experience rating, is whether the mechanism
will be able to take into consideration an employer's losses in the form of contribution
claims or through elimination of the employer's reimbursement right. For a discussion of
workers' compensation insurance rating in Minnesota, see zd. at 136-91.
Based upon the study the commission made, a number of recommendations, several
of which related to insurance rating, were made. &t' zd. at 42-49. Many of the recommendations were enacted by the Legislature in 1979. See Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 3, 1979
Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 1256 (amending scattered sections of MINN. STAT. chs. 79, 176
(1978)).
231. &t' 4 A. LARSON, supra note 224; FINAL REPORT, supra note 227, at VII-92 to -93.
232. Coverage B is written in the standard amount of 5100,000 per occurrence.
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Act 233 (Model Act). Section 114 of the Model Act, dealing with
the problem of workplace injuries, provides for an offset from the
tort recovery of any workers' compensation benefits paid or payable and, in addition, eliminates any right of subrogation by the
employer. 234 There would be no need to have the employer involved in the lawsuit, thus avoiding the increase in transaction
costs that would be produced by the litigation of third party
claims. 235 According to the Department of Commerce: "The purpose of the solution adopted in Section 114 is to sharpen employer
incentives to keep workplace products safe without undermining
233. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT §§ 100122, uprintd in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714-50 (1979).
234. Id. § 114,44 Fed. Reg. at 62,740. The section reads as follows:
(A) In the case of any product liability claim brought by or on behalf of
an injured person entitled to compensation under a state Worker Compensation
statute, damages shall be reduced by the amount paid as Worker Compensation
benefits for the same injury plus the present value of all future Worker Compensation benefits payable for the same injury under the Worker Compensation statute.
(B) Unless the product seller has expressly agreed to indemnify or hold an
employer harmless for harm caused to the employer's employee by a product,
the employer shall have no right of subrogation, contribution, or indemnity
against the product seller when the harm to the employee constitutes a product
liability claim under this Act. Also, the employer's Worker Compensation insurance carrier shall have no right of subrogation against the product seller.
(C) When final judgment in an action brought under this Act has been
entered prior to the determination of Worker Compensation benefits, the prod·
uct seller may bring a subsequent action for reduction of the judgment by the
amount of the Worker Compensation benefits, or for recoupment from the em·
ployee if the product seller has paid a judgement [SIC] which includes the amount
·of such benefits.
235. According to the Analysis:
The principal benefit of the approach adopted in Subsections (A) and (B) is
a reduction in litigation transaction costs. Subrogation actions are not allowed.
Furthermore, proceedings under this Act will be streamlined because in cases of
employer negligence, there will be no three-party litigation as to the relative
percentages of fault of employers and manufacturers.
Id. Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,741.
The approach taken by the supreme court in Lambertson was considered but rejected:
The court in that case held that the product manufacturer would be allowed
limited contribution up to the amount of the Worker Compensation lien. This
reduces the inequity against the product manufacturer, but preserves the employer's interest in not paying more than its Worker Compensation liability.
The principal disadvantage of the "Lambertson" approach, as compared with
Section 114, is that "Lambertson" does not reduce transaction costs.
Id. Although approving the result of Lambertson, if not the method, the drafters of the
Model Act made the assumption that the employer's liability would be limited to its workers' compensation lien, an erroneous assumption in light of the court's subsequent decision
in Johnson v. Raske Bldg. Sys., Inc., 276 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1979).
The Model Act also differs from the Minnesota procedure in that third parties will be
able to reduce their liability for workplace injuries even when the employer is not at fault.
See MODEL ACT, Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,741.
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the limited-liability concept that is central to the Worker Compensation system. "236
In light of the uncertain impact of allowing a contribution claim
in excess of workers' compensation liability, the cautious approach
of the Model Act is instructive. The critical point in the proposal
appears to be the preservation of the limited liability that lies at
the heart of workers' compensation acts. Contribution is allowed
to the extent it is consistent with that principle. Although the
Model Act may adopt a more streamlined procedure than the
more cumbersome method adopted by the supreme court inJohnson, the Johnson procedure ensures that the employee will receive
the full benefit to which he is entitled by the Act.
In order to bring the Minnesota procedure into line with the
balance achieved by the Model Act, however, only a slight modification of the Minnesota procedure adopted in Johnson would be
necessary. This could readily be accomplished by adhering to the
apparent intent of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Lambertson to
limit the liability of the employer to that imposed on it by the
workers' compensation act. The best way to achieve that result is
to limit the third party's contribution claim not to the workers'
compensation liability of the employer but by the reimbursement
right of the employer. This would ensure that the basic workers'
compensation insurance "bargain" would not be disrupted, yet it
would limit the right of the employer to obtain reimbursement for
workers' compensation benefits paid to the injured employee. The
suggested approach seems most consistent with the apparent intent
of the court in Lambertson to do the least violence possible to the
statute, while allowing a limited form of contribution by the third
party against the employer.
The result of limiting the third party's contribution claim would
be to preclude contribution in any situation in which the net effect
on the employer would be to increase its loss exposure beyond its
workers' compensation liability. It would mean that in the four
illustrations mentioned at the beginning of this section, no contribution would exist for the excess liability of the employer. In any
case in which the employer is reimbursed in an amount less than
the workers' compensation benefits paid, or in which the employer
is granted a credit and the employee incurs additional expenses for
236.

MODEL ACT,

Analysis,

r~pnnti!d

in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,741.
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which benefits would be payable but for the credit, no additional
liability on the contribution claim would exist.
There may, arguably, be arbitrary results with respect to the
credit because the employer's liability will depend on the benefits
actually paid at the time of the tort recovery. Although the results
may be characterized as arbitrary, there is a significant distinction
between making an employer statutorily liable to the employee for
a continuing proportion of the fees and expenses and creating a
new nonstatutory liability to the third party that may not be covered by workers' compensation insurance.
In addition, in cases in which the employer is required to bear a
proportionate share of the plaintiff-employee's fees and expenses, it
is arguable that the third party should not be required to bear
those expenses by having its contribution claim limited. It must be
remembered, however, that it is the function of the statute to ensure that the employee is reimbursed for the share of fees and expenses properly attributable to the potential or actual benefit
received by the employer. If the employer's share of fees and expenses are not paid to the employee it becomes clear that the recovery the statute intends to guarantee to the employee will be
reduced.
Under the circumstances, the preferable approach appears to be
the cautious approach; the superiority of a legislative solution to
the problem becomes apparent given the uncertainty of the implications of a judicially created contribution remedy that expands
the liability of the employer. Until greater certainty exists, or until
the implications of such an approach are better understood, a limitation of contribution so as to do the least violence possible to the
statutory scheme seems advisable.
e.

Applzcatlon to Stnct Liability Claims

In Lambertson both the employer and third party were negligent.
A final question is whether the third party's claim for contribution
would extend to cases in which the third party is held strictly liable, but not negligent. Because of the court's decision in Busch ll.
Busch Construction, Inc. ,237 there seems to be no reason why a strictly
liable manufacturer would be precluded from obtaining contribution from a negligent employer. Although the basis for fault allocation may change, application of comparative fault in Busch
237. 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977).
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cannot logically be limited to contribution claims against product
users or consumers.

f

Summary

As a result of the supreme court's decision in Lambertson, a negligent third party may obtain contribution from an employer. Following the court's decision in Busch, the right would also extend to
a strictly liable third party.
Lambertson was grounded in the court's desire to avoid requiring
the third party to bear the full burden of the tort judgment in
situations in which the employer's negligence has contributed to
the employee's injury, and to avoid the employer's statutory right
to obtain reimbursement in spite of its fault. The basic approach
adopted in Lambertson thus allows contribution, limited by the
workers' compensation liability of the employer. Although the exact manner of allocating loss among the parties in a third party
action was not specified in Lambertson, the supreme court subsequently clarified the method of allocation in Johnson, which requires the third party to pay the full tort award to the plaintiff, the
employer to pay to the third party the amount of the employer's
fair share of the judgment limited by its workers' compensation
liability, and the employee to reimburse the employer according to
the statutory method for apportioning tort proceeds between employer and employee.
The basic policy of Lambertson seems sound. As a result of the
formula the court adopted for allocating loss in a third party action, however, it becomes possible for an employer to be subjected
to liability that is actually in excess of its workers' compensation
liability. This can occur in a number of ways, with varying degrees of impact on the employer. In such cases, however, the increased liability of the employer does not flow from the workers'
compensation act. Because this raises unresolved questions of insurance coverage and costs, with only a speculative increase in deterrence, the approach advocated in this section has simply been a
return to the fundamental position taken by the supreme court in
Lambertson-that the employer's net liability should not exceed its
workers' compensation liability. To ensure that result, the third
party's right to contribution should be limited to the value of the
employer's reimbursement interest.
Any further modification of the right to contribution in workplace injuries should, ideally, be a matter for legislative solution, a
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preference that the Lambertson court indicated. Although the contribution right established in Lambertson, if appropriately limited, is
probably not the best approach, it is the one that, given creation of
the right to contribution, does the least violence to the workers'
compensation act pending legislative resolution of the problem.
B

ContributIon and Indemmljl in the Chain

of Distnoutlon

When a party in the chain of distribution is held liable for a
product defect, the preferred remedy is to seek indemnity from the
party next highest in the chain. 238 Indemnity provides superior
relief from a retailer's perspective because it results in a full shifting of the loss, whereas contribution shifts only part of the loss.239
In Hendriclcson D. Minnesota Power & Light Co. ,240 the Minnesota
Supreme Court explained the circumstances under which indemnity would be appropriate:
(1) Where the one seeking indemnity has only a derivative or
vicarious liability for damage caused by the one sought to be
charged.
(2) Where the one seeking indemnity has incurred liability
by action at the direction, in the interest of, and in reliance
upon the one sought to be charged.
(3) Where the one seeking indemnity has incurred liability
because of a breach of duty owed to him by the one sought to
be charged.
(4) Where the one seeking indemnity has incurred liability
merely because of failure, even though negligent, to discover or
prevent the misconduct of the one sought to be charged.
(5) Where there is an express contract between the parties
containing an explicit undertaking to reimburse for liability of
the character involved. 241

The Minnesota Supreme Court, in its attempts to do substantial
justice in individual cases without being bound by "any hard-andfast rules," has expanded indemnity as an equitable means of reallocating losses beyond the basic rules established in HendnClcson. 242
238. See 3A L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 44.02[2] at 15-16 to
-17 (1979).
239. See zd. at 15-10.
240. 258 Minn. 368, 104 N.W.2d 843 (1960), olJeTTlI/ed in parI, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus.,
Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68 (Minn. 1977) (abrogating rule 4).
241. Id. at 372-73, 104 N.W.2d at 848. The five Hendni:lcson rules are also examined in
Note, supra note I, at 135-40, 150-58.
242. Sorenson v. Safety Flate, Inc., 298 Minn. 353, 361, 216 N.W.2d 859, 864 (1974).
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A few examples will illustrate the operation of the indemnity
concept in Minnesota products liability cases. In Fa" lJ. Armstrong
Rubber Co. ,243 plaintiffs were injured when the truck in which they
were riding overturned after one if its tires blew out. Plaintiffs
brought suit against the manufacturer of the tire, Armstrong, and
the retailer, Elmer N. Olson Company. The case was submitted to
the jury on theories of breach of warranty as to Olson only, strict
liability in tort as to Olson and Armstrong, and negligent failure to
warn as to Armstrong only. The jury returned a general verdict
against both defendants. 244
The trial court awarded Olson indemnity from Armstrong. 245

In upholding the indemnity award, the supreme court emphasized
the derivative nature of Olson's liability and the lack of any active
misconduct by Olson:
In the instant case, Olson's liability is predicated on or derived from Armstrong's wrongful act. According to the court's
instructions, Olson could be found liable only if it breached an
express or implied warranty, or if it were strictly liable in tort.
There is no evidence of an express warranty given by Olson.
The only statement made by the agent of Olson is that the tires
would be adequate, and this statement is nothing more than a
reaffirmance of what is required under an implied warranty of
merchantability, that is, fitness for the ordinary purposes for
which such goods are used.
Thus, Olson was found liable either on the grounds of breach
of implied warranty or of strict liability in tort. In neither instance did Olson perpetrate any active wrong upon plaintiffs.
Olson could not have found the defect with reasonable inspection, and it was not Olson's responsibility to alter the product
in any way before it was sold. Thus . . . Olson's liability stems
solely from its passive role as the retailer of a defective product
furnished to it by the manufacturer, and it therefore is entitled
to indemnity.246
Indemnity may have been appropriate even in cases in which
the retailer was negligent. In Bjorklund lJ. Hantz, 247 the plaintiff sustained injuries in a snowmobile accident due to a defective throttle
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
Gerber

288 Minn. 83, 179 N.w.2d 64 (1970).
Id. at 87, 179 N.W.2d at 67.
!d. at 87, 179 N.W.2d at 68.
Id. at 96-97, 179 N.W.2d at 72 (footnote omitted).
296 Minn. 298, 208 N.W.2d 722 (1973) (per curiam), overruled in parI, Tolbert v.
Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68, 368 n.ll (Minn. 1977).
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on the snowmobile 248 that struck the snowmobile on which the
plaintiff was riding. The jury attributed forty-five percent of the
negligence to Bombardier, the snowmobile manufacturer, thirty
percent of the negligence to Grover Marine Sales, the retailer, and
twenty-five percent of the negligence to Hantz, the operator of the
snowmobile that struck the plaintiff's snowmobile. The trial court
then granted Grover indemnity from Bombardier. Because
Grover's negligence consisted solely of a failure to discover the defect in the snowmobile, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined
that the trial judge's award of indemnity was appropriate. 249
In cases in which the retailer's negligence consists of more than
failing to discover the defect, however, indemnity might not be
appropriate, unless the retailer's negligence could be labeled passive as compared to the active negligence of the party against
whom indemnity is being sought. In Kenyon lJ. F.M C Corp. ,250 the
plaintiff was injured in a riding lawnmower accident caused by a
malfunction of the lawnmower's clutch mechanism. The jury
found both the retailer and the manufacturer of the lawnmower
negligent. The sole question on appeal was based upon the trial
court's denial of the retailer's claim for indemnity against the manufacturer.25I Because the record supported a finding that the retailer's negligence consisted of more than a failure to discover the
defect, in particular, a failure to warn of dangers of which he was
aware and a failure to properly lubricate the lawnmower prior to
delivery, the court determined that the retailer's acts of negligence
were independent of and concurrent with the manufacturer's negligence, justifying the denial of indemnity.252
Even in cases in which the retailer's or distributor's conduct goes
beyond a failure to inspect a product, indemnity might be appropriate, as in Sorenson lJ. Safety F/ate~ Inc. 253 Sorenson sustained injuries when the rim of a tire he was changing flew off a tire changing
apparatus, striking him. At the time, the plaintiff was using a device called a "Safety-Flater" which was designed to prevent just
such an occurrence. The device was marketed by Safety Flate,
Inc., a corporation that was formed to market the device. The
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. at 299-300, 208 N.W.2d at 723.
See Id. at 301, 208 N.W.2d at 724.
286 Minn. 283, 176 N.W.2d 69 (1970).
Id. at 285, 176 N.W.2d at 70.
See Id. at 287,176 N.W.2d at 71-72.
298 Minn. 353, 216 N.W.2d 859 (1974).

HeinOnline -- 6 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 311 1980

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

312

[Vol. 6

device was fabricated by Standard Metal and was distributed and
sold by Hennessey-Three Star. The Safety-Flater in question was
purchased by Standard Oil from Hennessey-Three Star and was
ultimately purchased from Standard Oil by plaintiff's employer. 254
Hennesey-Three Star, in making its sales presentation to Standard Oil, used a fiyer that illustrated and described the Safety
Flater. It contained the following language:
Whether you change one or fifty tires a day, the danger of
exploding lock rings always exists. Everyone knows the damage
or serious injury that may occur. It only has to happen once.
THE THREE STAR SAFETY FLATER will protect your
. man and enable you to meet insurance underwriters specifications for safety.255

The plaintiff's employer had seen and relied upon the fiyer ill
making the purchase of the Safety Flater. 256
At the close of the trial, the trial judge ruled that Safety Flate,
Inc. and Standard Metal were manufacturers of the product and
that Hennessey-Three Star and Standard Oil were distributors.
The jury found all defendants to be strictly liable. Standard
Metal and Safety Flate were also found to be negligent. Hennessey-Three Star and Standard Oil were determined to have made
and breached an express warranty. The jury apportioned seventyfive percent of the fault to Safety Flate, five percent to Standard
Metal, and ten percent each to Hennessey-Three Star and Standard Oil. The trial court awarded indemnity to Hennessey-Three
Star and Standard Oil from Safety Flate and Standard Metal.
The primary question on appeal concerned the propriety of the
trial court's award of indemnity to Hennessey-Three Star and
Standard Oil.2 57
Because the express warranty in the brochure made no representations encouraging the use of the Safety-Flater in a manner other
than for which it was intended, the supreme court concluded that
the conduct of the distributors was secondary (passive) in relation
to the primary (active) conduct of the manufacturers. 258 Indemnity was thus determined to be appropriate. 259
The Minnesota Supreme Court's decisions in Tolbert ll. Gerber In254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 355, 216 N.W.2d at 860-61.
at 355, 216 N.W.2d at 861.
at 357, 216 N.W.2d at 861.
at 360-61, 216 N.W.2d at 863-64.
at 361,216 N.W.2d at 864.
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dustnes) Inc. 260 and Frt(JIlJ. Montgomery Ward & Co. 261 require a reconsideration of the indemnity principles established in cases such
as Farr) Bjorklund, and Sorenson. The next sections of this Article
will examine the Minnesota court's decisions in Tolbert and Frt(JI to
determine their impact on the law of indemnity in the products
liability context.
I.

Tolbert v. Gerber Industries, Inc.

In Tolbert the plaintiff was injured when a tracks ide loading leg
on which he was working collapsed, causing him to fall to the
ground. 262 The grain handling equipment, of which the loading
leg was a part, was ordered by Schuler, plaintiff's employer, from
Voldco, Inc., a corporation engaged in the construction of grain
elevators and the installation of grain handling equipment. Schuler specified its needs to Voldco and Voldco decided what equipment was necessary, selected Gerber as the supplier, and obtained
and installed the equipment. Based on information supplied by
Voldco, Gerber determined the specific components necessary for
the system. 263
One of the components, an A-valve, which was designed to
carry the grain out toward a hopper car at an angle below horizontal. to allow for the gravity loading of grain, was designed to be
installed at a thirty-five degree angle. Gerber's shipping department sent a forty-seven degree angle A-valve by mistake. The improper angle of the A-valve allowed the loading leg to slip out and
falJ.264
The jury found Gerber and Voldco liable on theories of strict
liability, implied warranty, and negligence; 100% of the negligence
was attributed to Gerber and Voldco jointly.26. . The trial court,
relying on two Minnesota Supreme Court cases in which the court
had held that submission of the comparative negligence question
to the jury under such circumstances would be improper, awarded
Voldco full indemnity from Gerber.266
260. 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. 1977).
261. 258 N.w.2d 782 (Minn. 1977).
262. 255 N.W.2d at 365.
263. Id. at 364.
264. Id. at 365.
265. /d. at 364.
266. /d. The trial court relied on Sorenson v. Safety Flate, Inc., 298 Minn. 353, 216
N.W.2d 859 (1974) and Hillman v. Ellingson, 298 Minn. 346, 215 N.W.2d 810 (1974).
Hillman involved a suit against a school bus driver and two students whose negligent acts
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The Majoriry Opinion

The Minnesota Supreme Court commenced its opinion with an
analysis of the indemnity rules established in HendriCkson D. Mziznesota Power & Light Co. 267 The court determined that the facts fell
within category four of HendricKson, "Where the one seeking indemnity has incurred liability merely because of failure, even
though negligent, to discover or prevent the misconduct of the one
sought to be charged."268
The Tolbert court isolated categories one through three of HendricKson .269 Those categories involve derivative or vicarious liability imposed on the person seeking indemnity 270 when the person
seeking indemnity has incurred liability "by action at the direction, in the interest of, and in reliance upon the one sought to be
charged,271 and where the person seeking indemnity has incurred
liability because of a breach of a duty owed to him by one sought
to be charged. "272 The basis for the separation was as follows:
resulted in injury to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's right eye was injured when a length of
plastic tubing that was being stretched by the two students broke, striking the plaintiff in
the eye. The trial judge submitted the apportionment question to the jury. The jury
found the school bus driver to be 76% at fault and the students each 12% at fault. Because
the school bus driver's negligence was determined to be passive or secondary in relationship to the active, primary negligence of the students, the supreme court determined that
indemnity rather than contribution was the appropriate form of relief for the driver. 298
Minn. at 352, 215 N.W.2d at 814. The interesting aspect of the decision is the contrast
between the jury's perception of loss allocation under which the bus driver would have
borne the greatest share of the judgment, and the court's, under which the entire loss
would be shifted to the students. Se~ id.
267. 258 Minn. 368, 104 N.W.2d 843 (1960), olJerruled in part, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus.,
Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68 (Minn. 1977) (abrogating rule 4); SI!i! text accompanying
notes 240-41 supra.
268. Id. at 373, 104 N.W.2d at 848.
269. 255 N.W.2d at 366.
270. Id. This category of indemnity encompasses cases in which an automobile owner
is held liable for the negligent conduct of a user, S~~ Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn.
349,63 N.W.2d 355 (1954), or in which a general contractor is held liable for the negligent
acts of a subcontractor. See Keefer v. AI Johnson Constr. Co., 292 Minn. 91, 193 N.W.2d
305 (1971).
271. 255 N.W.2d at 366. This second category of indemnity includes cases in which
the person seeking indemnity has acted tortiously, but in which the act on its face appears
to be proper. An example is a case in which a sheriff wrongfully attaches property because
of the misdirection of the person against whom indemnity is sought. Su Henderson v.
Eckern, 115 Minn. 410, 132 N.W. 715 (1911).
272. 255 N.W.2d at 366. The third category involves cases in which the person seeking
indemnity is held liable on the basis of a non-delegable duty. As an example, it includes
cases in which a landlord is held liable for failure to keep property free of obstructions
although the tenant has assumed that obligation. The landlord, held liable on the basis of
breach of a non-delegable duty to keep the premises safe, would be entitled to indemnity
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Cases which fall under Rule 4 are of a very different type
from the others. Aside from cases of contractual indemnity, the
other rules concern parties seeking indemnity who are without
personal fault, but who nevertheless are liable in tort. Rule 4,
however, concerns parties who are themselves culpably negligent but who nevertheless seek to avoid responsibility for the
injury they have caused. The typical example of this is where
the party seeking indemnity has failed to discover or prevent
the negligence or misconduct of another when an ordinarily
prudent person would have done so. Previously, the rule has
been interpreted to apply where the negligence of the party
seeking indemnity was merely 'passive' or 'secondary' as contrasted with the 'active' or 'primary' negligence of the other
tort feasor. 273

In the court's opinion, category four indemnity cases present a
trial judge with a "bewildering array of issues" to resolve. 274 A
court is required to determine whether the negligence of the party
seeking indemnity is passive or secondary275 and whether the
party's negligence is concurrent with the negligence of the party
from which indemnity is sought. 276 Finally, the Tolbert court noted
that indemnity cannot be determined by any hard and fast rules, a
qualification that complicates the indemnity inquiry.277 Abrogating the rule of indemnity in category four cases, the Tolbert court
held that in such cases liability must be apportioned according to
the relative fault of the parties, a result that is tantamount to contribution. 278

b.

The Dissenting Opimans

Justices Kelly and Rogosheske, joined by Justices Todd and
Yetka, dissented. Justice Kelly's dissent was based on two points.
from the tenant, who breached a duty to the landlord. Su Minneapolis Mill Co. v.
Wheeler, 31 Minn. 121, 16 N.W. 698 (1883).
273. 255 N.W.2d at 366-67 (footnote omitted).
274. Id. at 367.
275. Id. The court noted that the active/passive or primary/secondary distinctions
may have emerged from dicta rather than from holdings in cases such as Keefer v. Al
Johnson Constr. Co., 292 Minn. 91, 193 N.W.2d 305 (1971) and Lunderberg v. Bierman,
241 Minn. 349,63 N.W.2d 355 (1954). 255 N.W.2d at 367 n.6.
276. 255 N.W.2d at 367. The determination that a party's conduct is concurrent emphasizes that his liability is neither derivative nor prompted by the party from whom
indemnity is sought. Su White v. Johnson, 272 Minn. 363, 137 N.W.2d 674 (1965), OlJerTU/~d on other grounds, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68, 368 n.ll
(Minn. 1977); Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 272 Minn. 217, 136 N.W.2d 677 (1965).
277. 255 N.W.2d at 367.
278. Su id. at 367-68.
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First, he expressed the opmlOn that fundamental fairness and
sound economic principles required full indemnity when the negligence of the installer consisted only of the failure to discover a
product defect that was not obvious in the process of installation
and directly resulted from the manufacturer's breaches of contract
and warranty to deliver a specified product for a known purpose. 279 Second, and somewhat paradoxically, he felt that the flexibility inherent in the common law indemnity approach had been
destroyed by the majority opinion. 280
In support of his opinion that indemnity should have been
granted, Justice Kelly emphasized the jury's findings that both defendants were strictly liable to the plaintiff and that both defendants had breached warranties to the purchasers. 281 In cases in
which a defendant's liability is based on strict liability and breach
of warranty as well as on negligence, Justice Kelly would have
held that the policies underlying strict liability theory required the
manufacturer, Gerber, to bear the full loss caused by the plaintiff's
injuries. 282
As a final matter, Justice Kelly illustrated the difficulties with
the majority opinion by raising a number of potentially perplexing
questions that could frustrate the comparative negligence inquiry:
In this case, both the manufacturer and the installer were
found liable under theories of negligence, breach of implied
279. See id. (Kelly,j., dissenting). In arguing that indemnity is the appropriate form of
relief in cases such as Tolbert, Justice Kelly relied on Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Williams
Mach. & Tool Co., 62 Ill. 2d 77, 338 N.E.2d 857 (1975), in which the Illinois Supreme
Court, emphasizing the strict tort purpose of ensuring that a loss is ultimately borne by the
manufacturer, allowed a product manufacturer to obtain indemnity from a component
part manufacturer. 255 N.W.2d at 370-71 (Kelly, j., dissenting). Subsequent Illinois
Supreme Court opinions appear to have established that responsibility for product-caused
injuries should be borne by the defendants according to their relative degrees of fault.
This would allow the manufacturer to obtain contribution from either an employer or a
party lower in the chain of distribution, at least in cases in which the conduct constitutes
misuse or assumption of the risk. Stevens v. Silver Mfg. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 41, 44, 374 N.E. 2d
455, 457 (1978) (partial indemnity allowed based on relative degree of employer's misuse
of product that caused plaintiff's injury); Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach.
Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 13,374 N.E.2d 437, 442 (1978) ("there is no valid reason for the continued existence of the no-contribution rule and [there are] many compelling arguments
against it')'
It is not clear whether these cases provide support for Justice Kelly'S opinion. Rather
than disagreeing with Liberty Mutual, these subsequent cases provide more liberal rules of
loss allocation.
280. See 255 N.W.2d at 371-72 (Kelly, j., dissenting).
281. Id. at 370 (Kelly, j., dissenting).
282. Id. at 368-72 (Kelly, j., dissenting).
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warranty, and strict liability, and the majority holds that only
contribution is allowed. What if the case had been submitted
on strict liability alone? What if one or both parties had
breached an express warranty? What if breach of an express
written contractual provision were involved? Regardless of any
problems posed by such questions, the majority would presume
to do justice in all future cases by allowing a jury discretion in
allocating losses, a result, I predict, which will cause a greater
spreading of loss among tortfeasors at the expense of economic
and social policies favoring complete shifting of liability.283
Justice Rogosheske dissented for similar reasons. He agreed
with the majority opinion as to the desirability of apportionment
when liability is predicated solely on negligence; however, given
the facts of Tolbert, Justice Rogosheske suggested that the findings
of strict liability and breach of implied warranty should result in
the granting of full indemnity to Voldco against Gerber.284 He
assumed that the majority opinion would be confined to cases in
which both the manufacturer and retailer or installer are found to
be negligent: "If my assumption is incorrect and apportionment is
to be extended to defective product cases where liability is based
on breach of warranty or strict liability, apportionment of fault
would require a wholly different comparison of the fault-producing relationship between the parties."285 Justice Rogosheske seriously questioned whether an intelligible rule or jury instruction
could be fashioned that would permit a jury rationally to apportion liability. In such cases, the question of indemnity would, in
his opinion, be one for the court.286

2.

Frey v. Montgomery Ward & Co.

The Minnesota court had an opportunity to reconsider its
Tolbert decision in Frey lJ. Montgomery Ward & CO.2B7 In Frey the
plaintiffs brought suit against Montgomery Ward to recover for
damages to their chinchilla herd allegedly caused by the overheating of a space heater purchased from Montgomery Ward for use in
a house trailer where the chinchillas were bred and raised for com:mercial purposes. Plaintiffs received no warnings or instructions
concerning operation of the heater in a confined space. Montgom283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

Id. at 371-72 (Kelly, j., dissenting).
Id. at 372 (Rogosheske, j., dissenting).
Id. (Rogosheske, j., dissenting).
Id. (Rogosheske, J., dissenting).
258 N.W.2d 782 (Minn. 1977).
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ery Ward initiated a third-party action against McGraw-Edison,
the manufacturer of the space heater, and McGraw-Edison impleaded Robertshaw Controls Co., manufacturer of the space
heater control unit. The trial court granted a motion for a directed verdict in favor of McGraw-Edison and a motion for dismissal in favor of Robertshaw, in addition to directing a verdict
against Montgomery Ward on the negligence issue. 288
a.

The Majoriry Opinion

The supreme court reversed the directed verdict as to McGrawEdison and held that the determination of McGraw-Edison's negligence for failure to warn of the dangers of using a space heater in
a confined area was properly a question for the jury.289
One of the additional issues before the court concerned the
proper allocation of responsibility between McGraw-Edison and
Montgomery Ward. 290 Because the liability of both parties might
be predicated on negligence, should the jury so find, the court left
it to the trial court to determine whether category four indemnity
was applicable, in which case Tolbert would be dispositive 291 or, as
suggested by Justice Kelly in his concurring opinion, whether the
case fell within category three, "Where the one seeking indemnity
has incurred liability because of a breach of duty owed to him by
the one sought to be charged. "292
b. . The Concumng OPinion

Justice Kelly concurred in the result reached by the majority,
but attempted to provide some guidance for the trial court if it
would be required to apportion negligence between Montgomery
Ward and McGraw-Edison. Although Justice Kelly had no
problems equating the negligence of Montgomery Ward with that
of McGraw-Edison in failing to warn of the danger, at least with
respect to the plaintiffs, he was of the opinion that the analysis
would differ when the question involved the apportionment of
288. Id. at 784.
289. Id. at 788.
290. Id.
291. /d. at 788-89.
292. Id. at 791 (Kelly, J., concurring specially) (quoting Hendrickson v. Minnesota
Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 373, 104 N.W.2d 843, 848 (1960), overruled in pari on
other grounds, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68, 368 n.ll (Minn.
1977».
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negligence among the defendants. 293
On appeal Montgomery Ward argued that McGraw-Edison
breached an implied warranty of merchantability of fitness for the
ordinary purposes for which such goods are sold by failing to warn
of the dangers of using the space heater in a confined space. 294
Justice Kelly assumed that because the majority opinion contained
no statement to the contrary, Montgomery Ward would be entitled on remand to prove a breach of implied warranty by McGraw-Edison. He also stated that because of reliance on the
expertise of McGraw-Edison, Montgomery Ward should be able
to prove that, as between McGraw-Edison 295 and itself, little or no
culpability was attributable to Montgomery Ward, even though
Montgomery Ward did participate to some extent in the design
process. 296 Justice Kelly commented further that were it not for
Tolbert, he would have held that Montgomery Ward was entitled
to indemnity from McGraw-Edison as a matter of law. 297
Justice Kelly noted that although a retailer might be liable to a
consumer for failing to inspect a product, the retailer might not be
similarly liable to the manufacturer because the retailer may have
reasonably relied on the manufacturer's warranties and expertise. 29B In such situations, Justice Kelly was of the opinion that
category three indemnity would be appropriate. 299
Justice Kelly's concurring opinion was joined in by Justices
Todd and Yetka, as in Tolbert, but not Justice Rogosheske, one of
the Tolbert dissenters. There are important points about the opinions of Justice Kelly in Tolbert and Frey and Justice Rogosheske's
opinion in Tolbert that must be considered.

oJ Cases

3.

To What lYpes

a.

Retailer Negligent; Manufacturer Stnct{y Liable

Will Tolbert App{y?

Tolbert abrogated indemnity in category four cases, but only
when both the retailer and manufacturer are negligent. This holding has the effect of overruling cases such as Bjorklund v. Hantz, 300 as
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
Gerber

258 N.W.2d at 790-91 (Kelly, j., concurring specially).
Id. at 789 (Kelly, j., concurring specially).
Id. at 790 (Kelly, j., concurring specially).
/d. (Kelly, j., concurring specially).
Id. (Kelly, j., concurring specially).
/d. at 790-91 (Kelly, j., concurring specially).
Id. at 791 (Kelly, j., concurring specially).
296 Minn. 298, 208 N.W.2d 722 (1973) (per curiam), olJmu/ed in parI, Tolbert v.
Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 368 n.11 (Minn. 1977).
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the court made clear in its opinion. Less certain is its impact on
other combinations of liability, including the situations presented
in Fa" v. Armstrong Rubber CO.30) and Sorenson v. Saflty Flate, Inc. 302
The key inquiry raised by Tolbert is whether the rules of contribution or indemnity will be applied when the manufacturer is
strictly liable and the retailer is negligent. This issue was raised by
Justice Rogosheske's dissenting opinion in Tolbert, in which he assumed that the majority opinion would be limited to cases in
which both the retailer and manufacturer are negligent.
In spite of the dissent, there are several reasons why the Tolbert
court's abrogation of category four indemnity should be extended
to such cases. First, the result seems to be dictated by the court's
subsequent opinion in Busch v. Busch Constroction, Inc. 303 In Busch
the strictly liable manufacturer, General Motors, was allowed contribution from Busch, a negligent plaintiff and codefendant. 304
Because the claim was for contribution it seems clear the contribution would have worked in favor of Busch as well as General Motors. If a strictly liable manufacturer is able to obtain contribution
from a negligent party outside the chain of distribution, or a negligent party outside the chain can obtain contribution from the
strictly liable manufacturer, there is no reason why contribution
would be inappropriate to adjust losses between a negligent retailer and a strictly liable manufacturer.
Although the assumption was made in Justice Rogosheske's dissent in Tolbert that the nature of the fault comparison would be
substantially different if theories other than negligence were involved, Busch seems to have resolved that problem by recognizing
that strict liability and negligence can be compared. The comparison of fault between a negligent retailer and strictly liable manufacturer should be no more difficult than comparing the fault of a
negligent plaintiff and a strictly liable manufacturer.
A second reason for extending Tolbert to such cases is the policy
underlying abrogation of category four indemnity. Indemnity in
category four cases was abolished in Tolbert because the court perceived a significant distinction between that category of indemnity
and the first three indemnity categories; unlike those seeking indemnity in the first three categories, the retailer is culpably negli301.
302.
303.
304.

288 Minn. 83, 179 N.w.2d 64 (1970).
298 Minn. 353, 216 N.W.2d 859 (1974).
262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977).
Id. at 393-94.
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gent. In addition, the court was concerned with the difficulty
involved in making the indemnity determination, which presented
the trial judge with "a bewildering array of issues" to consider.
The same reasons should apply in cases in which the manufacturer
is strictly liable. The negligent retailer is just as culpable and the
indemnity determination is just as difficult, whether the manufacturer is strictly liable or negligent.
Finally, as a matter of logical consistency, the rule of Tolbert
should be extended to such cases. If Tolbert is not applied, thus
preserving category four indemnity in cases in which the retailer is
negligent and the manufacturer strictly liable, a curious result
would arise. A greater burden would be imposed on the manufacturer even though it is less culpable than if found negligent.
In summary, the court's decision in Busch, the policy of Tolbert,
and logical consistency would seem to compel the extension of
Tolbert to cases in which the retailer is negligent and the manufacturer strictly liable.
b.

Retalter Strictty

Liab/~·

Manufacturer Stnd/y Liable

The Tolbert rationale in eliminating category four indemnity is
to preclude the shifting of the full loss, as a matter of law, from a
retailer to a manufacturer when the retailer has been negligent in
causing the plaintiff's injury, either in failing to discover the defect
or in some other respect. In a case such as Fa" D. Armstrong Rubber
CO.,305 in which there has been no negligent misconduct on the
part of the retailer, the justification for eliminating the right of
indemnity, at least as specified in Tolbert, disappears. The justification for eliminating category four indemnity when the retailer is
negligent is based upon a dislike of the rule of indemnity when it
allows a retailer who has been negligent to recover and a dislike of
complex determinations involved in making the indemnity determination. The first reason for eliminating category four disappears when the retailer is not negligent. The second reason, the
complexity of that determination, is also eliminated when there is
no negligence or active misconduct on the part of the retailer.
There are good reasons from the majority's opinion in Tolbert to
believe that it was not intended to cover situations in which the
retailer or installer is not negligent. First, in criticizing the
305. 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970). For a discussion of Fa", see text accompanying notes 243-44 supra.
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problems created by the active-passive dichotomy, the Tolbert
court referred only to cases that have drawn the distinction when
the party seeking indemnity has been determined to be negligent. 306 Second, in referring to cases that are overruled by Tolbert,
the court made no reference to chain of distribution cases in which
the retailer was not negligent. 307 The specific omission of cases
such as Farr from that listing provides further support for the conclusion that indemnity continues to apply in such cases.
c.

Retazfer Liable on Express Warranty/ Manufacturer Strictly Lzable

Tolbert provides no clear guidelines as to the propriety of granting a retailer indemnity in cases in which the retailer is held liable
on the basis of breach of an express warranty, in addition to implied warranty or strict liability, and the manufacturer is determined to be strictly liable or negligent. In criticizing the difficult
distinctions that must be made in deciding if indemnity is appropriate, the Tolbert court cited Sorenson v. Safety Flate, Inc. ,308 in
which distributors who were held liable on the basis of breach of
express warranty were allowed indemnity against strictly liable
and negligent manufacturers because of the secondary nature of
the distributors' liability in relationship to that of the manufacturers. 309
If indemnity is allowed in such situations, the result that is
reached is somewhat anomalous because the standards used to determine the propriety of indemnity are the same standards the
court criticized in Tolbert. In a case in which a retailer is held liable on the basis of express warranty, the indemnity determination
turns on whether the retailer's conduct can be labeled secondary in
relationship to the conduct of the manufacturer.
In light of the apparent limitation of Tolbert to cases in which
the retailer has been negligent, however, there is no reason to believe that the rule of indemnity would be abrogated in such cases.
This leaves cases in which breach of express warranty is determined to be primary or concurrent with the manufacturer's fault.
In such cases, contribution would be the appropriate remedy. Although Tolbert on its face does not extend to such situations, logic
again compels the conclusion that contribution would be appro306.
307.
308.
309.

Su 255 N.W.2d at 367 & n.6.
Send. at 368 n.11.
298 Minn. 353, 216 N.W.2d 859 (1974).
/d. at 361,216 N.W.2d at 864.
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priate, and that the fair shares of the parties would be determined
on a comparative fault basis. 310
In summary, the key factor in deciding if comparative fault
principles apply should be the nature of the retailer's liability.
The basis of the manufacturer's liabilty may be important in allocating loss, but it should be irrelevant in deciding if comparative
fault principles apply. If a retailer is negligent, in whatever respect, or if the retailer has breached an express warranty and that
breach is determined to be concurrent with the manufacturer's liability, contribution would be appropriate and the shares of the
parties should be determined on the basis of comparative fault
principles. If the retailer is not negligent, but is held liabile on the
basis of strict liability or implied warranty, or express warranty
when the breach is not concurrent with the manufacturer's liability, indemnity should be the appropriate remedy.
1.

Classijication Problems

Justice Kelly's dissenting opinion in To/bert 311 and his concurring opinion in Frey312 raise further complications in the interpretation of the majority opinion in Tolbert. In Tolbert Justice Kelly
took the position that Gerber's breach of warranty with respect to
Voldco should justify an award of indemnity, despite Voldco's
negligence. 313 The negligence finding was labeled superfluous by
Justice Kelly in light of the breach of warranty by Gerber.314 In
Frey Justice Kelly again raised the implied warranty, this time
running from McGraw-Edison to Montgomery Ward, as a justification for an award of indemnity.315 In addition, he indicated
that the presence of a breach of warranty plus the potential breach
of a duty to warn by McGraw-Edison would place the case in category three indemnity.316
Justice Kelly's analysis was apparently accepted by the majority
310. The feasibility of apportioning fault in cases in which some of the parties are held
liable on the basis of breach of express warranty is illustrated in Sorenson v. Safety Flate,
Inc., 298 Minn. 353, 216 N.W.2d 859 (1974). It would be anomalous to find contribution
appropriate in cases in which the retailer is negligent or has breached an express warranty,
but to determine the fair shares of the parties in the former situation on the basis of comparative fault and the latter on a pro rata basis.
311. 255 N.W.2d at 368-72 (Kelly, j., dissenting).
312. 258 N. W. 2d at 789-92 (Kelly, j., concurring specially).
313. 255 N.W.2d at 369 (Kelly, j., dissenting).
314. See id. (Kelly, j., dissenting).
315. 258 N.W.2d at 789 (Kelly, j., concurring specially).
316. Id. at 791 (Kelly, j., concurring specially).
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in Frey because of the statement that on remand the trial court,
assuming McGraw-Edison was found to be negligent, would have
to determine whether the case fit within category three "as suggested by Mr. Justice Kelly,"317 or within category four in which
case Tolbert would apply.318
The difficulty with this analysis is that in most cases, including
one such as Tolbert, there usually will be reliance on the expertise
of the manufacturer. It is arguable that the non-delegable duty
concept embodied in category three indemnity cases fits the products liability context. However, that duty would exist in virtually
all cases. Even in cases in which the retailer is negligent, as in Frey,
that reliance may be justifiable. Application of the non-delegable
duty concept transforms category four cases into category three
cases. If the analysis suggested by Justice Kelly is followed it seems
clear that the majority opinion in Tolbert could be significantly
limited.
Following Justice Kelly's analysis, a judge must first determine
whether the facts establish that the retailer's reliance on the warranties and expertise of the manufacturer is reasonable. If so, the
case would fall within the third categoy of indemnity, even though
the retailer is negligent. If not, the jury would apportion fault and
that apportionment would determine the fair shares of the parties
on the contribution issue.
In effect, the same determination that the Tolbert majority indicated would present courts with a "bewildering array" of factors to
consider would be utilized. It is the exact sort of analysis the court
sought to avoid. If the rule announced in Tolbert is to remain viable, the position advocated by Justice Kelly will have to be rejected. If not, the Tolbert rule will have to be reconsidered.

C.

Summary

The Minnesota court's decisions in Lambertson and Tolbert give
rise to a number of interpretive problems. The problems of the
. workplace injury can be given separate consideration because of
the peculiar problems involved in the interplay between products
liability law and the workers' compensation statute. The primary
problem involved in interpreting Lambertson concerns the method
to be used in determining to what extent contribution will be al317. Id. at 788 (majority opinion).
318. Id. at 789.
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lowed to a third party. The court's decisions in Johnson v. Raske
Budding Systems) Inc.,319 and Cronen v. Wegdahl Cooperative Elevator
Assocz"atzon 320 should resolve most of those problems, although
those decisions must be scrutinized to determine if their implications are consistent with the basic policy of limitation established
in Lambertson.
The decision in Tolbert was clear: the rule of indemnity in category four cases was rejected. The problem is in determining what
the implications of the decision are. The court's decision in Busch
seems to mandate an extension of Tolbert because of the inability to
restrict the logical implications of the Busch decision. What this
means is that the court has come close to adopting comparative
fault principles for purposes of determining contribution between
multiple defendants, whether those defendants are inside or
outside the chain of manufacture and distribution. 321
Other problems, such as those raised by Justice Kelly in his separate opinions in Tolbert and Frey, are more difficult to resolve.
Because his opinions, if followed, create the possibility that indemnity will prevail, even in situations in which Tolbert would otherwise appear clearly to apply, the views of Justice Kelly will have to
be scrutinized carefully to determine whether they are consistent
with the majority opinion in Tolbert.
It also seems to be the case that indemnity, even without Justice
Kelly's opinions, will be the appropriate remedy in some situations, such as when the conduct of the party lower in the chain of
distribution can appropriately be labeled passive or nonculpable.
The means of making the distinctions necessary to isolate those
cases in which indemnity will be appropriate were, to an extent,
discredited in Tolbert, but only in situations in which the retailer's
or installer's conduct was negligent. It would seem, therefore, that
indemnity will continue to prevail, except in those cases in which
319. 276 N.W.2d 79, 81 (Minn. 1979) (procedure for apportionment requires thirdparty tortfeasors to pay entire verdict to plaintiff; employer then contributes amount in
proportion to its negligence, not exceeding amount of workers' compensation benefits, to
third-party tortfeasor, and plaintiff reimburses employer pursuant to workers' compensation statute).
320. 278 N.W.2d 102, 101 (Minn. 1979) (employer's no-fault insurer entitled to be
subrogated to claim of employee's survivors against third parties' amount paid to insurer
properly deducted from total third-party recovery).
321. The Minnesota Legislature adopted a comparative fault act partially in response
to the Legislature's perception that comparative fault principles already had been adopted
judicially. See' Tape' ofHe'(lnng on H.F. .338 Bifore' the'Mtnne'Sot(l Smole' Judiciary Subcommittu on
Judicial Admlnistr;atlon, 70th Minn. Legis., 1978 Sess. (Feb. 1, 1978).
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the retailer or installer has been negligent, or when breach of express warranty is deemed to be concurrent with the fault of the
manufacturer.

IV.

A

SYNTHESIS OF

Loss

ALLOCATION PRINCIPLES

Loss allocation has previously been considered in isolated contexts. Busch D. Busch Construction~ Inc. 322 concerned the apportionment of fault between a negligent plaintiff and a strictly liable
manufacturer;323 Lambertson D. Cincinnati COrp.324 involved contribution between a negligent manufacturer and a negligent employer;325 and Tolbert D. Gerber lndustries~ Inc. 326 involved
contribution between parties in the chain of distribution. 327
In previous sections of this Article, these decisions and their
ramifications have been analyzed. Integrated, the decisions indicate that Minnesota has moved close to a full comparative fault
procedure that permits the allocation of negligence, strict liability,
and breach of implied and express warranties as components of
"fault." In this section, the three decisions are placed in a more
practical context-submission of the comparative fault question to
juries. This section also deals with the resolution of indemnity
claims following the comparative fault determination, and a new
issue in comparative fault cases; the problem of aggregation.

A. Jury Standards
If the Minnesota court's decisions concerning loss allocation in
the products liability context are viewed in isolation, special factors important to allocation may be distilled. The factors relevant
to apportioning fault among parties in the chain of distribution
were detailed by Justice Kelly in his concurring opinion in Frey D.
Montgomery Ward &I CO.328 Justice Kelly focused on the degree of
reliance by a retailer on a manufacturer's skill and expertise as
demonstrated by inquiries into whether the manufacturer fulfilled
its obligation to warn of dangers associated with the use of the
product and whether implied warranties were given to the retailer
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977).
Id. at 393.
312 Minn. 114,257 N.W.2d 679 (1977).
See ld.
255 N.w.2d 362 (Minn. 1977).
See ld.
258 N.W.2d 782, 789-91 (Minn. 1977) (Kelly, J., concurring specially).
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by the manufacturer. 329 An additional factor is the degree to
which the retailer may have encouraged use of the product apart
from the manufacturer, such as through the giving of an express
warranty to the purchaser of the product. 33o
The comparison of the fault of users and consumers or employers to the fault of parties in the chain of distribution is based on
similar factors. The degree of knowledge of the product's characteristics and performance may differ between the ordinary consumer and an employer, but the degree of justifiable reliance on
the manufacturer's skill and expertise is important as is the ability
of the consumer or employer to avoid the injury by exercising reasonable care to prevent injuries from occurring. In addition, there
will have to be a focus on the product and the conduct of parties in
the chain of distribution with respect to that product. Aside from
the negligence inquiry, the strict liability inquiry involves the same
factors that are considered in determining if the product is defective. 331
Irrespective of the specific context, whether employer-manufacturer, retailer-manufacturer, or consumer-manufacturer, the factors involved in fault apportionment are substantially similar. But
in asking a jury to apportion fault it is questionable whether detailing the factors that a jury may legitimately rely on in making
their apportionment will be of any meaningful assistance to the
jury without complicating the process. 332
Given the subjective nature of the determination involved in apportioning fault it should be recognized that attempts to provide
detailed guidance for juries are likely to be illusory.333 Drawing
the jury's attention to specific facts influencing the comparative
fault determination is more legitimately a function of closing argument rather than jury instruction.
The comparative fault inquiry should be no more complicated
than that involved when negligence alone is being apportioned.
The only necessary addition would be to define for the jury the
term "fault" so that conduct constituting strict tort liability or
329. S~e ld. at 790 (Kelly, J., concurring specially).
330. S~~ Sorenson v. Safety Flate, Inc., 298 Minn. 353, 216 N.W.2d 859 (1974).
331. Su Steenson, supra note 82, at 28 n.131.
332. As is the case with establishing detailed guidelines for a jury in deciding if a product is defective, se~ ld. at 57 n.218, it is questionable whether the factors could be quantified for a jury.
333. Se~ ld.
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breach of warranty may be taken into consideration in making the
apportionment.
The following suggested instruction adopts a comparative fault
approach and is presented with the idea of simplifying the comparative fault determination for jury submission:
The law requires that fault be apportioned among those parties found to be at fault in causing the plaintiffs injuries. Fault
consists of negligence, strict tort liability, and [breach of warranty]. If by your answers to questions - and - you have
determined any of the parties to be at fault and that their fault
was a direct cause of plaintiffs injuries, you must apportion
fault among those parties.

Assuming that the jury has affirmatively answered the special
verdict questions covering the theories of liability that have been
asserted against every defendant, and that fault has been allocated, two additional problems remain. One concerns indemnity
and the other the problem of aggregation.
B.

Indemniljl

Although the comparative fault question would be submitted to
a jury, a judicial determination would still have to be made
whether indemnity is appropriate. At least in cases in which the
retailer or other party lower in the chain of distribution is found to
be liable solely on the basis of strict liability in tort, indemnity may
be appropriate. The jury's answer to the fact question would be
conclusive. But if the jury finds that the retailer has made and
breached an express warranty, the determination would have to be
made by the trial judge whether the warranty representations were
inconsistent with those implicit in the product itself. As in Sorenson
v. Safiljl Flate, Inc. 334 that determination would control the indemnity issue. 335

C

Aggregation

When multiple parties are involved in a lawsuit and fault is apportioned among those parties, the question arises whether the
plaintiffs fault will be compared to the fault of each individual
defendant or to the combined fault of the defendants. As an example, assume that a plaintiff is determined to be forty percent at
334. 298 Minn. 353, 216 N.w.2d 859 (1974).
335. See' notes 253-59 supra and accompanying text.
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fault, a defendant retailer and manufacturer are each thirty percent at fault, and that the findings as to the retailer and manufacturer are based upon the jury's conclusion that they were strictly
liable. Will the plaintiff be entitled to recover against the retailer
and manufacturer, or will he be denied recovery?
The comparative negligence statute provided as follows:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action
by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for
negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property,

if the

contributory negligence was not as great as the negligence of the
person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed

shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the person recovering. 336

The aggregation question has not arisen in the products liability
context in Minnesota, in part due to the rule of indemnity ordinarily applicable to products liability cases premised on strict liability,337 and in part because of the absence of a comparative fault
procedure applicable to strict liability cases. 338 The court's deci336. Act of May 23,1969, ch. 624, § 1, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069, 1069 (emphasis added)
(current version at MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1978».
337. Because indemnity would be the ordinary remedy in cases involving the apportionment of loss among parties in the chain of distribution, there would be no necessity of
making a comparative fault apportionment. &e Sorenson v. Safety Flate, Inc., 298 Minn.
353,359-61,216 N.W.2d 859, 862-64 (1974); Bjorklund v. Hantz, 296 Minn. 298, 301-02,
208 N.W.2d 722, 724 (1973) (per curiam), overruled z'npart on other grounds, Tolbert v. Gerber
Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 368 n.ll (Minn. 1977).
338. Strict liability and comparative negligence have developed independently. See
Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 733, 575 P.2d 1162, 1167, 144 Cal. Rptr.
380,385 (1978). Only recently have mergers of the two separate theories taken place. In a
pure comparative fault system, such as that adopted by the California Supreme Court in
Daly, the aggregation issue becomes important for purposes of deciding contribution questions, but not for purposes of deciding whether the plaintiff will be entitled to recover.
In Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 641, 207 N.W.2d 866 (1973),
the Wisconsin Supreme Court intimated that an aggregation rule would be adopted in
products liability cases. The case involved damage to a fire truck that overturned because
of a defective wheel. Suit was brought by the city against the company that handled the
sale of the truck chassis, Badger Ford, the manufacturer of the chassis, Ford Motor, and
the manufacturer of the truck wheels, Gunite Division of Kelsey Hayes. Taking 100% as
the total negligence involved in the case, the jury was asked what percentage of negligence
should be assigned to the city and to the defective product. The jury determined that the
city was negligent but that its negligence was not causally related to the accident. One
hundred percent of the negligence was thus attributed to the defective product. Only
after negligence is apportioned between the plaintiff and the defendant would questions
concerning the apportionment of negligence among multiple defendants in the chain of
distribution become relevant, and then only for purposes of contribution. &e z'd. at 649,
207 N.W.2d at 871. The controlling finding in deciding if the plaintiff will be entitled to
recover is the comparison of the plaintiff's negligence to the negligence attributed to the
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sions in Busch lJ. Busch Construction, Inc. 339 and Tolbert lJ. Gerber Industries, /nC. 340 now directly present the problem.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has considered the aggregation
problem twice, in Krengel lJ. Midwest Automatic Photo, Inc. 341 and in
Marier lJ. Memorial Rescue Service, Inc. 342 In Krengel the plaintiff was
injured when she tripped on the riser of an automatic photo booth
in a dime store. Suit was brought against the dime store, the photo
booth distributor, and the servicer of the machine. The jury determined that the plaintiff was forty percent at fault, and that the
dime store, distributor, and servicer were thirty, twenty, and ten
percent negligent respectively. Because the defendants were engaged in a joint venture, with shared control over the profits from
the photo booth enterprise, their percentages of negligence were
aggregated and compared to the plaintiff's negligence, allowing
the plaintiff to recover sixty percent of her damages. 343 Had her
negligence been compared against each defendant individually,
she would not have been entitled to recover because her negligence
was greater than the negligence of the individual defendants.
In Maner the plaintiff was injured in a truck-ambulance collision. The plaintiff brought suit against the ambulance service and
the truck driver. The jury found the plaintiff and defendants each
to be one-third at fault. Because the plaintiff's negligence was
equal to the negligence of each of the two defendants, recovery
would be denied unless aggregation was permitted. The Minnesota Supreme Court distinguished Krengel, stating that the aggregation rule would be limited to situations in which joint ventures
defective product. See I'd. The Wisconsin procedure thus accomplishes aggregation among
parties in the chain of distribution.
With the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in May v. Skelly Oil Co., 83 Wis. 2d
30, 264 N.W.2d 574 (1978), abolishing the rule of aggregation will, of course, have an
impact on products liability cases, as illustrated in the context of a workplace injury in
Soeldner v. White Metal Rolling & Stamping Corp., 473 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
In Soeldner a ladder manufacturer found to be eight percent negligent as compared to the
plaintiff who was found to be 32% negligent, was held liable. The manufacturer's liability,
however, was limited to its percentage of liability, but only in the context of this workers'
compensation/third party action. See 473 F. Supp. 753, 756-57 (E.D. Wis. 1979). The
decision is not the result of any peculiar products liability aggregation rule, as in Fran/clin,
but the general rule allowing aggregation, which the court in May indicated it would
adopt.
339. 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977).
340. 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. 1977).
341. 295 Minn. 200, 203 N.w.2d 841 (1973).
342. 296 Minn. 242, 207 N.w.2d 706 (1973).
343. 295 Minn. at 208, 203 N.W.2d at 846.
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are involved. 344
Products liability cases will fit somewhere between Krengel and
Marier. The usual marketing arrangements will not involve joint
ventures. Yet, the nature of the marketing relationship distinguishes products liability cases from Marier based upon two factors. First, in products liability cases, the actions of two or more
parties in the chain of distribution are not likely to be the unrelated, concurrent acts of negligence that existed in Maner. Second,
the law of strict liability, with its broad social and economic poli-

344. 296 Minn. at 246, 207 N.W.2d at 709.
Minnesota's comparative negligence statute, Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 624, § 1, 1969
Minn. Laws \069, \069-70 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1978)), was based on
the Wisconsin comparative negligence statute up to the time of the adoption of the Minnesota comparative negligence act in 1969. Su Marier v. Memorial Rescue Serv., Inc.,
296 Minn. 242, 245, 207 N.W.2d 706, 708 (1973). Wisconsin has traditionally refused to
aggregate percentages of negligence of defendants, see Chille v. Howell, 34 Wis. 2d 491,
500, 149 N.W.2d 600, 604 (1967); Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519,
535,252 N.W. 721, 727 (1934), absent some sort of joint duty. See Reber v. Hanson, 260
Wis. 632, 51 N.W.2d 505 (1952) (joint duty of supervision of parents over child justified
aggregating parents' negligence).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has indicated its intent to abandon the rule against
aggregation in an appropriate case. See May v. Skelly Oil Co., 83 Wis. 2d 30, 264 N.W.2d
574 (1978). In Soeldner v. White Metal Rolling & Stamping Corp., 473 F. Supp. 753
(E.D. Wis. 1979), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
followed the court's ruling in May and allowed the plaintiff to recover against a defendant
found to be less negligent than the plaintiff. In Soeldner the plaintiff, an employee of Sears,
Roebuck & Co. was injured when he fell from a ladder manufactured by defendant White
Metal. The jury found the plaintiff 32% negligent, Sears 60% negligent, and White Metal
eight percent negligent. Because Wisconsin law made workers' compensation the employee's exclusive remedy against his employer, the employer could not have been held
liable for contribution by White Metal. See 473 F. Supp. at 754. An untempered application of Mty' would have obligated White Metal to pay 68% of the plaintiffs damages, even
though it was only eight percent negligent. In the interest of fairness, the court held that
White Metal's liability would be limited to eight percent of the plaintiffs damages. However, the court limited its holding "to those instances in which a plaintiff has a separate
remedy against his employer via the workman's compensation process." 473 F. Supp. at
756.
Mty', of course, would not be controlling in Minnesota. The rationale for the use of
Wisconsin law set out by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Marier is inapplicable to cases
decided by the Wisconsin courts after the date of the adoption of the Minnesota comparative negligence act. This does not detract from the persuasiveness of the decision in Mtg',
however. In fact, Mty' provides support for judicial latitude in construing the Minnesota
act. For a criticism of May, see Comment, Change 0/ the Wisconsin Comparative Negligence
Statute in Multl~De.fendant Suits: May v. Skelly Oil Co., 62 MARQ. L. REV. 227 (1978).
In cases arising after the effective date of the Minnesota comparative fault act, see Act
of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 6, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 839-40, Mty' would be irrelevant given
the clear legislative intent to deny the rule of aggregation. See notes 352-420 infta and
accompanying text.
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cies, was obviously inapplicable in the Marier situation. 345
Although technical arguments may be made that would support
aggregation by analogizing products liability cases to other cases
involving joint duties,346 the question is ultimately one of policy.
Indemnity in products liability cases has traditionally considered
the liability of a party lower in the chain of distribution to be derivative, secondary, or passive. 347 Thus characterizing the distributor's conduct allows the distributor to obtain indemnity from the
manufacturer. Part of the justification for the adoption of strict
liability in tort as applied to product manufacturers is based upon
a recognition of the rule of indemnity that allows the loss to be
shifted through the chain of distribution until the manufacturers
ultimately become responsible for the loss.348 The rule of strict liability is made applicable to retailers and other parties lower in the
chain of distribution, with the recognition that the retailer may
not be able to shift the loss to the manufacturer. 349 The obligation
of the parties in the chain of distribution is a special responsibility
to bear the loss arising from injuries due to defective products. It
is, in effect, a joint obligation to market safe products.
Following Tolbert there now exists a mechanism for apportioning
loss among parties in the chain of distribution in most situations.35o The fact that the Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted
a method ofloss allocation does not mean, however, that the fundamental nature of the relationship of parties in the chain of distribution to injured users and consumers is altered. The supreme
court has developed a more equitable means of loss allocation between those parties, not a means of fragmenting what seems to be
a dual or joint responsibility to manufacture and sell non-defective
products. 351
345. q: Hammontree v. Jenner, 20 Cal. App. 3d 528, 532, 97 Cal. Rptr. 739, 742
(1971) (rejecting strict liability in the automobile accident context).
346. See, ~.g., Reber v. Hanson, 260 Wis. 632, 51 N.W.2d 505 (1952) (parentalobligation to protect child held to be ajoint duty); Wold v. Grozalsky, 277 N.Y. 364, 14 N.E.2d
437 (1938) (in. party wall collapse, joint obligation imposed on two owners of one of the
adjoining buildings).
347. See Prosser, supra note 110, at 1123-24.
348. See ld.
349. See Sorenson v. Safety Flate, Inc., 298 Minn. 353, 216 N.W.2d 859 (1974); Farr v.
Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970).
350. See notes 303-18 supra and accompanying text.
351. In cases in which indemnity is appropriate, as in vicarious liability cases, it would
be inappropriate to split into two shares what should be a single responsibility. &~ Martindale v. Griffin, 233 A.D. 510, 253 N.Y.S. 578 (1931) (automobile driver and owner held
liable for a single share). Following Tolb"t, indemnity would continue to be the appropri-
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If a plaintiffs liability is compared to the fault of each individual defendant, then recovery will depend on the complexity of the
marketing arrangements made for selling the product. The more
complex the chain of distribution, the greater the dispersion of
fault among the defendants, and the less likely that a plaintiff who
is partially at fault will be entitled to recover for his injuries.
It is questionable whether loss allocation should be structured so
as to disallow recovery in such a situation. The objective of strict
liability, encouraging greater manufacturer and seller responsibility and providing compensation for those injured by defective
products, will be diluted to the extent that losses that should ordinarily be borne by those profiting from the sale of defective products are shifted to the consumer.

D.

The Comparative Fault Act

Although the Minnesota Supreme Court's decisions in Busch,
Tolbert, and Lambertson moved Minnesota close to a comparative
fault approach, reservations in those decisions placed Minnesota
law just short of a full comparative fault procedure. 3s2 Because of
those limitations, the impact of the recently adopted comparative
fault act 3S3 (Minnesota Act) on loss allocation principles is likely to
ate remedy in vicarious liability cases, which thr court regards as encompassing the first
three categories of indemnity. In these situations it would seem that fault would not be
apportioned among the defendant whose active fault caused the accident and the defendant who is vicariously responsible. The defendants would be jointly reponsible for a single
share. Strictly speaking, percentages of fault are not being aggregated. Rather, fault is
not being apportioned among defendants who in fairness are jointly responsible for a single share of liability.
In post- TO/h"' products liability cases in which indemnity is appropriate, such as
cases similar to Sorenson v. Safety Flate, Inc., 298 Minn. 353,216 N.W.2d 859 (1974), the
same rationale might apply. Because indemnity would be appropriate, the liability of
distributor and manufacturer would be joint for purposes of comparison to the plaintiff'S
fault.
The nature of the relationship between distributors and manufacturers that prior to
TO/h"' caused the supreme court to apply the rule of indemnity would not seem to be
altered solely because the court decided that fault could be apportioned among parties in
the chain of distribution. If fault would not be apportioned in a case such as Sormson,
because the rule of indemnity applies, but would be apportioned in a case such as Bjorklund v. Hantz, 296 Minn. 298,208 N.W.2d 722 (1973) (per curiam), OlJn-ru/ed in par' on o,h"
grounds, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 368 n.11 (Minn. 1977), when the
retailer is negligent, then the plaintiff's right to recover could well depend on the degree of
culpability of the retailer. In either case the relationship of the parties in the chain should
. be treated the same.
352. Su notes 319-21 supra and accompanying text.
353. See notes 355-420 infia and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 6 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 333 1980

334

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6

be substantial.
The section-by-section analysis of the Minnesota Act that follows will explain the general operation of the Minnesota Act and
specifically analyze the impact of the Minnesota Act on the court's
decisions in Busch and Tolbert. Before beginning, however, a brief
word on the derivation of the Minnesota Act is in order. The Minnesota Act was modeled in part on the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act 354 (Uniform Act). The Uniform Act and the Senate
floor debates over the Minnesota Act were relied upon heavily in
the analysis that follows.
1.

Section 601. 01

a.

SubdilJlslon 1

Contributory fault shall not bar recovery in an action by any
person or his legal representative to recover damages for fault
resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if the contributory fault was not greater than the fault of the person
against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed
shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of fault attributable to the person recovering. The court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the jury to find separate
special verdicts determining the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of fault attributable to the person recovering.355

Subdivision 1 of section 604.01 makes two significant changes in
the comparative negligence statute. First, the statute provides for
the comparison of "fault" rather than "negligence." Second, it
changes the cutoff point for determining liability. Under the comparative negligence statute, a plaintiff would be entitled to recover so long as his negligence was not equal to the negligence of
the party against whom recovery was sought. 356 The Minnesota
Act bars recovery only if the plaintifPs fault is greater than the fault
of the person against whom recovery is sought. Otherwise, the
Minnesota Act retains the comparative negligence approach requiring a comparison of the fault of the claimant to the fault of the
person against whom recovery is sought. The impact of this lan354. See Tape of Hearing on H.F. 338 Before the Minnesota Smate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Judicial Administration, 70th Minn. Legis., 1978 Sess. (Feb. 1, 1978).
355. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 6, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 839-40 (amending MINN.
STAT. § 604.01(1) (1976».
356. See Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 624, § 1, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069, 1069-70 (current
version at MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1978».
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guage on the important question of aggregating the fault of multiple defendants will be reserved until the statutory provisions
governing loss allocation in section 604.02, subdivision 3 of the act
are discussed. 357
b.

Subdivision Ja

The term "fault" is defined in subdivision la of section 604.01:
"Fault" includes acts or omissions that are in any measure
negligent or reckless toward the person or property of the actor
or others, or that subject a person to strict tort liability. The
term also includes breach of warranty, unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting an express consent, misuse of a
product and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages. Legal requirements of causal relation apply
both to fault as the basis for liability and contributory fault. 358

The breadth of the definition of fault raises a number of questions concerning the impact of the definition on the allocation of
fault among a plaintiff and defendant. The effect of the Minnesota Act on the court's decision in Busch v. Busch Construction) Inc. 359
must be analyzed and, since the Minnesota Act goes significantly
beyond Busch, the implications of the statute for loss allocation
must be analyzed.
Because the definition of fault includes "acts or omissions that
are in any measure negligent or reckless" including "unreasonable
assumption of risk not constituting an express consent" and "misuse of a product and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to
mitigate damages" it becomes apparent that the Minnesota Act,
although consistent with Busch, expands the definition of apportionable plaintiff misconduct. The inclusion of assumption of the
risk in the Minnesota Act is consistent with Busch, but there is no
provision in the statute for the preservation of the Busch exception
preventing consideration of contributory negligence consisting of
failure to discover a defect. 360 The inclusion of "acts or omissions
357. St-e notes 405-17 infta and accompanying text. In addition, subdivisions 2-5 of the
comparative negligence statute, dealing with settlements, are retained without change.
Compare Id. with MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1978).
358. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 7, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 840 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 604.01 (I)(a) (1978».
359. 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977).
360. Although it is clear the Legislature was aware of Busch, St"e Tape o.fHearing on HF
338 Bifore the Minnesota Smote Judiciary Subcommlitu on Judicial Administration, 70th Minn.
Legis., 1978 Sess. (Feb. 6, 1978), there is no express provision precluding consideration of
negligent failure to discover a defect. An argument for preservation of the Busch exception
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that are in any measure negligent or reckless" seems to override
the Busch exception, allowing for the consideration of any plaintiff
negligence, even if it consists of failure to discover a product defect.
By including "misuse of a product" as a defense, the same distinctions concerning misuse already adopted by the Minnesota
Supreme Court seem to be continued. 361 The Uniform Act provides a clear indication of how misuse is to be treated. Although
the Uniform Act varies slightly from the Minnesota Act by including as a defense "misuse of a product for which the defendant
otherwise would be liable," the variance is insignificant as the
comment to the Uniform Act indicates:
The meaning in this Section is confined to a misuse glvmg
rise to a danger that could have been reasonably anticipated
and guarded against. The Act does not apply to a misuse giving rise to a danger that could not reasonably have been anticipated and guarded against by the manufacturer, so that the
product was therefore not defective or unreasonably dangerous. 362

When an unforeseeable misuse is made of the product a manufacturer will owe no duty to the product user. Misuse as a defense
thus encompasses misuses that the manufacturer should reason. ably have anticipated.
The Minnesota Act seems to anticipate a merger of the defenses
of contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and misuse. 363
Specific enumeration of those defenses in the statute is designed to
could, however, be constructed by reference to the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. Section 1(a) of the Uniform Act provides as follows:
In an action based on fault seeking to recover damages for injury or death to
person or harm to property, any contributory fault chargeable to the claimant
diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages for
an injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault, but does not bar recovery. This rule applies whether or not under prior law the claimant's contributory fault constituted a defense or was disregarded under applicable legal
doctrines, such as last clear chance.
UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1(a). The Comment makes it clear that the Uniform Act is intended to reach conduct that would not previously have been a bar, including "ordinary contributory negligence in an action based on strict liability." Id.,
Comment.
Section I(a) of the Uniform Act was not included in the Minnesota Act. One may
argue that because this section was excluded from the Minnesota Act, ordinary contributory negligence is not a defense, preserving that aspect of the Busch holding.
361. See notes 29-34, 86-91 supra and accompanying text.
362. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § l(b), Comment.
363. &.,. Wade, supra note 44, at 383 nn.38 & 39, 394.
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ensure that they will be considered as aspects of a plaintiffs contributory fault. The Minnesota Act does not seem to anticipate
that the defenses would be given separate consideration. Up to
this point, the treatment of defenses under the Minnesota Act appears to be consistent with the approach under the court's decision
in Busch, with the exception of the treatment of negligent failure to
discover a product defect.
The Minnesota Act goes beyond existing law in including
breach of warranty in the definition of fault. 364 With this inclusion, the statute resolves the question left open in Chatfield v. Sherwin- Williams Co. 365 and Wenner v. Gu{f Oil Corp. ,366 in which the
supreme court reserved decision on the applicability of the comparative negligence statute, as interpreted in Busch, to breach of
warranty claims. 367 However, the Minnesota Act is limited to
claims involving personal injury or property damage, excluding
actions involving solely economic loss.368
Because of the breadth of the definition of fault under the Minnesota Act, the question arises as to how claims based on the
breach of a statute are to be treated. Under the comparative negligence statute, the supreme court excluded the defense ofcontributory negligence in cases involving the breach of statutes designed
to protect a particular class of individuals. In Zerby v. Warren ,369 a
case involving the sale of toxic glue to a minor in violation of a
Minnesota criminal statute, the court held that the defendant
could not raise the defenses of contributory negligence or assumption of the risk, the comparative negligence statute notwithstanding, and that contribution against the minor purchaser of the glue
would not be permitted. 370 Although the Minnesota Act provides
no guidance as to how breach of a statute is to be treated, the
Su MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (I)(a) (1978).
266 N.W.2d 171 (Minn. 1978).
264 N.w.2d 374 (Minn. 1978).
Su 262 N.W.2d at 393-94.
The Comment to Section I of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act provides in
follows:
An action for breach of warranty is held to sound sometimes in tort and
sometimes in contract. There is no intent to include in the coverage of the act
actions that are fully contractual in their gravamen and in which the plaintiff is
suing solely because he did not recover what he contracted to receive. The restriction of coverage to physical harm to person or property excludes these
claims, however.
UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § I'-Comment.
369. 297 Minn. 134, 210 N.W.2d 58 (1973).
370. ld. at 140-43,210 N.W.2d at 62-64.

364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
part as
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Uniform Act appears to resolve the question. The applicability of
the Uniform Act to cases involving statutory breaches has been
acknowledgedYI The comments indicate, however, that courts
will still have latitude in deciding if defenses to a statutory breach
will be permitted: "A tort action based on violation of a statute is
within the coverage of the Act if the conduct comes within the
definition of fault and unless the statute is construed as Intended to prolJlde
for recovery of/ull damage irrespective

of contributory fault."3 72

The final inclusion in the Minnesota Act's definition of "fault,"
"unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages,"373 may create problems in application. It is intended to encompass the doctrine of avoidable consequences that will justify
barring or reducing the plaintiff's recovery for damages that he
could, in the exercise of reasonable care, have avoided. Professor
Wade's example illustrates the intended operation of the section in
the Uniform Act:
[S]uppose the plaintiff was driving a new car with due care,
when due to a defect the left front wheel locked, causing him to
swerve and hit a tree. Plaintiff had not buckled his seat belt
and as a result his head hit the windshield and his face was
damaged. His leg was broken, but this would have happened
even if the seat belt had been buckled. He would not consent
to medical treatment of the broken leg and the bone has not
knit together. His recovery for both the facial injury and the
untreated leg will be diminished, but for separate reasons
(avoidable injury, and failure to mitigate damages). The damages to his car will not be mitigated. 374

One of the primary purposes of the section appears to be to ensure
that the "seat belt defense" will be considered in apportioning
damages. 375 While seat belt evidence is inadmissible in Minnesota,376 the principle of avoidable consequences set out in the Minnesota and Uniform Acts will have other applications. The intent
is to reduce the plaintiff's damages according to the percentage of
371. Set" Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Cal. 2d 581, 177 P.2d 279 (1947).
also Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920).
372. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § I, Comment (emphasis added).
373. MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (Ia) (1978).
374. Wade, supra note 44, at 386.
375. Set" id.
376. Set" MINN. STAT. § 169.685(4) (1978) ("Proof of the use or failure to use seat belts,
or proof of the installation or failure of installation of seat belts shall not be admissible in
evidence in any litigation involving personal injuries or property damage resulting from
the use or operation of any motor vehicle.").
St!~
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contributory fault chargeable to the particular injury the plaintiff
could have avoided. 377
The defendant would carry the burden of proof of establishing
that the plaintiffs fault contributed to each element of damage
sustained by the plaintiff. Proof that the plaintiffs misconduct
contributed to the damage would require the application of comparative fault principles. Administration of the rule would require
the use of special verdict forms that would, when appropriate, ask
for a separate fault determination as to each type of damage, at
least when it reasonably appears that there is a basis for distinguishing between types of damages. 378

2.
a.

Section 601. 02
Subdivision J

"When two or more persons are jointly liable, contributions to
awards shall be in proportion to the percentage of fault attributable to each, except that each is jointly and severally liable for the
377. The Uniform Act contains a provision stating that: "In an action based on fault
seeking to recover damages for injury or death to person or harm to property, any contributory fault chargeable to the claimant diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as
compensatory damages for an injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault, but
does not bar recovery . . . . " UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1(a). The intent of
the quoted language is to ensure that there is a requirement of a causal relation between
the plaintiff's conduct and the particular damage suffered.
Although this section was not made part of the Minnesota Act, there is no reason to
expect that the requirement of a causal relation between the plaintiff's damage and the
particular damage would be inapplicable.
The distinction between contributory negligence and avoidable consequences has
been questioned by Prosser. Seoeo W. PROSSER, supra note 109, § 65, at 423. The distinction
drawn is that contributory negligence is plaintiff negligence arising before any injury or
damage occurs, whereas avoidable consequences comes into being after the wrong has
taken place, but while there is still time to limit damages. Seoeo z'd. Prosser has suggested
that the reason for the distinction is the difficulty, in the avoidable consequences situation,
of assigning a part of the damages to the defendant's negligence. Seoeo z'd. Making the rule
of avoidable consequences part of the comparative fault determination precludes the use
of that rule as a complete bar to recovery by supplying a means of apportioning responsibility for a particular injury. Given the reason for the development of the rule, its absorption by the comparative fault act seems to be logical.
378. In cases in which the rule of avoidable consequences applies, it has been held that
the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the damages can be apportioned. If no
basis for apportionment could be established, the plaintiff's fault would bar all recovery.
Seoeo W. PROSSER, supra note 109, at 473 n.70. Even in pre-comparative fault cases, it is
difficult to understand why the plaintiff would bear the burden of proving separability. If
the plaintiff is at fault it would seem that the defendant should bear the burden of proving
that the plaintiff's fault contributed to the separate elements of damages.
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whole award. "379
Subdivision 1 makes it clear that the general rule that contributions to awards shall be made in proportion to the percentage of
fault attributable to each of the parties when there is joint liability,
but that each individual defendant remains jointly and severally
liable for the whole award has been preserved. This continues the
practice under the comparative negligence statute380 by ensuring
that the responsibility of a defendant will not be limited to his
percentage of fault and that each defendant will bear the burden
of the uncollectibility from the other, except in cases covered in
subdivision 2, in which the claimant (plaintiff) is at fault, and
must bear part of that risk. 381 As an example, if two defendants
are found to be at fault, the first twenty percent and the second
eighty percent at fault, and if the defendant who is eighty percent
at fault is insolvent, the defendant who is twenty percent at fault
will be responsible for the entire award to the plaintiff.
Subdivision 1 also requires contributions to an award to be determined on the basis of the percentages of fault assessed against
the defendants. From a products liability defendant's perspective,
fault will include negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty. The broad definition of fault directly raises the question of
how the comparative fault act will affect the court's decisions in
Lambertson , 382 Tolbert '
383 =
Frev 384and
Busch
"
.385 More specifically ,
the issue is whether indemnity will be appropriate under the Minnesota Act, and if so, under what circumstances. There is no express provision in the Minnesota Act stating how indemnity claims
are to be treated, raising a question whether any of the rules of
indemnity as summarized in Hendndcson 386 and modified in
Tolbert 387 are still valid.
The Uniform Act, like the Minnesota Act, provides that contributions to awards shall be made according to the percentage of
379. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 8, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 840 (codified at MINN.
§ 604.02(1) (1978»;
380. Su Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 624, § 1, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069, 1069 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1978».
381. MINN. STAT. § 604.02(2) (1978).
382. 312 Minn. 114,257 N.w.2d 679 (1977).
383. 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. 1977).
384. 258 N.W.2d 782 (Minn. 1977).
385. 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977).
386. 258 Minn. 368, 104 N.W.2d 843 (1960), overru/~d in pari, Tolben v. Gerber Indus.,
Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. 1977).
387. 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. 1977).
STAT.
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fault of the parties but that the rule of joint and several liability is
retained. 388 The comment to section 2 of the Uniform Act, providing for loss allocation, further indicates that "[i]n situations such as
that of principal and agent, driver and owner of a car, or manufacturer and retailer of a product,"389 the court may "under appropriate circumstances find that the two persons should be treated as a
single party for purposes of allocating fault."390
The Uniform Act does not provide specifically for the treatment
of indemnity claims, other than in this comment. But the comment illustrates at least two situations in which indemnity should
be appropriate. In the case of an automobile owner and driver, or
of principal and agent, the liability of the automobile owner and
the principal is vicarious. Because of the derivative nature of the
liability of those parties, there is no basis for apportioning fault
among a principal and agent or an automobile owner and
driver. 391 Because the illustrative situations in the comment are
not meant to be exclusive, the first three rules of Hendriclcson could
still be preserved, given the supreme court's interpretation of those
rules as involving derivative liability on the part of persons who
are without personal fault. 392
Because the comments to the Uniform Act describe situations in
which indemnity is appropriate, the inclusion of the products liability case involving a retailer and manufacturer might seem puzzling. However, the comment, in addition to describing situations
in which indemnity might be appropriate, as in the case of principal and agent or automobile owner and driver, also describes situations in which loss, if it must be reallocated in the event of
uncollectibility of a judgment from one of the responsible parties,
such as the automobile owner or the principal, should be borne by
the remaining party, such as the automobile driver or the agent.
Loss will be shifted from the automobile owner/driver combination, or principal/agent, only if the judgment is uncollectible from
either party. Because of the inability to separate the fault of the
388. Compare MINN. STAT. § 604.02(1) (1978) wzth UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT
Acr § 2(c).
389. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2, Comment.
390. Id.
391. Su Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 104 N.W.2d
843 (1960) (rule 1), ()vn-ruled in part on othn- grounds, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255
N.w.2d 362 (1977).
392. Su Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 367 (Minn. 1977).
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parties, they are jointly responsible for their share of the judgment,
as determined by the comparative fault allocation.
Although the liability of a manufacturer and retailer may not be
deemed to be derivative or vicarious, the inclusion of such a case in
the comment indicates that the liability of the retailer and manufacturer should be considered joint. Treating the retailer/manufacturer combination like the principal/agent or
automobile owner/driver combinations, then, leads to the conclusion that loss will be reallocated to other parties in the litigation
only if neither the retailer nor the manufacturer are able to satisfy
their joint portion of the judgment. This concept is embodied in
section 604.02, subdivision 3 of the Minnesota Act, which provides
that in the event a portion of a judgment is uncollectible from a
party in the chain of distribution or manufacture, that portion
shall be reallocated to the other parties in the chain.
The comment, ifit were read as an intent in the Uniform Act to
provide for indemnity in chain of distribution cases, would be inconsistent with the statute's express purpose of apportioning loss,
according to the percentages of fault assessed against the parties,
whether the fault consists of negligence, strict liability, or breach of
warranty. The intent of the Uniform Act to abrogate the rule of
indemnity in products liability cases is bolstered by reference to
Professor Wade's comments indicating that one of the purposes of
the Uniform Act is to ease a manufacturer's burden by providing
for the shifting of loss from the manufacturer to other responsible
parties. 393 As applied to the Minnesota Act, this rationale would
seem to make clear the intent to override the rule of indemnity in
products liability cases. In the end, the argument rests upon the
inconsistency between a true comparative fault act and the rule of
indemnity, which, if applied, would of necessity override the comparative fault determination.
If indemnity is preserved following Tolbert it would be limited to
cases such as Sorenson 394 and Farr,395 in which the liability of the
retailer is based solely ori strict liability or breach of an express
warranty, and in which the warranty is not inconsistent with the
representation of safety inherent in the product. Because the definition of fault reaches all bases of liability, however, including
strict liability and breach of warranty, the clear implication of the
393. See' Wade, supra note 44, at 389.
394. Sorenson v. Safety Flate, Inc., 298 Minn. 353, 216 N.W.2d 859 (1974).
395. Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970).

HeinOnline -- 6 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 342 1980

1980)

THE ANA TOMY OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY

343

Minnesota Act would seem to be that even the limited reservation
of indemnity following Tolbert would have to give way.
The court's decision in Lambertson, abrogating the employer's
workers' compensation immunity from contribution claims, however, remains unchanged. In Lambertson the third party manufacturer and employer were both negligent. The Minnesota Act
makes it clear that a third party held liable on the basis of strict
liability or breach of warranty would also be entitled to contribution, a result that the supreme court made apparent by its decision
in Busch.

b.

Subdivision 2

Upon motion made not later than one year after judgment is
entered, the court shall determine whether all or part of a
party's equitable share of the obligation is uncollectible from
that party and shall reallocate any uncollectible amount among
the other parties, including a claimant at fault, according to
their respective percentages of fault. A party whose liability is
reallocated is nonetheless subject to contribution and to any
continuing liability to the claimant on the judgment. 396

Subdivision 2 of section 604.02 is a new provision providing for
loss reallocation in the event of uncollectibility of a judgment. If it
is determined, upon motion made not later than one year after
judgment is entered, that all or part of a party's equitable share of
the obligation is uncollectible from that party, the portion that is
uncollectible will be reallocated among the remaining parties to
the lawsuit, including the plaintiff. 397 The loss reallocation provision overrides the principle of joint and several liability to the extent that the uncollectible share of a defendant will not be borne
solely by the remaining defendant or defendants. An example will
clarify the operation of the section:
Assume that a plaintiff is found to be ten percent at fault,
defendant one is forty percent at fault, and defendant two is
fifty percent at fault.
396. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 8, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 840 (codified at MINN.
§ 604.02(2) (1978)).
397. This provision of the Minnesota Act is based on section 2(d) of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. The Uniform Act does not state how the determination of uncollectibility is to be made. It would seem to require a showing of more than nonpayment of the
defendant's share of the judgment. More probably, it would require a showing that the
usual creditors' remedies are ineffective because the defendant lacks assets that can be
reached.
STAT.
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Further assume that the damages sustained by the plaintiff are
$10,000. Assume also that defendant two is insolvent and his portion of the judgment is uncollectible, as established by motion of
defendant one. Under prior law, the plaintiff would be entitled to
collect $9,000, the total damages reduced by his percentage of
fault, from defendant two because of the effect of joint and several
liability.398 Because of the loss reallocation provision, however, defendant two's portion of the judgment, fifty percent of the damages ($5,000), must be reallocated among the plaintiff and
defendant one.
The plaintiff's and defendant one's equitable shares would be
ten percent and forty percent, respectively, providing a common
denominator of fifty percent. Defendant one would thus bear
four-fifths of the uncollectible $5,000, or $4,000. The remaining
$1,000 would be reallocated to the plaintiff. 399 Should defendant
two become solvent, he is subject to a contribution claim by defendant one and to continuing liability to the plaintiff on the judgment. 4OO
The reallocation provision, however, does not have any impact
on the principles governing liability at the outset. In order for a
defendant to be held liable, it will still be necessary to establish, as
required by section 604.02, subdivision 1, that the plaintiff's fault
was not greater than the fault of the defendant against whom recovery is sought. For example, if a plaintiff is found to be twentyfive percent at fault, defendant one is twenty percent at fault, and
defendant two is fifty-five percent at fault, the plaintiff will not be
entitled to recover against defendant one because the plaintiff's
fault is greater than the fault of defendant one. 401 Defendant two
will be required to pay the plaintiff seventy-five percent of plaintiff's damages, even though he is only fifty-five percent at fault.402
398. &e Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 624, § 1, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069, 1069 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 604.01(1978».
399. For other examples of how the reallocation provision would work, see UNIFORM
COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2, Comment.
400. See MINN. STAT. § 604.02(2) (1978).
401. &e id. § 604.01 (1).
402. In light of the reallocation provision, see ld. § 604.02.(2), it might seem anomalous
that defendant one's share of the judgment is not reallocated to the plaintiff as well as
defendant two. This would be the result under section 2(d) of the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act if the judgment could not be collected from defendant one. If there is reallocation in the event of uncollectibility, it would seem that there should be reallocation when
defendant one is not liable. It must be noted, however, that the Uniform Act is a pure
comparative fault act, and that defendant one would not escape liability because his fault
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No right of contribution would exist against defendant one because there is no common liability.403 The only exception would
be when aggregation is allowed. At least in the context of nonproducts liability cases, there will be no aggregation absent a joint
adventure or joint duty.404
In considering the impact of the reallocation provisions, it
should be remembered that in some cases, such as principal/agent
or automobile owner/driver, two defendants may in combination
be treated as a single party. Loss would be reallocated to the other
parties in the lawsuit only in the event that the percentage of the
judgment allocated to those combinations is not collectible from
either of the defendants in the combination.

c.

Subdivision 3

In the case of a claim arising from the manufacture, sale, use
or consumption of a product, an amount uncollectible from any
person in the chain of manufacture and distribution shall be
reallocated among all other persons in the chain of manufacture and distribution but not among the claimant or others at
fault who are not in the chain of manufacture or distribution of
the product. Provided, however, that a person whose fault is
less than that of a claimant is liable to the claimant only for
that portion of the judgment which represents the percentage
of fault attributable to him.405

Subdivision 3 of section 604.02 provides special rules for loss alis less than the fault of the plaintiff. Under MINN. STAT. § 604.01(1) (1978), defendant
one cannot be held liable because his fault is less than the fault of the plaintiff. Although
it could be argued that "uncollectibility" in rd. § 604.02(2) includes cases in which the
judgment is not collectible because of nonliability, the argument is invalid. The reallocation provision in the Minnesota Act was taken virtually verbatim from section 2(d) of the
Uniform Comparative Fault Act. As previously explained, under the Uniform Act the
problem of nonliabiity does not arise because it is a pure comparative fault act. "Uncollectibility" obviously was not intended to encompass nonliability. Thus, although it
would be equitable for defendant one's 20% of the judgment to be reallocated to the plaintiff as well as defendant two, the reallocation provision does not seem to be designed to
encompass uncollectibility because of nonliability.
403. Su Marier v. Memorial Rescue Serv., Inc., 296 Minn. 242, 207 N.W.2d 706
(1973).
404. Su Krengel v. Midwest Automatic Photo, Inc., 295 Minn. 200, 203 N.W.2d 841
(1973); notes 341-45 supra and accompanying text.
405. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 8, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 840 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 604.02(3) (1978)). Subdivision 3 does not have a direct parallel in the Uniform
Act. However, it appears that the Uniform Act does anticipate such a procedure, as indicated by the Comment to section 2 of the Act, providing that the liability of a retailer and
manufacturer can be considered together.
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location among defendants in the chain of manufacture and distribution in a products liability lawsuit. It differs from subdivision 2
in that any portion of a judgment that is uncollectible from a
party in the chain will be reallocated among other parties in the
chain, but not among parties outside the chain. To illustrate, assume the following example:
Plaintiff is twenty percent at fault. Defendant retailer is
thirty percent at fault and defendant manufacturer is fifty percent at fault. Damages are in the amount of $10,000.

If the judgment against either the retailer or manufacturer is uncollectible, that part of the loss would be reallocated to the other
party in the chain of distribution. The purpose of this unique rule
is to ensure that all parties in the chain of manufacture and distribution will insure against risks legitimately attributable to their
enterprises.
The most difficult issue in construing subdivision 3 is whether it
will be permissible to aggregate the fault of parties in the chain of
distribution. To illustrate, assume the following example:
Plaintiff is thirty percent at fault. Defendant retailer is
twenty percent at fault and defendant manufacturer is fifty
percent at fault. Damages are in the amount of $10,000.

If section 604.01, subdivision 1 is applied without qualification, the
defendant retailer would not be liable because his fault is less than
that of the plaintiff. Unlike subdivision 2 reallocation in nonproducts liability cases, however, subdivision 3 contains language
indicating that the retailer will be held liable.
Following the general rule on reallocation in products liability
cases, the last sentence of subdivision 3 states that a person whose
fault is less than that of the claimant will be held liable only for
that portion of the judgment representing the percentage of fault
attributable to him. This seems to encompass the situation in the
hypothetical in which the claimant's fault is greater than the retailer's.
Since, as a matter of statutory construction, a statute should be
read so as to give effect to all its provisions,406 it can be argued that
subdivision 3 creates a limited exception to the general rule, established in subdivision 1 of section 604.01, that a defendant cannot
be held liable if his fault is less than the fault of the plaintiff.
The legislative history of the Minnesota Act, however, makes
406. Su

MINN.

STAT. § 645.17 (1978).
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the argument spurious. Subdivision 3 of section 604.02 was constructed in stages. At the time the comparative fault bill came to
the floor of the Senate, subdivision 3 contained only the first sentence and subdivision 1 of section 604.01 was in a very different
form than the bill that passed. Instead of requiring a comparison
of the fault of the plaintiff to the fault of the person against whom
recovery is sought, the bill provided that a plaintiff would not be
barred from recovery so long as his fault was not equal to or
greater than the fault of the persons against whom recovery was
being sought. 407 The bill thus would have required a comparison
of the plaintiff's fault to the aggregate fault of all defendants involved, rather than to the fault of each individual defendant. In
the products liability context, as well as in tort cases in general, a
defendant whose fault was less than that of the plaintiff would
have been held liable.
With the bill in this form, the last sentence of subdivision 3 of
section 604.02 was added by an amendment introduced by Senator Coleman. 408 The amendment was a direct response to the impact the aggregation provision in the bill would have had on
products liability cases. 409 Senator Coleman's amendment would
not have avoided the liability of any such party in the chain of
distribution whose fault was less than the fault of the plaintiff, but
it would have limited it to no more than the party's percentage of
fault.
The Coleman amendment touched only products liability cases.
The aggregation principle in subdivision 1 of section 604.01 would
still have applied to the other torts cases. It was in response to this
problem as well as the problem of aggregation in the products liability context that Senator Sieloff offered to amend the aggregation language of subdivision 1 of section 604.01410 by substituting
the language that appears in the statute as enacted. 411 It requires
a comparison of the fault of the plaintiff to the fault of the person
against whom recovery is sought.
The Sieloff amendment, which was adopted, made the Coleman
amendment (the last sentence of subdivision 3) irrelevant because
407. &~
408. &~
409. &~
Sess. (Mar.
4\0. &~
411. &~

4 MINN. S.

JOUR.

5178 (1978).

ld.
Tap~

of D~ba/~ on H.F. 338 Befor~ Ih~ Minn~sola Sma/~, 70th Minn. Legis., 1978

16, 1978).
ld.

4 MINN. S.

JOUR.

5178 (1978).
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it eliminated the possibility that a defendant whose fault is less
than that of the plaintiff could be held liable. Although it is not
likely that the Sieloff amendment will always require a comparison
of the plaintiff's fault to the fault of each individual defendant, it
does eliminate the possiblity that the last sentence of subdivision 3
can be used as an argument that aggregation should usually be
permitted in the products liability context.
Following the Sieloff amendment, the bill was amended once
more. Senator Davies moved to amend section 604.01, subdivision
1, to provide that a plaintiff could recover as long as his fault was
not greater than the fault of the person against whom recovery is
sought. 412 The amendment ensures that a plaintiff whose fault is
equal to the fault of a defendant will be entitled to recover.
As constituted, it becomes apparent that the Minnesota Act tugs
in opposite directions. The broad definition of fault in subdivision
la of section 604.01 ensures that parties lower in the chain of distribut ion will bear a greater part of the responsibility in products
liability cases through elimination of the usual rule of indemnity,
and subdivision 3 ensures that all parties in the chain of manufacture and distribution will be responsible for any portion of a judgment uncollectible from any other party in the chain. On the
other hand, the Sieloff amendment limits the liability of parties in
the chain of distribution and manufacture when a party's fault is
greater than the fault of the plaintiff.
The exact impact of the Sieloff amendment is difficult to assess.
The amendment induced a substantial amount of debate. 413 A
reference to some of the perceived problems justifying the amendment may have a bearing on how the amendment should be read.
In illustrating the impact of the aggregation rule in the products
liability context, Senator Sieloff used examples that did not involve exclusively products liability actions. 414 As the debate wore
on, however, there was a strong sense of support for a nonaggregation rule specifically in the products liability context;415 the paradigm for discussion became the small retailer, less at fault than the
plaintiff, held liable for a small portion of a large judgment. 416
412. Set' id.; notes 355-57 supra and accompanying text.
413. Set' Tapt' oj'Dt'balt' on H.F 338 Bifou Iht' Minnt'sola Smalt' , 70th Minn. Legis., 1978
Sess. (Mar. 16, 1978).
414. SUld.
415. Set'ld.
416. Su ld.
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Even if the retailer's liability was limited in accordance with the
last sentence of subdivision 3 of section 604.02, it was recognized
that requiring the retailer to pay one or two percent of a large
judgment would impose a substantial burden on the retailer. 417
The limited scope of the evil addressed provides some insights
into the aggregation issue. In the first place, it is not likely that the
Sieloff amendment would disturb situations involving vicarious liability when the nature of the liability of two or more defendants
is such that there is no logical basis for dividing responsibility.
The obvious examples are cases involving master/servant or automobile owner/driver.
The Sieloff amendment should not be held to apply to situations
involving joint ventures, the substance of the supreme court's decision in Krengel D. Mzdwest Automatic Photo Supp{y) Inc. 418 This conclusion is supported by the discussion in the Senate floor debates
on the amendment. On several occasions there were indications of
a desire to maintain the law of aggregation as it was under the
'comparative negligence act. 419 Because aggregation was then permitted in cases involving joint ventures,420 there is no reason why
such decisions should not stand.
The Sieloff amendment will not affect situations in which the
retailer is held liable but is responsible for only a small portion of
the total judgment. If the retailer's fault is equal to or greater than
the fault of the plaintiff, the retailer will be jointly and severally
liable with the other defendants in the case. In addition, the first
sentence of subdivision 3 would be unaffected. It provides that loss
will be shifted from the parties in the chain of distribution only
when none of the parties in the chain can absorb the portion of the
judgment that the chain of distribution combination is liable for.
Other problems were not considered, including the problem of
the plaintiff who is denied recovery because of the complexity of
the marketing chain. Nor was consideration given to the case in
which there is an integral relationship between manufacturer and
distributor or dealer.
While it must be recognized that the aggregation problem in the
products liability context was considered in the floor debates, it
417. &.,.id.
418. 295 Minn. 200, 203 N.W.2d 841 (1973).
419. &.,. Tap.,. of D.,.bal.,. on H.F 338 &.fim ,h.,. Minnuo/a Smal.,., 70th Minn. Legis., 1978
Sess. (Mar. 16, 1978).
420. &.,. notes 336-51 supra and accompanying text.
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also must be recognized that the remedy in the form of the Sieloff
amendment was not based on a consideration of the variety of situations in which the problem will likely be presented. Given the
evil to be remedied by the legislation, it is arguable that it would
be inappropriate to expand the remedy beyond the problem of the
independent retailer being held liable for a small percentage of a
large judgment.
Although as a general rule aggregation will not be permitted,
there should be latitude in creating exceptions. Certainly, there
should be an exception in cases in which there is a joint adventure.
Less certainly, cases involving intimate tie-ins of parties in the
chain should be covered. Beyond that, the nonaggregation rule
should control, given the absence of any principled basis for limiting the rule.
3.

Summary

The Minnesota Act makes significant changes in the comparative negligence law, even as modified in Busch and Tolbert. With
its expanded definition of fault, the Minnesota Act takes into consideration all forms of negligent or reckless misconduct. It includes
strict liability and breach of warranty.
The impact of the Minnesota Act on Busch is apparent. The
. statute overrides the Busch exception of contributory negligence
consisting of failure to discover a defect. Aside from the impact on
that specific exception, the Minnesota Act seems to be consistent
with the approach to defenses taken by the court in Busch. The
Minnesota Act also changes the law of contribution and indemnity. Implied indemnity in products liability cases is no longer the
rule. To the extent that Tolbert can be read as preserving indemnity in cases involving nonnegligent, passive conduct on the part of
a party lower in the chain of distribution, that exception would be
overridden.
Aside from adopting a broad approach to fault allocation, the
Minnesota Act makes new changes in the law governing the reallocation of loss in cases in which judgments are uncollectible from
one or more defendants. Although the rule of joint and several
liability is maintained in the statute, in cases involving the uncollectibility of a judgment from one or more defendants, the defendant's share will be reallocated among all parties to the litigation,
including the plaintiff. Because fault, irrespective of the theory of
recovery is now compared under the Minnesota Act, the statute

HeinOnline -- 6 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 350 1980

1980)

THE ANATOMY OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY

351

attempts to ensure the fairest allocation of loss by reqUlrmg all
responsible parties to the litigation to bear the risk of uncollectibility of a judgment according to their percentages of fault.
In products liability cases, the rule differs. If a portion of a judgme~t is uncollectible from a party in the chain of manufacture and
distribution, that portion of the judgment will be reallocated only
among other parties in the chain.
In the products liability context, one of the principal questions
raised by the Minnesota Act is whether the fault of parties in the
chain of distribution can under any circumstances be aggregated.
The legislative history does not provide a clear answer to that
question. The answer will be worked out in individual cases, keeping in mind not only the purposes of strict tort liability but the
intent to limit the responsibility of product sellers.

E

The J980 Legislation

At the end of the most recent session of the Legislature, a statute
was enacted limiting the liability of nonmanufacturers in products
liability suits.421 In order to understand just exactly what impact
the statute will have on loss allocation it is necessary to understand
the operation and effect of the statute. The statute reads as follows:
Subdivision 1. In any product liability action based in
whole or in part on strict liability in tort commenced or maintained against a defendant other than the manufacturer, that
party shall upon answering or otherwise pleading file an affidavit certifying the correct identity of the manufacturer of the
product allegedly causing injury, death or damage. The commencement of a product liability action based in whole or part
on strict liability in tort against a certifying defendant shall toll
the applicable statute of limitation relative to the defendant for
purposes of asserting a strict liability in tort cause of action.
Subd. 2. Once the plaintiff has filed a complaint against a
manufacturer and the manufacturer has or is required to have
answered or otherwise pleaded, the court shall order the dismissal of a strict liability in tort claim against the certifying defendant, provided the certifying defendant is not within the
categories set forth in subdivision 3. Due diligence shall be ex421. Su Act of Apr. 24, 1980, ch. 614, § 156, 1980 Minn. Sess. Law Servo 1256, 1323
(West) (to be codified as MINN. STAT. § 544.41). The effective date of the statute was the
day following enactment, April 25, 1980. &e itl. § 192, 1980 Minn. Sess. Law Servo at 1337
(West).
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ercised by the certifying defendant in providing the plaintiff
with the correct identity of the manufacturer and due diligence
shall be exercised by the plaintiff in filing a law suit and obtaining jurisdiction over the manufacturer.
The plaintiff may at any time subsequent to dismissal move
to vacate the order of dismissal and reinstate the certifying defendant, provided plaintiff can show one of the following:
(a) That the applicable statute of limitation bars the assertion of a strict liability in tort cause of action against the manufacturer of the product allegedly causing the injury, death or
damage;
(b) That the identity of the manufacturer given to the plaintiff by the certifying defendant was incorrect. Once the correct
identity of the manufacturer has been given by the certifying
defendant the court shall again dismiss the certifying defendant;
(c) That the manufacturer no longer exists, cannot be subject
to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, or, despite due diligence, the manufacturer is not amenable to service of process;
(d) That the manufacturer is unable to satisfy any judgment
as determined by the court; or
(e) That the court determines that the manufacturer would
be unable to satisfy a reasonable settlement or other agreement
with plaintiff.
Subd. 3. A court shall not enter a dismissal order relative to
any certifying defendant even though full compliance with subdivision 1 has been made where the plaintiff can show one of
the following:
(a) That the defendant has exercised some significant control
over the design or manufacture of the product, or has provided
instructions or warnings to the manufacturer relative to the alleged defect in the product which caused the injury, death or
damage;
(b) That the defendant had actual knowledge of the defect in
the product which caused the injury, death, or damage; or
(c) That the defendant created the defect in the product
which caused the injury, death or damage.
Subd. 4. Nothing contained in subdivisions 1 to 3 shall be
construed to create a cause of action in strict liability in tort or
based on other legal theory, or to affect the right of any person
to seek and obtain indemnity or contribution. 422
422. Id. The statute was passed as section 156 of a 192 section appropriations bill, on
April 11, 1980, without benefit of Senate hearings. &e MINN. H.R. JOUR. 7278 (1980);
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The obvious purpose of the Act is to limit the liability of
nonmanufacturer defendants in products liability cases. 423 The
Act applies to product liability actions based in whole or in part
on strict liability in tort. A nonmanufacturer defendant against
whom a strict liability claim is asserted is entitled to dismissal of
the strict liability claim upon certifying by affidavit in a responsive
pleading the name of the product manufacturer. 424
MINN. s. JOUR. 6828 (1980). The manner in which the bill was enacted puts the constitutionality of the bill in question under MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 17, which provides that
"No law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title."
423. The Minnesota statute was taken virtually verbatim from Illinois. See Act of
Sept. 24, 1979, Pub. Act. No. 81-1056, 1979 III. Legis. Servo 2753 (West) (to be codified as
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 801-804 (Smith-Hurd». The underlying concept is similar to
statutes in Nebraska, SI!!! NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 181 (Cum. Supp. 1978) and Tennessee.
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3706(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979). The concept is also integrated in
the Model Act:
(A) A product seller, other than a manufacturer, is subject to liability to a
claimant who proves by a preponderance of the evidence that claimant's harm
was proximately caused by such product seller's failure to use reasonable care
with respect to the product.
Before submitting the case to the trier of fact, the court shall determine that
the claimant has introduced sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable person to
find by a preponderance of the evidence that such product seller has failed to
exercise reasonable care and that this failure was a proximate cause of the claimant's harm.
In determining whether a product seller, other than a manufacturer, is subject to liability under Subsection (A), the trier of fact shall consider the effect of
such product seller's own conduct with respect to the design, construction, inspection, or condition of the product, and any failure of such product seller to
transmit adequate warnings or instructions about the dangers and proper use of
the product.
Unless Subsection (B) or (C) is applicable, product sellers shall not be subject to liability in circumstances in which they did not have a reasonable opportunity to inspect the product in a manner which would or should, in the exercise
of reasonable care, reveal the existence of the defective condition.
(B) A product seller, other than a manufacturer, who makes an express warranty about a material fact or facts concerning a product is subject to the standards of liability set forth in Subsection 104(D).
(C) A product seller, other than a manufacturer, is also subject to the liability of manufacturer under Section 104 if:
(1) The manufacturer is not subject to service of process under the laws of
the claimant's domicile; or
(2) The manufacturer has been judicially declared insolvent in that the
manufacturer is unable to pay its debts as they become due in the ordinary
course of business; or
(3) The court determines that it is highly probable that the claimant would
be unable to enforce a judgment against the product manufacturer.
(D) Except as provided in Subsections (A), (B), and (C), a product seller,
other than a manufacturer, shall not otherwise be subject to liability under this
Act.
MODEL ACT § 105, repnnted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,726.
424. See Act of Apr. 24, 1980, ch. 614, § 156, 1980 Minn. Sess. Law Servo 1256, 1323
(West) (to be codified as MINN. STAT. § 544.41 (2».
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It seems clear from the Act that certification of the name of the
product manufacturer only entitles the certifying defendant to dismissal of the strict liability claim, not necessarily dismissal of the
entire suit. If, in addition to the strict liability claim, the plaintiff
alleges negligence or breach of express warranty or implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, only the strict liability
claim should be dismissed.
If there is a dismissal of the strict liability claim, the plaintiff
may "at any time subsequent to dismissal move to vacate" the dismissal order and reinstate the certifying defendant, if the plaintiff
establishes one of five conditions: (1) that the applicable statute of
limitations has run on the strict liability claim against the manufacturer; (2) that the certifying defendant has provided the plaintiff with the wrong manufacturer's name, although dismissal
would again be appropriate if the right name is provided; (3) if the
manufacturer no longer exists, is not subject to jurisdiction in Minnesota, or if the manufacturer is not amenable to service of process,
despite the exercise of due diligence by the plaintiff; (4) if the manufacturer is unable to satisfy any judgment as determined by the
court; or (5) if the court determines that the manufacturer would
not be able to satisfy a reasonable settlement or other agreement
with the plaintiff. 425

Subdivision 3 provides that a dismissal order shall not be entered, despite compliance by the certifying defendant with subdivision 1, if the plaintiff can show one of three specified conditions:
(1) "the defendant has exercised some significant control over the
design or manufacture of the product, or has provided instructions
or warnings to the manufacturer relative to the alleged defect in
the product . . . . "; (2) the defendant had actual knowledge of the
defect; or (3) the defendant created the defect. 426
The most plausible construction of subdivision 4 is that other
substantive rights are not to be affected by the Act. The statute
should, however, have an impact on contribution claims asserted
by a manufacturer. Under the Minnesota Act, contribution is the
usual vehicle for the allocation of loss among parties in the chain
of distribution, irrespective of the theory of recovery under which
those parties are held liable. To the extent that the 1980 statute
limits the liability of nonmanufacturers, however, the broad prin425. Id.
426. Id. (to be codified as MINN. STAT. § 544.41(3».
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ciple of comparative responsibility established in the Minnesota
Act will be narrowed. If, in situations in which a manufacturer is
joined or is subject to suit, the nonmanufacturer is not subject to
liability under a strict liability theory, a manufacturer should be
precluded from obtaining contribution against the nonmanufacturer if the sole basis for the contribution claim is that the
nonmanufacturer is strictly liable to the plaintiff. Because a
nonmanufacturer cannot be held liable on a strict liability theory,
the common liability impediment would preclude contribution. 427
If the contribution right is not limited, so as to allow a manufacturer to obtain contribution upon establishing the liability of the
nonmanufacturer on a strict liability claim, the legislative intent to
limit the liability of those defendants would be subverted. Accordingly, the new Act should be an impediment not only to the assertion of strict liability claims by plaintiffs against nonmanufacturer.
defendants but also to the assertion of such claims by manufacturers seeking to establish contribution claims against those defendants.428
427. St't' Conde v. City of Spring Lake Park, 290 N.W.2d 164, 165 (Minn. 1980); Hart
v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 276 N.W.2d 166, 168-69 (Minn. 1979).
428. Although the concept underlying the statute may be sound, it i$ a procedural
nightmare. There are a variety of problems created by the statute. Subdivision 2 states
that once the plaintiff has filed a complaint against a manufacturer and the manufacturer
has or is required to have answered or otherwise pleaded, the court shall order the dismissal of a strict liability in tort claim against the certifying defendant, provided the certifying defendant is not within the categories set forth in subdivision 3. Set' Act of Apr. 24,
1980, ch. 614, § 156, 1980 Minn. Sess. Law Servo 1256, 1323 (West) (to be codified as
MINN. STAT. § 544.41 (2». Subdivision 2 goes on to say that the plaintiff may at any time
"subsequent to dismissal" move to vacate the order of dismissal and reinstate the certifying defendant, provided plaintiff can show one of the specified conditions. Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of proof of establishing the conditions. Id. Problems will invariably
arise in determining just exactly what kind of showing the plaintiff must make in order to
justify reinstatement.
Proof that the statute of limitations has run against the manufacturer should be relatively easy to satisfy. Proof of the other conditions will undoubtedly be more complicated.
Establishing that the manufacturer no longer exists appears to be a relatively simple requirement, but it does not take into consideration the problem of the liabilility of successor
corporations. Set', t'.g., Leannais V. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977); Ray V.
Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977); Turner v. Bituminous
Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976). If a successor corporation would be held
liable on a strict liability claim would the statute apply if the original manufacturer has
ceased to do business, or would the presence of the successor be sufficient to bar the plaintiff from asserting a strict liability claim against the nonmanufacturer?
Deciding whether the manufacturer is subject to jurisdiction in Minnesota is also
likely to present problems. Will the plaintiff be able to satisfy the burden short of serving
the manufacturer and waiting for the manufacturer to move to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction? If it will not be necessary for the plaintiff to actually serve the manufacturer,
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CONCLUSION

The principles of loss allocation in Minnesota have been the
the plaintiff will be placed in the curious position of attempting to establish facts sufficient
to disprove personal jurisdiction, something the plaintiff is ordinarily required to prove
affirmatively. If, for tactical reasons, the plaintiff has determined that the claim against
the manufacturer does not justify suit against the manufacturer it would seem unreasonable to require the plaintiff to serve the defendant and await a motion to dismiss as a
condition to reinstatement of the certifying defendant.
The due diligence aspect should present fewer problems. If service cannot be obtained after reasonable efforts, the plaintiff should readily be able to establish the efforts
expended in attempting to obtain service on the manufacturer.
The final two factors are likely to present the greatest difficulty. The certifying defendant will be reinstated if the plaintiff can show "[t]hat the manufacturer is unable to
satisfy any judgment as determined by the court" or "that the manufacturer would be
unable to satisfy a reasonable settlement or other agreement with plaintiff." S<!'<!' Act of
Apr. 24, 1980, ch. 614, § 156,1980 Minn. Sess. Law Servo 1256, 1323 (West) (to be codified
as MINN. STAT. § 544.41 (2) (d)-(e)). Can the plaintiff establish by pretrial motion that the
manufacturer would be unable to satisfy any judgment or must the case be litigated and
an attempt made to collect on the judgment before the condition is satisfied? If a pretrial
resolution is allowed it will be necessary not only for the plaintiff to discover information
concerning the financial status of the defendant but the likely damages to be awarded.
Because of the problems likely to arise in obtaining discovery of information concerning
the manufacturer's financial status, and the uncertainty involved in predicting the
amount of plaintitrs damages, pretrial resolution would be difficult and time consuming.
If the plaintiff fails to establish that the manufacturer is not able to satisfy any judgment,
the case would have to be litigated. If, after judgment, the manufacturer is in fact not
able to satisfy the judgment the plaintiff would, at that point, be entitled to have the
certifying defendant reinstated. In all likelihood, several years will have passed. In addition, because the certifying defendant has been dismissed, the plaintiff would have to reprove his case against the retailer. The result is suspect in light of the supreme court's
decision in Haugen v. Town of Waltham, No. 49964 (Minn. March 28, 1980), holding
unconstitutional a portion of the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act because
it failed to satisfy MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8, which provides that "Every person is entitled
to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive to his
person, property or character, and to obtain justice freely and without purchase, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformable to the laws." In
Haugm the court referred in particular to the requirement that there be "a certain remedy
in the laws" which shall "completely" allow a person to obtain justice. No. 49964, slip op.
at 5. The specific provision of the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile' Insurance Act at issue
was MINN. STAT. § 65B.51(1) (1978), which required an offset from any tort recovery not
only for basic economic loss benefits paid or payable, but also for benefits "which will be
payable in the future." Id. As the supreme court noted:
the no-fault carrier of the successful plaintiff in this case is not a party to the
action. Thus, the plaintiff has no assurance that his insurance carrier will accept
the amount of damages awarded, let alone that it will accept responsibility for
such damages. If the no-fault carrier contests these matters, then the successful
plaintiff must relitigate his claim under the arbitration provisions of his policy.
No. 49964, slip op. at 5. Finding that "the constitution seems to contemplate a single
remedy and not a series of remedies," id., the court held the provision unconstitutional.
Id., slip op. at 5-6. Suffice it to say that similar problems appear to exist with the products
liability legislation.
A potential remedy for the problem through construction may exist. The Model Act
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subject of recent judicial and legislative modification. The controlling principles depend on whether the cause of action arose
before the passage of the comparative fault act. If before, the principles depend on the supreme court's position on the retroactivity
of its decisions.
Although there are important differences between pre-comparative fault act and post-act loss allocation principles, the Minnesota
takes the position that the nonmanufacturer will be subject to a strict liability claim if
"[t)he manufacturer has been judicially declared insolvent in that the manufacturer is
unable to pay its debts as they become due in the ordinary course of business." MODEL
ACT § 105(C)(2), repnnted In 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,726. If the Minnesota statute is similarly
interpreted, at least some of the pretrial uncertainty would be removed and the plaintiff
would be presented with a more objective standard that could be more readily satisfied.
The same problems are presented with respect to the final condition of subdivision 2,
that the manufacturer would be unable to satisfy a reasonable settlement or other agreement with the plaintiff. The vagueness of the standard is a good argument for a more
certain standard. Again, the Model Act could provide a potential solution.
If the plaintiff is able to show that one of the conditions set forth in subdivision 3 of
the statute is met, the strict liability claim against the certifying defendant would not be
dismissed. All of the conditions are likely to present factual issues that will be difficult to
resolve in a pretrial proceeding. It is clear that the plaintiff has the burden of showing one
of the conditions. It is unclear just exactly what the burden entails. Does the plaintiff
have to prove the conditions by a preponderance of the evidence? If so, it is difficult to see
how the burden could be met in a hearing without violating plaintiff's constitutional right
to trial by jury. See MINN: CaNsT. art. I, § 4. It would be absurd to require a virtual
pretrial trial on the merits to determine if the plaintiff can assert a strict liability claim
againt the certifying defendant. If pretrial trial on the merits would not be feasible, as it
most certainly would not be, the statute poses a dilemma. If there is uncertainty as to the
conditions, the plaintiff should be given the benefit of the doubt. In a sense, a reverse
summary judgment standard would be workable. If there is a genuine dispute as to a
material fact, which would be sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment, then
the case should proceed to trial on the strict liability issue.
Application of any other standard is likely to lead to additional problems. If a stricter
standard is imposed on the plaintiff, so that the strict liability claim, and perhaps the
entire claim against the defendant, is dismissed, the plaintiff could well be placed in a
position in which it would be impossible to establish his case against a manufacturer. As
an example, in a case in which it is not clear which of the parties in the chain of distribution introduced the defect into the product, the absence of the nonmanufacturer defendant may make it difficult for the plaintiff to prove the critical fact of where the defect
arose. At the very least, the plaintiff's burden would be complicated by the absence from
the suit of the nonmanufacturer defendant, because of discovery .limitations.
In response to this problem, the Model Act has suggested that "[t)he non-manufacturer product seller be treated as a party for the purposes of discovery under the applicable procedural code. If this step is not taken, the Act may place an undue burden on the
claimant in his or her attempt to prove the case." MODEL ACT § 105, Analysis, rl!pnnted In
44 Fed. Reg. at 62,727.
Overall, it seems clear that the procedures required by the statute will be cumbersome and time consuming. If the procedures are judicially interpreted in a fashion consistent with the treatment in the Model Act, however, at least some of the major problems.
can be minimized.
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Supreme Court took the law to the brink of a full comparative
fault system with its decisions in Busch D. Busch Construction) Inc. ,429
Tolbert D. Gerber Industnils) Inc. ,430 and Lambertson D. Cincinnati Corp. 43\
Each of the decisions introduces new rules of loss allocation and
each creates new problems of interpretation.
The critical questions left open by Busch concern the interpretation of the specified defenses to strict liability claims, the method
of loss allocation in strict liability cases, the interpretation of the
Busch exception, and the relationship of strict liability defenses to
the defenses to negligence and warranty theories. In understanding the treatment of the separate defenses set out by the court,
reference to the treatment of those defenses under negligence theory provides assistance. The same merger of defenses that has
taken place under the court's decision in Springrose D. Willmore 432
should be applied to strict liability defenses. This has the virtue of
providing a consistent treatment of defenses for two of the potential theories of recovery. The similarity of strict tort and warranty,
when the damage consists of personal injury or property damage,
leads to the easy conclusion that the defenses to all three theories
should be the same. For purposes of consistency, the Busch exception should also be applicable irrespective of which theory of recovery the plaintiff relies upon. A consistent approach to the
defenses to products liability claims also points toward the method
of loss allocation to be used. Although there are a variety of potential approaches to that question, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that it really is fault that is being compared, no matter how
the process is characterized. The comparison should prove to be
workable, just as the comparison of negligence has worked in Minnesota over the past decade.
The final question, that of interpreting the Busch exception, is
not readily answerable, at least if the search is for some definitive
means of resolving cases in which the exception will arise. The
important point is to understand how the exception operates in
relation to other types of plaintiff misconduct. Beyond that, the
only thing that can be done is to set out clearly the exception and
leave it to the trier of fact to resolve.
The contribution and indemnity decisions of the court also cre429.
430.
431.
432.

262
255
312
292

N.w.2d 377 (Minn. 1977).
N.w.2d 362 (Minn. 1977).
Minn. 114,257 N.w.2d 679 (1977).
Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971).
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ate interpretive problems. The principal question involved in interpreting Tolbert is to decide just how far the decision goes in
abrogating indemnity in favor of contribution. On its face, Tolbert
extends only to situations in which the retailer and manufacturer
are negligent. Tolbert and Busch, read in tandem, take the majority
rule one step further, to situations in which the retailer is negligent
and the manufacturer strictly liable. The rationale of the opinion
does not, however, extend beyond such situations. When the contribution rule applies, the same comparative fault principles applied in apportioning loss among a plaintiff and defendant should
be equally applicable in apportioning loss among defendants.
The primary question raised by the court's opinion in Lambertson is whether the court intended f~r its opinion to be read so as to
create the possibility that an employer will be subjected to liability
beyond its actual workers' compensation liability. Although the
basic concept established in Lambertson is defensible, the apparent
extension of that concept by Johnson lJ. Raske Budding Systems~ Inc. 433
may not be. Because the employer's right to share in the proceeds
of a tort judgment must be filtered through the statute governing
the distribution of tort judgments between an employer and employee, it is possible for an employer to receive less than it is required to payout on the third party's contribution claim, thus
creating the likelihood that in most situations, the employer will
be required to pay more than its workers' compensation liability.
The approach suggested in this Article has been to avoid the
undesirable consequence of such an extension by adopting a rule
that would restrict the employer's net liability to its workers' compensation liability, an approach that the supreme court seemed to
adopt initially in Lambertson. It is an approach that does the least
violence to the workers' compensation act, pending legislative resolution of the problem of third party claims.
The comparative negligence act and the new law established by
the supreme court in its recent loss allocation decisions are in turn
altered by the comparative fault act. The Minnesota Act changes
the percentage of fault necessary to block a plaintiff's recovery.
Under the comparative negligence act a plaintiff would not be
barred from recovery unless his negligence was equal to or greater
than the negligence of the defendant. Under the Minnesota Act, a
433. 276 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1979).
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plaintiff's fault must be greater than the fault of the defendant in
order to bar his recovery.
The Minnesota Act should not alter the method of loss allocation adopted in Busch. It would, however, eliminate the exception
carved out in Busch for plaintiff misconduct consisting of failure to
discover a product defect. The broad definition of fault set out in
the statute also makes it likely that whatever vestiges of the indemnity rule remain following Tolbert will be eliminated, imposing increased responsibility on parties lower in the chain of distribution.
Consistent with this purpose, the Minnesota Act's provision on loss
reallocation in products liability cases ensures that greater responsibility will be borne by parties in the chain of manufacture and
distribution by imposing the risk of uncollectibility of the judgment from any of the parties in the chain on the remaining parties
in the chain. That principle is modified to a limited extent by the
1980 products liability legislation limiting the liability of
nonmanufacturer defendants to theories of recovery other than
strict liability, unless the manufacturer is not subject to suit or is
not financially responsible.
Both the court's loss allocation decisions and the Minnesota Act
create potentially perplexing problems of interpretation. Some of
the apparent complexity in the decisions and statute are due to
new terminology. The newness of the idea rubs off quickly, however, if it is recognized that the defenses to strict liability claims
and the methods of loss allocation among all parties to products
liability litigation are not radically different from what has already
been done in warranty and negligence law.
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